THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 MARCH 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014740
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 8, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
March 8, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category, 5fi( I ),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
March 8, 1975
Table of Contents
South Vietnam: Heavy fighting continues in the
central highlands with indications that inten-
sified combat will soon break out elsewhere.
(Page 1)
Turkey: The Turkish military is becoming increas-
ingly concerned about the government crisis.
(Page 2)
Iran-Iraq: The Shah, apparently as a result of his
agreement with Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn
earlier this week, yesterday began pulling out
of Iraq the military units he had sent to sup-
port the Kurds. (Page 4)
Egypt: An interagency intelligence memorandum as-
sesses gaps in Egypt's military inventory and
their effect on its ability to wage war.
(Page 5)
Libya: For the first time in many years, Tripoli
is having trouble making ends meet. (Page 6)
World Grain Outlook: The world grain situation
has eased slightly in the last three months.
(Page 7)
Notes: Cambodia; European Security Conference;
Poland (Pages 9 and 10)
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Demilitarized Zone
MR 1
\
BINH
DINH
Rt. 11
Ban Me -Tittio1? Rt. 21
Gulf of
Thailand
(TO
4
fAR 3
Capital Spveicl Zonc.
1
MR 2
South
China
Saa
SOUTH VIETNAM
190
MILES
557444 3-75
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Heavy fighting continues in the
central highlands with indications that
intensified combat will soon break out
in other sections of the country. Gov-
ernment forces in Quang Nam Province
have come under strong artillery attack,
and units have been forced to pull back
from lowland areas in Duc Duc and Dai
Loc districts.
Government counterattacks are under way at both
ends of Route 19 in Pleiku and Binh Dinh provinces.
Some positions apparently have been retaken, but
the road remains interdicted at several points, and
the government has encountered intense North Viet-
namese resistance near some of the strategic moun-
tain passes. Government commanders estimate that
it could take them as long as a month to resecure
the highway.
Communist forces have also cut Route 14 south
of Pleiku City and Route 21 leading in from the
coast to the southern highlands capital of Ban Me
Thuot. South Vietnamese counterattacks are under
way along these routes, but this communist action
has isolated Pleiku City from resupply by land.
Senior South Vietnamese officials are predict-
ing that a new round of fighting is about to begin
in the provinces around Saigon and in the delta.
The government is trying to recapture strategic
Nui Ba Den (Black Virgin) Mountain in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince before communist attacks begin. So far, resist-
ance to the government's operation has been light.
South Vietnam
believes the level of renewed fighting will be well
below that of last December because most of the
communist units are understrength. optimis-
tic that South Vietnamese forces can contain the
attacks and possibly deal the communists some set-
backs.
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TURKEY
The Turkish military is becoming
increasingly concerned about the gov-
ernment crisis; it may be considering
direct intervention to break the dead-
lock that has blocked formation of a
government for nearly six months.
Turkish military units
have been on various forms of stand-by
or alert status since February 28, with most indica-
tions being that this has been related to domestic
problems.
The extent of the alert and the reasons for it
are being tightly held by the military high command.
Among the possibilities being speculated about in
Ankara are:
--Reaction to Greek military unrest, including
the buildup of Greek forces on islands off
Turkey's coast.
--The threat of renewed violence between rival
political and religious factions.
--Concern over growing unrest among junior of-
ficers and noncommissioned officers.
--The possibility of President Koruturk's re-
signing and the military's taking over the reins
of government.
Adding to the anxiety
ister - designate Irmak
has so far been unsuccessful in
his efforts to form a coalition government. Irmak
may try a new approach next week, but his initial
idea of a broad national coalition has clearly
failed. The Democratic Party apparently turned
down the idea of joining a coalition with Ecevit's
Republican People's Party under the independent
Irmak.
in Ankara is prime min-
Armed forces officers
the political parties have betrayed the nation, with
many holding the view that parliament should be dis-
solved and new elections called.
(continued)
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Ecevit apparently is aware that a continued gov-
ernment stalemate could precipitate a military coup,
and his party is urgently working to form a coali-
tion with the Democratic Party.
Republican People's Party strategists report-
edly believe that, if Irmak fails to form a govern-
ment, the President will turn to Ecevit again.
These strategists also believe the threat of mili-
tary intervention may be sufficient to force the
Democrats to swallow their objections to an election
this summer and join a coalition.
The military may, in fact, be trying to create
just this kind of fear among politicians in the hope
of breaking the impasse. If no break comes, or if
the President resigns, the military may see little
choice but to step in and force new elections.
This could even be done while retaining the Irmak
government in its caretaker role.
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IRAN-IRAQ
Iran yesterday began withdrawing
the military units it had sent into Iraq
in support of rebellious Iraqi Kurds.
The withdrawal apparently results from
an agreement reached by the Shah and
Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn in Algiers
on Thursday.
Iranian mortar, ar-
tillery, and air defense units had been operating
inside northern Iraq since last summer. They played
a critical role in halting an Iraqi offensive last
fall.
The withdrawal of Iranian forces
from Iraq suggests the Shah has given Baghdad a free
hand to pursue its military solution to the Kurdish
problem to a conclusion in return for Iraq's accept-
ance of the Iranian position on border demarcation.
The Shah probably concluded that support of
military resistance by the Kurdish forces was no
longer a realistic policy. The Kurds, pushed back
toward the Iranian border last fall, have not been
able to regain any of their lost territory during
the winter. Their failure left the Iraqi army in
a good position to renew its offensive this spring
and faced the Shah with the prospect of an even
larger Iranian intervention if the Kurdish position
was to be preserved.
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EGYPT
The following paragraphs present the
major conclusions of an interagency intel-
ligence memorandum on "Gaps in Egypt's
Military Inventory and the Effects on its
Wartime Capabilities."
Egypt's overall military capabilities today
are somewhat less than prior to the October war.
--The army is nearly up to its prewar armored
strength, but shortages of certain major mil-
itary equipment still exist.
--Egypt has about only 70 percent of its pre-
war aircraft inventory.
Vis-a-vis Israel, Egypt's armed forces are
weaker than in October 1973 because of the signif-
icant increase in Israeli inventories and capabili-
ties. Thus, Egypt probably would have to rely on
joint military action with Syria to a greater degree
than in the October war.
Despite shortages, Egypt's armed forces are
estimated to be capable of a strong defense against
an Israeli attack or of mounting a major offensive
of short duration in the Sinai. There is little
information on Egypt's stockpiles of ammunition and
spare parts, but Cairo probably could not sustain
major military action without additional Soviet re-
supply.
Recent deliveries of Soviet aircraft and other
military equipment--believed to be under prewar
contracts--have not been sufficient to restore
Egypt's war losses. The prospects for the full-
scale resumption of Soviet military aid to Egypt
are uncertain, but President Sadat will feel less
need for such aid if he can negotiate a satisfactory
new disengagement agreement with Israel.
As an alternative to renewed Soviet aid, Egypt's
purchases of Western arms will improve its capabil-
ities gradually over several years, but not for the
near term. During this period, Egypt will continue
to be dependent on Soviet and East European supplies
of spares and ammunition to maintain its current
level of combat readiness.
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LIBYA
During 1974 Libya cut oil prices in
order to compete with Persian Gulf sup-
pliers, but the cuts were too late and
too little to offset falling tanker rates
and reduced demand for low-sulfur crude.
Now, for the first time in many years,
Tripoli is having trouble making ends
meet.
Libyan oil production fell sharply from 2 mil-
lion barrels per day in January 1974 to 1 million
barrels per day in December. Late in the year rev-
enues began to lag behind current expenditures, and
Tripoli drew down its foreign exchange reserves by
more than $200 million during November and December.
Although oil revenues remain depressed, the
Libyans show no sign of restraining foreign exchange
expenditures. The newly released 1975 development
budget calls for a 50-percent increase in expendi-
tures--the largest ever scheduled by the Qadhafi
government. Large arms purchases are on the books,
and there are no indications that Qadhafi's erratic
aid program will be modified.
Libyan efforts remain focused on increasing
oil sales. Following reductions of low-sulfur crude
and freight premiums on January 1, the government
further cut prices on lower grade crude oils in
February. Moreover, the Libyan National Oil Company
has been shaving prices of its independently pro-
duced oil even below prices charged to the oil com-
panies.
the
Libyans reportedly are offering reduced prices, ex-
tended credit terms, and even balance-of-payments
loans to obtain long-term oil purchases and indus-
trial and agricultural cooperation.
Package oil deals and price shaving have ena-
bled the National Oil Company to raise its inde-
pendent production significantly since the third
quarter of 1974, but total production has been
fairly constant. The oil companies that market al-
most 90 percent of Libyan output maintain that large
price reductions will be necessary to boost sales.
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WORLD GRAIN OUTLOOK
The world grain situation has eased
slightly in the last three months, more
so for wheat than for corn. We still
forecast 1974/75 grain production (ex-
cluding rice) at 6 percent below 1973/743
but prices have fallen because of a sharp
decline in grain fed to livestock in the
US. This has released enough grain so
far to meet foreign buying, which has
been running ahead of estimates made
three months ago.
Total worldwide grain consumption will not de-
cline as much as production, however, so that stocks
of major producers are expected to fall by over 20
million tons--mostly in the US--to a new low of
about 85 million tons by mid-1975.
Wheat
World import demand for wheat is estimated at
65.3 million tons for 1974/75, up 1.3 million tons
from our December estimate and 3.4 million tons
above exports in 1973/74. Larger import demands of
Brazil, South Asia, Mexico, and northern Africa have
more than offset the highly publicized cancellations
in recent weeks by the USSR and China. The largest
share of the Chinese cancellations pertain to wheat
shipments from the 1975 harvest.
We estimate world wheat production in 1974/75
to be down by over 20 million tons, or 5.6 percent.
Production declines in Argentina, Australia, Canada,
India, and the USSR were not offset by bumper har-
vests in Europe and the US.
Wheat available for export may reach 67.6
million tons--some 2.3 million tons above import
demand--if the US and Canada draw down stocks to
minimum acceptable levels. This estimate--3.6
million tons higher than our December estimate--
is a result of smaller quantities of wheat being
fed to livestock in the EC and an increase in the
US crop. Australia will also have larger quantities
available for export than a year ago.
(continued)
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Foreign demand for US wheat and flour is fore-
cast at 31.2 million tons--200,000 tons above our
December estimate and 100,000 tons above 1973/74
exports. This quantity can be exported, but stocks
would be drawn down to a record low of under 5.6
million tons, approaching minimum pipeline require-
ments.
Corn
We estimate world import demand for corn in
1974/75 at 41.8 million tons--14 percent more than
forecast in December and about the same as in 1973/74.
The increase is due primarily to less feeding of
wheat to livestock in the EC, prompted by lower im-
port prices for US corn and crop shortfalls in other
West European countries and Mexico. This higher lev-
el of demand can be met only if US stocks are drawn
down to minimum pipeline requirements and US domestic
use continues to decline.
We estimate export demand for US corn at 28.2
million tons, up 4.7 million tons from three months
ago. This level of exports is contingent upon a
19-percent drop in US consumption. The increase is
the result of foreign buying to take advantage of
falling US corn prices, which have dropped 25 percent
since mid-December.
Continuing Uncertainties
Current demand for US grain exports could change
as a result of the following:
--Transport or port problems plaguing grain
shipments from Canada, Argentina, and South
Africa.
--The North African drought, which could raise
wheat import requirements above current pro-
jections.
--The amount of corn substituted for wheat in
livestock feeding in the EC.
--The extent of the decrease in US grain feeding.
--Resumption of Soviet corn purchases to take
advantage of lower prices.
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
0 udong
Tuol Leap.
SOUTH VIETNAM
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NOTES
Airlift operations in Cambodia continued at
Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport on Friday, de-
spite sporadic Communist rocket and artillery
attacks. No further damage to aircraft or facil-
ities occurred.
The government force trying to retake the town
of Tuol Leap and eliminate insurgent artillery and
rocket positions in the area has bogged down in the
face of stiff resistance. Fighting in other areas
around the capital was relatively heavy but incon-
clusive.
The Soviet embassy in Washington has agreed to
US-proposed language for use at the European secu-
rity conference in Geneva that says national borders
"can be changed, in accordance with international
law, by peaceful means and by agreement."
West Germany has pushed hard for such a clause
and is urging other Western participants at the con-
ference to endorse the formula quickly before the
Soviets change their minds. Bonn's concern is
justified. Yesterday, the Soviet delegation sub-
mitted an apparently non-substantive wording change.
In addition, East and West must still decide exactly
where the formula will be placed in the text. The
Soviets continue to be intransigent on other out-
standing issues. Last week they even reopened
several science and technology items that Western
countries had thought were settled.
(continued)
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On Tuesday the Polish Politburo gave "important
priority" to expanding economic relations with the
US by implementing economic and scientific-technical
agreements signed during party leader Gierek's visit
to the US last fall.
A Foreign Ministry official recently said War-
saw had concluded that the disappointing lags in
implementing the agreements with the US were largely
the fault of Poland. Polish officials have indicated
that they have plans to increase trade with the US
despite Poland's ballooning hard currency debt with
the West. Warsaw not only will increase its indus-
trial purchases, but also will buy more agricultural
products because of bad winter weather. To facili-
tate expanded trade, Poland is seeking to eliminate
long-standing bilateral problems by such moves as
agreeing to redeem pre - World War II Polish govern-
ment bonds.
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