THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 FEBRUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014727
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 21, 1975

Declassified in 'Pa-rt - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936-A012500010006-2
The President's Daily Brief
February 21, 1975
5
To et25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
a I *11 M
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T0093-6A0125400010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
February 21, 1975
? Table of Contents
Cambodia: Military setbacks along the Mekong have
increased pessimism and recrimination among
senior government officials. (Page 1)
Syria: President Asad reportedly is in agreement
with our approach to further interim negotia-
tions. (Page 3)
Israel: Prime Minister Rabin hinted yesterday that
his country might be interested in a US secu-
rity guarantee. (Page 4)
Portugal: The long-awaited economic and social
program provides for heavy government super-
vision of the economy. (Page 5)
OPEC: Production capacity of the members of OPEC
is still growing. (Page 7)
Trinidad and Tobago: Prime Minister Eric Williams
has become the Caribbean's most traveled states-
man. (Page 9)
Greece: Defense Minister Averoff continues to be
optimistic about relations with NATO and the
US. (Page 11)
Note: Greece (Page 12)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A0125-00010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Recent military setbacks along the
Mekong have given rise to growing pes-
simism and recrimination among senior
government officials. It is impossible
to ascertain the point at which the
government's morale and internal cohe-
sion will break, but it is clear that
the strains on the Cambodian political
fabric haVe never been greater. As the
pressures build on Phnom Penh, the
chances increase for a political crisis
that would make it difficult if not im-
possible for the government to continue
to prosecute the war.
Much of the discontent now being voiced in
Phnom Penh is focused on President Lon Nol and his
leadership. Since the beginning of this month, a
number of government officials have been criticiz-
ing the President privately for what they view as
his inflexibility regarding a settlement.
Most of the recrimination being directed
against him is simply the result of frustration
over an inability to discover a feasible route
leading to negotiations and a compromise settle-
ment. Actually, there is no indication that the
communists are prepared to back away significantly
from their hard line on a settlement or that the
voluntary or forced departure of Lon Nol would
somehow open the way to a compromise solution.
At this point, the Khmer communists are confident
that time is on their sidee and they appear to be
banking on either total military victory or a
government surrender under the guise of a nego-
tiated settlement.
In the face of this seemingly intractable
communist, position, conviction still seems to be
growing in Phnom Penh that some way must be found
to break the negotiations impasse before the gov-
ernment's military position crumbles altogether.
Thus, the Khmer communist tactic of portraying
Lon Nol and some other senior leaders as obstacles
to peace could gain effectiveness, and sentiment
for Lon Nol's departure could become more wide-
spread and direct.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Political crisis could also arise from the
renewed friction between Prime Minister Long Boret
and army commander in chief Sosthene Fernandez.
The two appeared to have resolved their personal
differences late last year. This accommodation
has not survived the pressures of the present sit-
uation, however, and Long Boret in talks with Cam-
bodian officials has begun to blame Fernandez for
the deteriorating military situation.
On February 18, Lon Nol refused to accept the
resignation of Fernandez. At a cabinet meeting on
the same day, Long Boret threatened to resign un-
less the President allowed greater civilian control
over Fernandez and the military.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SYRIA
President Asad reportedly is in
agreement with our approach to further
interim negotiations, even though the
Syrians are telling other Arabs they
were disappointed with Secretary Kis-
singer's visit.
Asad concurs
in the Secretary's proposed procedure for a second-
stage Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. Asad believes
this procedure will be linked with a partial Israeli
withdrawal on the Golan Heights or with negotiations
to that end. He reiterated his warning, however,
that there could be no peaceful solution without
Syria's agreement.
Other members of the Syrian government are
expressing doubts about Asad's "extreme flexibility."
There is even talk in some circles about not going
to Geneva and of joining with Iraq and the Pales-
tinian "Rejection Front" in a common effort to
head off a partial solution to the Middle East con-
flict.
The Syrians are continuing their efforts to
maintain pressure on Sadat and to build support
among other Arabs for their public position. For-
eign Minister Khaddam recently visited several
Persian Gulf states carrying a message about Asad's
alleged disappointment with Secretary Kissinger's
visit. Khaddam described the step-by-step approach
to a settlement as a plot to split Arab ranks.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL
Prime Minister Rabin hinted publicly
yesterday that his country might be in-
terested in a US security guarantee.
Speaking before a group of university students,
the Prime Minister said that while Tel Aviv's basic
policy is to rely on its own strength and on defen-
sible borders, only a power like the US could help
Israel deter a threat from a super power such as
the Soviet Union. He likened Israel's position to
that of the West European states which met the So-
viet challenge by forming the NATO alliance with
the US.
The Israeli press has given prominent coverage
to recent reports that Washington is considering
the possibility of US security guarantees for Is-
rael in connection with a second-stage Egyptian-
Israeli agreement. Commentators are divided on the
issue, with opponents stressing what they view as
the unreliability of such a guarantee in light of
Washington's Vietnam experience and the high price
in territorial concessions Israel presumably would
have to pay.
An editorial in one daily that frequently re-
flects government opinion comments that despite the
obvious shortcomings of such a guarantee, it might
have a stabilizing influence in view of Soviet hos-
tility toward Israel and growing Arab power.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in -Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
The official version of the long-
awaited economic and social program, re-
leased by the government yesterday, pro-
vides for heavy government supervision
of the economy through control of key
industries and natural resources. The
program declares that Portugal will
build "a society in which the interven-
tion of the state will guarantee that
the principal resources are employed
for the well-being of the Portuguese
people."
Governmental control of essential industries
like oil and gas production, petrochemicals, steel,
and electricity will range up to complete national-
ization. The program maintains, however, that "the
larger part of economic activity" will remain in
private hands.
Foreign investment is welcomed, except in
defense-related industries, banks, and electricity.
Outside funds are invited in areas where Portuguese
technology will be improved, exports increased, or
jobs created. In agriculture, the program calls
for a limit on irrigated farms of 125 acres and
provides for limited expropriation of unused land
on large holdings. Expropriated land will be con-
verted into cooperative farms.
The government's program drew criticism from
the Communist-dominated labor confederation even
before it was made public. The confederation held
that its representatives were not consulted in all
areas covered and that positions counter to the
Armed Forces Movement had been adopted.
The US embassy in Lisbon reports that super-
vision of the economic program is among the legis-
lative powers the Movement has delegated to the
seven-man military junta. The junta's powers are
also said to include removing harmful influences
of the prior regime, and ensuring that future gov-
ernments adhere to the Movement's plans.
(continued)
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
According to two air force members of the junta,
the Movement is entering negotiations with the po-
litical parties to establish a platform for each
that will conform to standards set by the Movement.
Among other requirements, the parties reportedly
must agree to accept the economic program for the
next three years and to abide by the junta's inter-
pretation of both the Movement's program and the
economic program.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A0125-00010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
OPEC
Despite a series of production cuts
and a continuing worldwide surplus of
crude oils production capacity of the
members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries is still growing.
Oil production capacity in these states has now
reached a record 38.8 million barrels a day, up from
36.2 million in May--the peak month of production in
1974. Actual production is now only about 27 mil-
lion barrels a day, leaving nearly 12 million bar-
rels a day of excess capacity.
If OPEC states--principally Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Iraq--maintain their current schedules, as they
seem intent on doing, another 2 million barrels a
day will be added to capacity by late summer. We
expect world demand to decline by an additional 1
to 3 million barrels a day by that time and unused
capacity to increase to between 15 and 17 million
barrels a day.
In short, OPEC states will be producing 25
million barrels a day by late summer--about 60 per-
cent of capacity. On the eve of the embargo in
1973, they were producing a near capacity 32.8 mil-
lion barrels a day.
OPEC members generally believe that further
production cuts may be required to sustain prices.
Algeria has sent OPEC members several studies that
project sizable surpluses this year. Other OPEC
states have also made studies that indicate a need
to cut production substantially next summer.
At the same time, some Arab producers are al-
ready dissatisfied with the large cuts they have
had to absorb. Indeed, Abu Dhabi, Libya, Iraq,
and Algeria are likely to try to raise output in
the next few weeks. With demand on a downward trend,
such increases will be possible only if other OPEC
members make corresponding cuts.
(continued)
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Fart - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Thus far, production cuts by the international
oil companies and producing governments, acting
alone or in concert, have effectively reduced total
oil supplies of OPEC members to a level only slightly
in excess of demand. In some cases, however, the
companies favored or penalized certain countries be-
cause of price differentials. The OPEC Commission,
recognizing that prices were out of line, recently
recommended a new set of price differentials de-
signed to make the cartel's price system more secure.
When declining demand leads to production cuts,
it is in the cartel's interest to spread the reduc-
tion among its members, or perhaps to concentrate
it on the states that least need the money. The
present largely company-managed method of support-
ing the cartel price probably will become increas-
ingly difficult to maintain, however, in view of
the desire of several OPEC members to increase pro-
duction. In fact, if the companies focused produc-
tion cuts in a single country, that country might
overcompensate for its disadvantage by lowering
prices. It thus seems likely that a formal scheme
to prorate production will be put on the OPEC agenda
in the near future.
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012600010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Political opinions of Williams at home are
sharply divided. Everyone recognizes his contribu-
tion in achieving independence and consolidating
a national structure. Many students and intellec-
tuals, however, feel that he is out of touch with
recent changes in society and that he loves power
for its own sake.
When he resigned at the end of 1973 and then
reversed his decision, some people took at face
value his claim that he had decided to stay on in
the national interest. Others suspected--probably
more correctly--that the real reason was his dis-
like of the politicians waiting to succeed him.
In any case, Trinidad's increasing prosperity seems
to have convinced him to stay on at least until the
next election, which must be held by May 1976. If
he chooses to run again, nobody can beat him.
(continued)
9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A0126-00010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
People of African descent constitute over 40
percent of the country's 1.1 million population.
They are predominantly urban-oriented, hold most
of the professional jobs, and dominate politics.
Descendants of East Indian immigrants make up
the second largest block--from 35 to 38 percent.
The majority of them live in rural areas and are
employed in agriculture.
The principal factor promoting racial harmony
between these diverse groups is the country's wealth.
With a per capita income of over $1,100, and an
equitable pattern of income distribution, Trini-
dadians are among the most prosperous people in
Latin America.
Economic Background
The key to their economic well-being is oil.
It provides one quarter of the national product
and about two thirds of the country's exports. Do-
mestic production--now at more than 200,000 barrels
a day--is expanding, and about 400,000 barrels a
day is imported to be refined. The US buys about
90 percent of this output,
Williams has ambitious plans for this oil rev-
enue, both in building the country's economic fu-
ture and in expanding its influence in the Carib-
bean. He is emphasizing projects that can use oil
as fuel or as easily convertible high-value exports,
such as liquefied natural gas. He is also discuss-
ing an aluminum smelter plant as a joint venture
with Jamaica and Guyana.
The Prime Minister has also promised to use
Trinidad's mounting oil revenues to promote regional
development and integration. His plan would involve
giving balance-of-payments assistance to Jamaica,
Guyana, and possibly some other countries. He would
also make funds available to the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank and to international agencies, such as the
World Bank, for use in assisting Caribbean nations.
One of Williams' goals during his foreign trav-
els has been to diversify his country's sources of
capital. The US accounts for about 60 percent of
the more than $1 billion of foreign investment in
Trinidad and is its most important trading partner,
providing about a third of the country's imports
and taking half of its exports, Williams is par-
ticularly interested in Japanese industrial com-
panies that have expressed interest in helping
Trinidad manufacture fertilizer, petrochemicals,
and synthetics.
10
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T009-3-6A0126-00010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
GREECE
Defense Minister Averoff continues
to be optimistic about Greek relations
with NATO and the US, and about Prime
Minister Karamanlisr ability to consol-
idate his power in Athens.
Averoff told Ambassador Kubisch on Tuesday that
Athens wants to maintain close relations with NATO
and the US, but that the political climate arising
from the humiliation of Cyprus necessitates a modi-
fication of Greece's ties with its Western allies.
Since a return to the status quo ante in Cyprus is
not possible, he said Greece must seek a relation-
ship with NATO similar to that of France. Averoff
said he thought the French were more "in" than "out"
of NATO.
Averoff expressed satisfaction with the first
round of discussions last week between US and Greek
officials on the status of US facilities in Greece.
He acknowledged that the facilities served Greek
interests, and predicted the talks would turn out
well.
On the domestic front, Averoff said that the
shake-up in the armed forces would be completed by
June, barring some major internal or foreign policy
disaster. Incompetence and too close association
with the ousted junta were given as the principal
criteria for dismissals. Averoff noted that there
was some disaffection in the military arising from
the government's relaxed approach toward student
demonstrations. He felt, however, that his con-
tacts within the officer corps have enabled him to
keep abreast of stirrings in the armed forces.
Averoff told the ambassador that Karamanlis
was indispensable to Greece, at least "for awhile."
This formulation probably reflects Averoff's own
ambitions to lead the government one day rather
than any immediate intention to unseat Karamanlis.
inue to circulate in Athens,
unease in the army is a re ec 1
widespread these rumors have become.
11
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
SEA 01' MARMARA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Declassified in Fart - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
Greece reportedly moved ten infantry battalions
and additional artillery to six islands in the east-
ern Aegean during the first ten days of February,
increasing the number of Greek troops there by at
least 5,000.
Since a threatened clash with Turkey over
Aegean oil rights last June, Greece has reinforced
the islands with infantry, artillery, and armored
units. The army has purchased 60 light tanks and
over 100 antiaircraft guns for the islands' defense.
Greeks are planning a national-scale exercise
that will include scenarios for the
defense of the islands.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012500010006-2