THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014745
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 14, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 14, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 511(1112M)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 14, 1975
Table of Contents
Cambodia: A government task force has begun moving
into position for &renewed effort to retake
Tuol Leap. (Page 1)
China-Cambodia: The Chinese appear to be moving to
gain maximum influence over postwar develop-
ments in Cambodia. (Page 2)
'USSR: A Soviet strategic specialist has suggested
some new propositions about reducing strategic
weapons. (Page 3)
USSR: A lengthened variant of the D-class ballistic
missile submarine was launched early this year.
(Page 5)
USSR-CSCE: The Soviets ? push for a speedy conclu-
sion to the European Security Conference
appears to be having an effect on the West
Europeans. (Page 6)
Portugal: Leftist-attacks have-left conservative
-----political-parties near total disarray. (Page 7)
Notes: South Vietnam; Iraq; Saudi Arabia; Turkey
(Pages 8 and 9)
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
Oudong
'5574.73 3-75
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CAMBODIA
A 12-battalion government task force
began moving into position yesterday for
a renewed effort to retake TuoZ Leap.
Initial reports this morning indicate it
is making limited progress.
Government aircraft and artillery have been
softening up the area for the past two days. Thus
far, however, the government ground thrust and the
increased air and artillery strikes have failed to
halt insurgent shelling of Pochentong Airport. The
destruction of a small ammunition dump on the civil-
ian side of the airfield yesterday slightly damaged
the airport tower and halted the airlift. Flights
from Saigon resumed this morning.
The Australian government yesterday announced
that it will close its embassy in Phnom Penh. Aus-
tralian aircraft will evacuate all diplomatic per-
sonnel and some Australian civilians to Bangkok on
Saturday. Singapore yesterday ordered its diplo-
mats to evacuate. Israel is the only other nation
thus far to have pulled out of Phnom Penh. A num-
ber of embassies are operating with skeleton staffs.
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CHINA-CAMBODIA
Chinese propaganda on the Cambodian
fighting this year, although not volu-
minous, shows that Peking is trying to
retain all possible points of leverage in
a postwar Cambodia, almost certainly in
order to counter both North Vietnamese
influence and the possibility of a future
Soviet position there.
The Chinese may still be trying to catch up
with a situation that has moved considerably faster
over the past few months than they had anticipated.
During he first years of the war, the Chinese
viewed Prince Sihanouk as the most promising chan-
nel of influence in Cambodia after the fighting
ended. They clearly recognize now, however, that
Sihanouk's influence over developments there has
sharply diminished along with the chances for a
compromise settlement in which Sihanouk would play
a key balancing role.
Chinese unwillingness to abandon Sihanouk com-
pletely suggests, however, that Peking is not fully
confident of the strength and reliability of its
relatively new links with the Khmer communists. In
a step aimed at improving these ties, Peking signed
a military aid agreement with insurgent leader Khieu
Samphan last year. Efforts toward this end will un-
doubtedly continue.
Peking's sensitivities to the question of its
influence in Cambodia may also explain--at least in
part--the current visit of a high-level military
delegation to Hanoi. Although purely bilateral
Sino-Vietnamese issues are being discussed, the
situation in Cambodia almost certainly has been
included on the agenda.
The Chinese may have urged on the North Viet-
namese a postwar role for Sihanouk more substantial
than that of a titular head of state. Neither the
North Vietnamese nor the Khmer Communists would
welcome such suggestions.
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USSR
- L. S. Semeyko, specialist in strat-
egy at Moscow's USA Institute, has sug-
gested to US officials that the USSR
could reduce the aggregate ceilings on
its strategic weapons by as much as
30 percent in the aftermath of a SALT
II agreement.
The Soviet-specialist:went on to say, however,
that reductions beyond this could not be made with-
out-reference to the nuclear forces of China, the
UK, and France and that negotiations-on-the reduc-
tions could begin immediately following signing of
a SALT II agreement.
Semeykojs propositions go far beyond the offi7
cial Soviet position, which makes-no reference to
percentage-of-reductions-, envisions-reductions only
after 1980, and is heavily hedged-with statements
about the need for reducing nuclear weapons in
third countries, as well as-in-US forward-based
systems.
Members of the USA Institute do not hold
policy-making positions, nor do their views nec-
essarily reflect those of the leadership. In the
past, opinions offered by institute members have
not become official Soviet positions. The insti-
tute does appear to have a significant advisory
role, however, and the ideas of its members may be
representative of at least one school of informed
opinion.
Semeyko made his comments last week in two
conversations with US officials involved in arms
limitation negotiations. On the second occasion,
two other members of the USA Institute were pres-
ent. All three seemed to be making a special ef-
fort to demonstrate Soviet interest in additional
progress on arms control. For example, Semeyko
observed that the USSR would not reach its allowed
MIRV ceiling of 1,320 until well into the ten-year
SALT II treaty, and could therefore accept a reduc-
tion in the MIRV ceiling without having to disman-
tle existing systems.
(continued)
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The Soviet specialist also raised the subject
of mobile ICBMs, asserting that the USSR is less
interested in them than the US. He quoted the com-
mander of the strategic rocket forces to the effect
that the USSR does not intend to build mobile ICBMs.
When pressed on the discrepancy between this posi-
tion and the Soviet stance at SALT I, Semeyko re-
plied, "Maybe our position has changed."
We have evidence that the Soviets are develop-
ing a mobile ICBM.
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USSR
A lengthened variant of the D-class
ballistic-missile submarine was launched
at the Severodvinsk shipyard early this
year.
the submarine, which is now being fitted
out, is about 50 feet longer than
the standard D-class. The extra length was added
in the missile bay area.
the submarine
is believed to be designed to carry at least 16
SS-N-8 missiles. The standard D-class carries 12.
of these missiles, which have a 4,200-mile range.
Based on the number of hull sections seen at
the construction hall we.
estimate the Soviets will build another eight or
nine of the lengthened submarines.
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USSR -CSCE
The Soviets' push for a speedy con-
clusion to the European security confer-
ence appears to be having an effect on
the West Europeans.
General Secretary Brezhnev has sent letters
to leaders of major Western countries proposing
a summit-level meeting on June 30 as-a finale to
the conference. This is the first time the So-
viets have suggested a specific date, and the tim-
ing suggests that they would like-to have the se-
curity conference out of the way before Brezhnev
visits the US.
Several of the participants at the EC summit
meeting in Dublin this week expressed the view
that the West should take advantage of Brezhnev's
personal commitment to detente.
The West Europeans are not prepared at this
time, however, to pay an exorbitant price to bring
the conference to an end. While they are willing
to study where further concessions might be made,
the statement approved by the Nine favors a con-
clusion of the conference "at an early date and at
the highest level" only if "balanced and satisfac-
tory results" on all agenda items are achieved.
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PORTUGAL
Attacks by extreme leftists have
brought conservative political parties
to near total disarray. Non-communist
parties of the left are also increas-
ingly discouraged by the actions of the
military and the extremist violence.
While the roundup of military officers and
civilians alleged to have been involved in the coup
attempt continued yesterday, President Costa Gomes
told the nation in a televised speech that the core
of opposition to the new political-social conditions
still exists. He said that a thorough investiga-
tion is under way which would uncover "the enemy of
the people and the Armed Forces Movement."
The conservative Social Democratic Center and
the Christian Democratic parties may be outlawed.
Yesterday, a Christian Democratic leader was accused
of complicity in the coup attempt on Tuesday; many
of the party's leaders are reported to have fled to
Spain. The hopes of the moderate leftist parties
of recouping some of their losses by taking part in
the constituent assembly election next month appear
increasingly futile in view of the increasing domi-
nance of leftists in the government and the growing
extremist violence.
Socialist Foreign Minister Soares has confided
to Ambassador Carlucci that the effect of giving
broader powers to the military is to push the-polit-
ical parties outside the power spectrum. He said
the parties now had to determine whether it was
worthwhile participating in the political process.
the Portuguese Democratic Movement, a
communist front, will join the government when the
cabinet is reshuffled.
Several members of
and industrial families
inent businessmen
tamed for short
may presage more
vate sector.
parties is
tions against wealthy Portuguese
Portugal's leading banking
have been arrested. Prom-
in recent months have been de-
periods, but the arrests this time
serious intervention in the pri-
The most extreme of the far left
planning terrorist ac-
Spain, anticipating a request from the Portu-
guese government for the extradition of former
president Spinola, is increasingly embarrassed by
Spinola's presence. Spain would welcome an offer
from a third country to grant asylum to the former
general. The Brazilian foreign ministry has denied
reports that Spinola had requested asylum there.
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NOTES
Heavy fighting continues in all four military
regions of South : Vietnam,
Government counterattacks are spurring sharp
fighting in the northernmost provinces; the most
severe battles are near Hue. Reinforcements are
continuing to arrive around Ban Me Thuot, in prep-
aration for an attempt to force the communists out
of the provincial capital. Government forces have
made little progress in reopening the roads linking
the highlands with the coast.
The Iraqi? government and the rebel Kurds ap-
parently agreed to a cease-fire yesterday morning.
According to Baghdad radio, the truce will
lapse at the end of the month and Iraqi forces will
resume their offensive, presumably against any re-
maining Kurds who have not surrendered or sought
refuge in Iran. The Iraqis had earlier offered
amnesty to those Kurdish tribesmen who would sur-
render before April 1. On Wednesday, however, the
Iraqi Baath Party newspaper stated that the only -
solution to the Kurdish rebellion was "final liqui-
dation."
In a possible prelude to revaluation, the
Saudi- Arabian Monetary Agency yesterday sharply
limited trading in the riyal.
Bankers generally believe the government will
revalue the riyal, which is tied to the dollar, to
alleviate inflationary pressures at home. A re-
valued riyal would have no direct bearing on oil
prices, since those prices are primarily quoted in
dollars rather than the currency of the exporting
country. A decision to revalue, particularly if
the riyal were linked with the special drawing
rights of the International Monetary Fund, could
provide support for those OPEC members who wish
to quote oil.prices in terms of a "basket" of cur-
rencies.
(continued)
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Turkish President Koruturk has asked Bulent
Ecevit, chairman of the Republican People's Party,
to return home from a European tour, rousing specu-
lation that Ecevit will be asked to form a govern-
ment.
Koruturk's summons to Ecevit follows Prime
Minister Irmak's decision to abandon his effort to
form a coalition government. Koruturk will meet
today with senior politicians. Ecevit returns home
tomorrow.
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