THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 JANUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007912
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 8, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
January 8, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(11,0),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 8, 1975
Table of Contents
Syria-Lebanon: President Asad promised unconditional
support to Lebanon yesterday. (Page 1)
USSR: Despite rumors of disagreement among Soviet
leaders, General Secretary Brezhnev's authority
apparently remains intact, and the direction
of Soviet policy remains unchanged. (Page 2)
Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators will
meet again today to discuss terms of reference
concerning a Cyprus settlement. (Page 4)
Egypt: Authorities have arrested several hundred
communists. (Page 6)
Notes: South Vietnam; Ireland; Panama (Page 7)
At Annex we compare Soviet and US defense spending.
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SYRIA-LEBANON
Syrian President Asad concluded a
day of talks with Lebanese President
Franjiyah at Shtawrah yesterday by pub-
licly promising full 'and unconditional
support for Lebanon. Asad said that
Damascus will "regard any attack on
Lebanon as an attack on Syria itself."
Although Asad pledged in a joint communique
to meet any, Lebanese requests for help, there is no
indication of what military hardware, if any, Syria
would provide.. Franjiyah is believed willing to
accept conventional anti-aircraft weapons, but re-
luctant-to receive more.sophisticated weapons, such
as the SA-6 anti-aircraft missile system, that might
bring Syrian or other foreign troopsto Lebanon,
possibly inviting strong Israeli reaction.
The Lebanese did not accept offers of assist-
ance tendered by other Arab states at 'a 'meeting of
the Arab League Defense Council in Cairo last July.
The more radical states, particularly Libya, have
renewed their offers since then.
Franjiyah's purpose in pursuing cooperation
with the Syrians at this time is chiefly to silence
criticism he is receiving from his leftist and Mus-
lim domestic opponents. With Israeli incursions
into southern Lebanon continuing, these critics re-
fuse to be satisfied with the government's resort
to its usual strategy of complaining to the UN Se-
curity Council and promising to strengthen Lebanese
forces in southern Lebanon.
The Lebanese have long been concerned that the
Israelis are looking for an excuse to occupy south-
ern Lebanon as far north as the Litani River. The
Israelis deny any such intent, but only this week
issued a warning that any movement of Syrian troops
into the area would constitute a "continuance of
aggression."
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USSR
Rumors of disagreement among Soviet
leaders follow a period in which some
programs and initiatives closely asso-
ciated with General Secretary Brezhnev
have struck snags. Furthermore, these
are policies that at least some members
of Soviet officialdom have viewed skep-
tically. Brezhnev's authority apparently
is still intact, however, and the direc-
tion of Soviet policies remains unchanged.
Postponement of Brezhnev's highly touted visit
to Egypt is an unwanted embarrassment. Although
the General Secretary's health problems played a
part in the decision to put off the trip, it is
also clear that Moscow was unable to gain Cairo's
agreement on political questions, particularly re-
garding the Soviet role in Middle East peace nego-
tiations.
Difficulties had surfaced in December over
Brezhnev's twin programs of consumer welfare and
detente--particularly economic relations with the
US. A meeting of the party Central Committee opened
(continued)
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and closed with seeming abruptness on December 16,
and the USSR Supreme Soviet session convened on De-
cember 18. Brezhnev spoke to the Central Committee
on domestic and foreign policy. The US embassy re-
ports rumors that dissatisfaction was voiced at
the party plenum about the US trade legislation
and the compromise on emigration, with local of
complaining about the problems posed for main-
taining local controls.
The plenum and the Supreme Soviet approved an
economic plan. for 1975, spedifying group A indus-
tries (largely producer goods) are to grow at a
higher rate than group B industries (largely con-
sumer goods). This reverses. goals for growth laid
down in the 1971-75 plan, which Were linked, at
least in propaganda, with Brezhnev's promises to
improve living standards.
Two days after the party plenum, Moscow pub-
lished Foreign Minister Gromyko's letter of Octo-
ber 26 to Sedretary Kissinger and a Tass'statement;
both denied that the'Soviet Union'had agreed to
foreign demands on emigration in connection with
the US foreign trade legislation. Soviet media
have turned from euphoric treatment of the Vladi-
vostok summit to criticism of US trade restrictions
and hints that these restrictions would have nega-
tive effects on Soviet-US relations,
It remains uncertain how much of all this can
be ascribed to circumstantial events, to Brezhnev's
health 'problems, to his own decision to pull back
on some policy.initiatives, :or' to pressures exerted
by other leader's on specific elements of policy.
If Brezhnev is unable to return soon to work and
demonstrate that he retains the initiative in pol-
icy matters, his political position would almost
certainly be weakened.
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CYPRUS
Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides
and Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash
will meet today in another attempt to
reach agreement on the terms of reference
for the substantive negotiations on a
Cyprus settlement.
A snag developed in the talks last month over
the question of who will guarantee the final
settlement. The Turkish side favors the previous
arrangement, which designated Greece, the UK, and
Turkey as the guarantors. Such an arrangement would
give the Turks the right to intervene if the settle-
ment was violated. The Greek side has taken the
position that there must be progress on substantive
issues before the question of guarantees is tackled.
Denktash's tough bargaining position has
been endorsed by Republican Party leader Bulent
Ecevit, the former Turkish prime minister who
visited Cyprus last week. In Nicosia, Ecevit
publicly rejected the legal basis of Makarios'
presidency, and reiterated that Turkey would not
abandon its guarantor role or accept an "artifi-
cial increase" in the number of guarantor powers.
He also stated flatly that important issues could
not be addressed in the intercommunal talks until
Turkish Cypriots still in the south or in the
British bases are allowed to move north. Ecevit's
remarks drew immediate fire from Greek and Greek
Cypriot officials.
Ecevit's visit to Cyprus, however, was pri-
marily staged to remind his countrymen on the
Turkish mainland that it was he who had engineered
the Cyprus victory. In this way, he probably
hoped to consolidate his support within the armed
forces and head off Justice Party leader Demirel
who is close to obtaining the absolute majority
that would enable him to form a center-right gov-
ernment. Ecevit is still seeking a formula to end
the Turkish government crisis--now in its fourth
month--that would include a call for early elections,
which he believes would return him to power with a
parliamentary majority.
(continued)
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The problem of establishing satisfactory nego-
tiating procedures, meanwhile, has been complicated
by uncertainty about President Makarios' role in the
process. Makarios is not trusted by the Turkish
side, and Denktash is uneasy about the prospect that
any agreement he negotiates with derides must be
approved by Makarios.
Makarios has been devoting much of his time to
the formation of his cabinet, which is expected to
be announced this week. Once that hurdle has been
surmounted, he probably will direct his attention to
the negotiations.
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EGYPT
Egyptian se.curity authorities have
arrested several hundred members of the
outlawed, but _recently resurgent, Commu-
nist Party, as well as some radical left-
ist youths as a result of the violent
labor demonstration in Cairo last week.
-Leftist agitators for some time have been at-
tempting to stir up trouble among labor and student
groups. Officials say that these activists had
begun to operate with relative impunity, in the ex-
pectation that the government would not interfere
while the visit of ..Set, party chief Brezhnev-was
pending.
- Although there is no solid evidence of Soviet
involvement with Egyptian communist_or leftist
elements, Moscow may well have discreetly encour-
aged the communists to exploit legitimate poptlar
grievances in the hope of increasing pressure. on -
President Sadat. Despite the openly .pro-Bbviet.
line espoused by some of the .agitators, the.Egyp-
tian government has made no charges, either pub-
licly or privately, that Moscow is involved. In ,
any case, the. Soviets will obviously not be pleased
by the arrests.
While the Egyptian government .is moving, force-
fully against agitators, .it is also .attempting to
respond to popular grievances. Even before the
demonstrations, the cabinet had decided to'allo-
cate additional funds for the, immediate import of
consumer goods that are in short .supply. The
government has also promised to review the, .draft
of an unpopular_labor reform bill- Neither of
these measures are likely, to satisfy the public.
Discontent, therefore, is likely to continue for
some time and could lead to further disturbances.
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Nui Ba Den, Tay Ninh Province
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NOTES
South Vietnamese lose Nui Ba Den,
The South Vietnamese were forced from their
position atop Nui Ba Den--Black Virgin Mountain--
just outside Tay Ninh City yesterday, following
several weeks of determined communist attacks. Nui
Ba Den is a geographical oddity rising abruptly to
over 3,000 feet from the flat surrounding country-
side; it has been used since 1964 by the South Viet-
namese as an observation post and communications
site. The government was unable to resupply the
beleaguered outpost because of intense communist
anti-aircraft fire.
Ireland's Foreign Minister Fitzgerald is in
Washington for a brief round of talks.
Since Ireland joined the EC, it has replaced
the US and the UK as the focus of Irish foreign
policy. Now that Ireland has taken over the presi-
dency of the EC, the Irish hope to use the position
as the principal channel for US-EC consultations.
They are aware that this practice is only now evolv-
ing, and they wonder whether Washington will pursue
consultations in this manner when a small country,
such as theirs, holds the post.
Panama's Foreign Minister Tack may be ousted
in a dispute over the handling of canal treaty '
negotiations.
Foreign Minister Juan Tack's dissatisfaction
with the way the Torrijos government is handling
the canal treaty negotiations may lead to his de-
parture from the cabinet
The Foreign Min-
ister's complaints have become so vehement that Tor-
rijos reportedly is ready to fire him after the next
round of talks with Ambassador Bunker, which will
begin in Panama on Friday. Although Tack has had
a central role in the negotiations since they began
over a year ago, Torrijos himself is the final au-
thority on all aspects of the negotiations. The
Foreign Minister's departure would, if anything,
make the deliberations easier.
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180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
1964
180
160
140
120
lad
80
60
40
1964
Dollar Cost of Soviet Programs as
a Percent of US Defense Expenditures*
Total Defense Cost
(LIS=1 00 Percent)
Intercontinental
Attack
66 68 70
1973 dollar values.
66 68 70 72
74
800? Strategic Defense
700-
600
500
400
300
280
100
Note: Scale for this graph is significantly different from others.
US=100%
0
1964
1
66
i
68 .70
72
74
180? General Purpose Forces
160
140
120
100
80
60
.US=100%
40 11
1964 66
74
180 Investment Cost
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
1964
US=100%
66
.68
180' Operating Cost
160
140
120
100
80
66
40 I 1
1964 66
us=100%
70
72
74
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
68 70 72 74 1964
i tiil
68 70 72 '74
Note: Percentages calculated from 1973 dollar values.
-*Department of Defense data has been adjusted for comparable coverage.
.557077 1-75 CIA
66
68
70
72
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USSR DEFENSE SPENDING
A soon to be released CIA report on
Soviet spending for defense presents esti-
mates of the dollar costs of Soviet de-
fense forces and programs for the years
1.964 through 1974 as rough approximations
of what observed Soviet defense activity
would have cost to reproduce in the US
in 1973. These estimates are compared
with US outlays for the same years.
The main points of the report are subject to
some caveats because of differences in mission,
composition, and characteristics between the So-
viet and US military establishments.
--The comparisons of US defense spending with
the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense
programs should not be used in isolation to
draw conclusions about the relative military
effectiveness or capabilities of US and Soviet
forces.
--The US Department of Defense budget data
have been adjusted to achieve comparable ac-
counting coverage with the dollar estimates
made for the USSR.
--While the dollar costs of Soviet programs
reflect the magnitude of the Soviet defense
effort in terms that are comparable to the US
effort, they do not reflect the way the So-
viets measure their own defense effort.
Key Findings
In every year since 1971 the dollar costs of
Soviet defense programs have exceeded comparable
US defense outlays. In 1974, these costs--over
93 billion dollars in 1973 prices--were about 20
percent higher than US outlays. If the costs of
pensions and reserves are removed from both sides,
1974 Soviet costs exceeded the US total by about
25 percent. Cumulatively over the preceding
decade--1964-1973--the Soviet defense effort rep-
resented about 90 percent of US costs. US outlays
were greater through the Vietnam war period. With
the reduction in US spending as that war wound down,
Soviet expenditures began to exceed those of the US.
(continued)
Al
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Intercontinental Attack Forces
Estimated dollar costs of Soviet interconti-
nental attack programs have exceeded US outlays
every year since 1966--most US systems were opera-
tional by then--and were some 60 percent higher
than those of the US for the year 1974.
If the Soviet peripheral attack forces--pri-
marily intended for use on the Eurasian continent--
are included (the US has no counterpart for these
forces) the gap is widened to twice that percentage.
--Soviet ICBM programs would cost about three
times as much as US ICBM programs over the
period as a whole.
--In 1974, the Soviet costs reached almost
four and one half times the US level, reflect-
ing the four new Soviet ICBM systems coming
into operational status.
--The costs of Soviet submarine launched bal-
listic missile programs have exceeded US SLBM
costs since 1969 and were almost 30 percent
greater than us costs in 1974.
--US intercontinental bomber programs have
amounted to about five times the estimated
costs of Soviet intercontinental bomber pro-
grams over the period as a whole.
Strategic Defense Fortes
The USSR has traditionally maintained much
larger strategic defense forces than the US. The
cumulative dollar costs of Soviet programs over the
1964-1974 period were more than four times US spend-
ing, the biggest difference being in surface-to-air
missiles and fighter-interceptor programs.
In 1974, the dollar costs of Soviet strategic
defense programs accounted for almost eight times
US expenditures for strategic defense programs.
Spending by both countries on anti-ballistic mis-
sile programs was negligible.
2tata1.2212mat...12,a
During 1964-1974, the USSR spent steadily in-
creasing amounts on general purpose forces. By
1971, Soviet dollar costs had surpassed those of
the US, and in 1974 exceeded them by 20 percent.
The costs of Soviet ground forces are now more than
twice US costs, reflecting the much higher levels
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of Soviet manpower. The costs of naval forces are
about the same for both countries. The costs of
Soviet tactical air forces have been growing rapidly
since 1969 but are still only about half the US
level.
A Different Look at Defense Costs
Overall expenditures for military forces can
also be divided into research, investment, and op-
erating costs for comparison purposes. Investment
in each category is made up of hardware and facili-
ties acquisition. Operating costs include fuel,
ammunition, and salaries.
In 1974, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
military research, development, testing, and evalu-
ation exceeded US outlays by about 25 percent. US
expenditures measured this way exceeded estimated
Soviet dollar costs by a little over 50 percent from
1964 to 1970. Since 1971, however, Soviet dollar
costs have been higher.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet weapons
acquisition programs have exceeded US outlays for
comparable programs since 1970, and in 1974 were
about 25 percent larger than US programs.
Because of initial procurement costs for the
new generation of Soviet ICBMs and the costs of de-
ploying modern tactical aircraft, missiles and air-
craft have been the fastest growing elements of So-
viet procurement in recent years.
The costs of ships and boats have exceeded US
outlays by 50 percent over the 1964-1974 period,
and were about one-third greater in 1974.
Soviet land armaments procurement amounted to
over three times US expenditures for the 1964-1974
period.
For both the USSR and the US, the cost of mili-
tary personnel account for the largest part of the
operating budget. Costs for Soviet military per-
sonnel--at US 1973 pay scales--rose steadily over
the 1964-1974 period, whereas US military force re-
ductions since 1968 have lowered comparable US ex-
penditures. In 1974, total dollar costs for Soviet
military personnel were almost 50 percent higher
than corresponding US costs.
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Top Secret
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