THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 FEBRUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007935
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 6, 1975

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012400010053-1
The President's Daily Brief
February 6, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 5B(
duclassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
February 6, 1975
Table of Contents ?
Cambodia: The Cambodian army has done a creditable
job containing insurgent attacks, but is having
manpower and supply problems. (Page 1)
USSR - Middle East: An appraisal of Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko's trip to the Middle East.
(Page 3)
Ethiopia: The text of an Intelligence Alert Memo-
randum: Possible Coup in Ethiopia. (Page 8)
Turkey-Cyprus: Turkish Cypriots may be planning to
form an independent state. Meanwhile, Turkish
officials are still studying responses to the
US aid cutoff. (Page 7)
Peru: Violence in Lima yesterday could ultimately
weaken President Velasco. (Page 8)
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CAMBODIA
The Khmer communists have been on
the attack in the Phnom Penh area for al-
most five weeks now. Although the Cam-
bodian army has done a creditable job in
containing insurgent initiatives in most
areas around the capital, it has been un-
able to gain the upper hand. The supply
situation in Phnom Penh is still toler-
able but will not remain so for long.
Some army units, particularly the. 7th Division
manning the city's northwestern defenses, are los-
ing strength rapidly. Commanders are shoring up
weak points in the Outer defenses with Units from
less ?active fronts; ReinforceMents: will begin to
run short, however, if the communists continue their
attacks.
Situation on the. Mekong
Three Mekong Rivet supply convoys succeeded
in reaching Phnom Penh last month; The Communists
used mines to destroy three tugs in a convoy re-
turning to South Vietnam on February 3, and yester-
day mines sank three More tugs in a small convoy
attempting the run upriver. The rest of the convoy
turned back to. South Vietnamese Waters. Civilian
crews and ships owners may now refuse to risk the
trip upriver no matter what monetary incentives are
offered. Cambodian navy personnel could man civil-
ian vessels, but getting the permission of civilian
owners for them to: do so could be a lengthy process.
Even if civilian owners should agree to turn
their vessels over to the navy, it will be diffi-
cult to accumulate 'enough tugs and cargo vessels
to move the nedessary supplies. upstream. US of-
ficials are Scouring the region for more Cargo
barges, which are less vulnerable to shellings than
ships, but it may be Impossible to: round up enough
to carry all of Phnom Penh's supply requirements.
Our mission in Phnom Penh has informed govern-
ment leaders that the US does not consider a major
airlift of supplies into the capital a realistic
alternative to the Mekong supply route and is urging
military commanders to make a major effort to reopen
the river. Army commanders are now considering us-
ing a brigade, possibly from a provincial enclave,
to reinforce a beachhead along the lower Mekong,
and the navy will continue to use what little mine-
sweeping equipment it has to clear the shipping
channel.
(continued)
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So far, however, neither the presence of gov-
ernment troops at beachheads nor mine-sweeping op-
erations have been effective in preventing shipping
losses. A massive infusion of manpower will be
needed to push the insurgents back from the river,
but unless Khmer communist military pressure around
Phnom Penh eases, such large numbers of troops prob-
ably will not be available.
Supply Factors
Ammunition stocks in Phnom Penh on January 31
were sufficient to sustain the current level of
fighting for three weeks; the stocks continue to be
supplemented by air deliveries. Enough rice is on
hand to meet military and civilian needs for over
five weeks at the normal distribution rate and longer
with rationing. Most fuel stocks will last through
the end of the month.
Unless stocks are replenished soon, however,
the government will have to take drastic steps.
On the civilian side this will involve Closing some
rice distribution centers and sharp cutbacks in
civilian fuel consumption. Civilian morale will
sink as such Measures are implemented. The govern-
ment's options for conserving its military supplies
are limited. If the Situation continues to dete-
riorate the government may have to consider aban-
doning holdings in the Countryside in order to com-
mit its resources to the defense Of Phnom Penh and
the Mekong.
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST
Foreign Minister Gromyko appears to
have made little progress in bridging the
differences between the USSR and Egypt
during his visit to Cairo this week. His
earlier stay in Damascus seemed mainly
aimed at strengthening his hand for the
subsequent discussions with President
Sadat in Cairo. Gromyko also met with
fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat, but his
vague references to the formation of a
Palestinian "state" do not suggest that
Moscow is going to push this issue.
Although the Soviets seem resigned to the pos-
sibility of a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreement, Moscow is still seeking some commitment
from the Egyptians that the Soviets will be ac-
corded a significant role in the subsequent rounds
of negotiations. In an attempt to put pressure on
Cairo, Gromyko and the Syrians on Monday called for
a resumption of the Geneva talks within one month.
The Egyptians, however, resisted this gambit and
agreed only to a less specific formulation--the
"immediate" resumption of the Geneva forum,
In the statement yesterday marking the end of
Gromyko's Cairo visit, the Egyptians conceded that
Moscow should have a role in all aspects of the
Middle East settlement. Sadat, nevertheless, made
plain that he intends to continue to rely on the
US step-by-step approach to negotiations. Immedi-
ately after meeting with Gromyko on Tuesday, Sadat
publicly stated that he continues to welcome the
visit of Secretary Kissinger.
Sadat said that progress had been Made on
some bilateral issues, but that others would have
to wait until General Secretary Brezhnev visits
Egypt. Gromyko clearly was unwilling to make any
firm commitment regarding a trip to Egypt by Brezh-
nev; the joint statement on the Gromyko visit re-
fers only to the importance of Brezhnev-Sadat ex-
changes. Sadat's public remarks suggest that Cairo
once again is making a Brezhnev visit an issue be-
tween it and Moscow.
(continued)
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One of the unresolved issues Sadat undoubtedly
has in mind is his demand for new Soviet agreements
on arms. Although the Soviets have said they will
deliver arms ordered prior to the October 1973 war--
and apparently did deliver some MIG-23s on the eve
of Gromykols arrival--they have refused to make new
commitments.
The issue of Egyptian payment of its arms debt
also appears to remain unsettled. A Soviet official
has indicated that the debt will be the subject of
discussions in Moscow later this month.
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ETHIOPIA
We present below the text of an In-
telligence Alert Memorandum: Possible
Coup in Ethiopia.
There are indications that opponents of the
ruling military council in the Ethiopian army may
be planning to attempt a coup within the next few
days. They want to take advantage of the recent
transfer of troops from Addis Ababa to fight insur-
gents in Eritrea province.
The plan may involve cooperation between Gen-
eral Tamrat Tessema, the commander of the Fourth
Division in Addis Ababa, and Colonel Gebre-Yesus,
a brigade commander. Last month Gebre-Yesus was
reported to be planning a coup.
Tamrat has ordered troops
under the command of Gebre-Yesus to move into Addis
Ababa from positions north and south of the city.
today.
days.
The troops are due to depart for the city
They should reach Addis Ababa within two
It is possible that Tamrat is unaware of Gebre-
Yesus? coup plans and is reinforcing Addis Ababa
because of the departure of other troops for Eri-
trea. The arrival of additional troops, however,
will give Gebre-Yesus the edge over troops that are
likely to remain loyal to the council. Gebre-Yesus
commands key units already stationed in Addis Ababa,
including some of the units that protect the ruling
council's headquarters. Many units that might have
opposed Gebre-Yesus have been sent to Eritrea.
These include air force and airborne elements and
troops from the First Division. We believe Gebre-
Yesus would have a good chance of succeeding if he
attempts to take over the government.
A direct attack on the council's headquarters
would place Haile Selassie's life in jeopardy along
with some 130 other officials of the former regime
who are imprisoned within the council's compound.
The council might arbitrarily execute the prison-
ers, as it executed 59 other officials last Novem-
ber when it felt threatened by a coup.
(continued)
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The military units in Eritrea probably would
not interfere with a move against the council.
Some would support Gebre-Yesus; others might have
reservations, but they probably would remain in
Eritrea because of the current threat posed by the
insurgents.
The policies of a military government led by
Gebre-Yesus and those who support him probably would
be somewhat more moderate than the line being taken
by the present leadership. Gebre-Yesus is believed
to oppose the councils increasingly radical poli-
cies, including its adoption of socialism. He also
apparently opposes the willingness of some impor-
tant council members to jeopardize relations with
the West in favor of closer ties to communist coun-
tries.
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TURKEY-CYPRUS
Turkish Cypriot negotiator Rauf
Denktash says he is ready to form an
independent state on Cyprus if Ankara
agrees.
Denktash said in a press conference yesterday
that the Turkish-controlled northern part of Cyprus
should become a separate state until a federated
Cypriot republic is formed. He said that a con-
tinuation of his negotiations with the Greek Cyp-
riots depends on Ankara's wishes.
Denktash 'S
statements
suggest that preparations
to form an Independent state may already be under
way. If this is the case, some limited military
operations are probably in the offing to readjust
the cease-fire lines to provide more secure borders.
Such Turkish moves probably would provoke a violent
Greek Cypriot reaction, most likely directed at US
and UK targets.
Turkish officials, meanwhile, are still dis-
cussing their response to the cutoff of US mili-
tary assistance. ?the most
likely retaliatory move would be to begin charging
us rent for the ?use of Turkish facilities. Some
Turkish officers are arguing for a break with NATO
while others suggest proposing a non-aggression
pact with the Soviets as a ploy to ensure a flow
of military equipment from other NATO countries.
Public statements of Turkish officials yes-
terday reflected indecision on just what Turkey's
response would be, although they continued to in-
dicate that there was no intention to withdraw
from NATO. President Koruturk held meetings
throughout the day with political party leaders
to coordinate the government's position. Press
reports in Ankara indicated that measures under
consideration included summoning an emergency meet-
ing of the NATO Defense Committee and banning the
US Sixth Fleet from Turkish ports.
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PERU
The violence that rocked Lima yes-
terday has died down, but sporadic shoot-
ing continues despite the curfew. The
Peruvian capital remains tense and more
turmoil is possible.
The violence began when the army used tanks
and bazookas to dislodge striking police from their
headquarters in downtown Lima. Students, including
a number of anti-government leftists, soon assem-
bled. Their subsequent acts were anti-military in
character. A number of people were killed or in-
jured, and several buildings and cars were burned.
Agitators also stoned the US embassy, but
troops prevented serious damage.
President Velasco has increasingly tended to
react vehemently to dissent of any kind. For the
time being, the military probably will remain united
behind Velasco. If further violence erupts, the
armed forces will take the steps necessary to re-
main in power. Military leaders who already oppose
Velasco's policies, however, will become even more
critical. The violence thus may ultimately weaken
Velasco's power within the military.
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