THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JANUARY 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: MIRV
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007908
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 3, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
January 3, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 3, 1975
Table of Contents
Middle East - USSR: Some observers are skeptical
that Brezhnev postponed his Middle East visit
for health reasons. (Page 1)
USSR: Soviet objections to the "Schlesinger Doc-
trine" on target selection are unaffected by
the Vladivostok accord. (Page 2)
USSR: Press coverage of the US has become more
critical in recent weeks. (Page 4)
Latin America: Area nations are growing less and
less receptive to an inter-American dialogue
with the US. (Page 5)
Lebanon-Syria: The Lebanese President and Syrian
foreign minister met near the border yester-
day. (Page 7)
Notes: USSR; China; Jordan (Pages 8 and 9)
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MIDDLE EAST - USSR
Some observers in the Middle East
are expressing skepticism over reports
that General Secretary Brezhnev post-
poned his trip to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq
for health reasons, according to the US
embassy in Beirut. The observers are
attributing the postponement to Soviet
displeasure with Egypt and Syria, pri-
marily Egypt.
The embassy reports that Soviet officials in
Beirut have been telling selected newsmen of Soviet
dissatisfaction with President Sadat. They say
that Sadat refused to meet Moscow's demands that
Egypt take "concrete steps" in return for an im-
provement in Egyptian-Soviet relations.
Moscow Is
"furious" over the fact that Brezhnev's visit to
Damascus was originally scheduled to coincide with
a visit by Saudi King Faysal. President Asad re-
portedly angered the Kremlin when he informed the
Soviet ambassador that he could not reschedule Fay-
sal's visit and that Moscow should understand that
Syrian-Saudi relations are of the highest importance
to Damascus.'
Soviet and Egyptian media are still running
commentaries in high praise of Soviet-Egyptian re-
lations, but Moscow will probably not be pleased
with a speech by President Sadat last night reiter-
ating his confidence in US-sponsored peace negotia-
tions and explicitly advocating a delay in reconven-
ing the Geneva conference. Sadat said that he fears
that, if "we do not reach agreement with the super-.
powers" before going to Geneva; the situation will
return to "a state:of polarizationith the Soviet
Union supporting the. Arabs and the Americans sup-
porting Israel."
Sadat spoke warmly of the Soviets, asserting
that he fully accepts for post-
poning the trip and expects to begin a "new page"
in Egyptian-Soviet relations when the trip is re-
scheduled. On the state of relations now, Sadat
said only that "signs of a. new phase began to
emerge" during, 'Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to
Moscow.
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USSR
Two officials of the USA Institute
in Moscow told US embassy officers late
last week that Soviet objections to the
"Schlesinger Doctrine" on target selec-
tion are unaffected by the Vladivostok
accord.
M. A. Milshtein, chief of the strategic studies
department at the institute, and L. S. Semeyko, his
deputy, asserted that the doctrine is unacceptable
because it gives a national leader a choice of var-
ious modes of nuclear attack and thus makes nuclear
war an option. They said the stress in the doctrine
on the importance of missile accuracy implies an at-
tempt to acquire a first-strike capability. Both
men argued that the "race for accuracy" should be
controlled, and Semeyko suggested the possibility
of limiting the number of tests of new systems
"perhaps to 10 or 15."
Both also mentioned, as they had in a recent
article, that once the nuclear threshold is crossed,
it would be impossible for the side under attack
to determine within the time at its disposal whether
the attack is limited or full-scale. Milshtein said
that he could be comfortable with the doctrine only
if both sides agreed to "rules of the game" which,
he implied, would govern the steps in escalation
to full war. He quickly added, however, that the
Soviet Union would be unlikely to agree to such
"rules."
Milshtein said that the Soviets would never
make a nuclear first strike and that as a matter
of policy, all Soviet missiles are aimed at mili-
tary targets. Semeyko seconded this, but added
that the term "military targets" is not defined in
a narrow sense.
Another USA Institute official, foreign policy
department chief G. A. Trofimenko, had expressed a
somewhat different attitude toward the "Schlesinger
Doctrine" in early December, also during a conver-
sation with US embassy officers. Trofimenko had
said that provision for such a large number of war-
heads in the Vladivostok agreement had reduced the
importance of the main Soviet argument against the
"Schlesinger Doctrine," the danger that in estab-
lishing the need for more targets, it would also
(continued)
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create a need for more warheads. The Soviet atti-
tude toward the doctrine "would still be negative,"
he had contended, but the terms of the Vladivostok
agreement meant that the Soviet side could move to
a similar strategy.
Milshtein and Semeyko revealed considerable
interest in, and expertise on, Chinese strategic
affairs. Semeyko repeatedly noted that the Chinese
threat must be taken into account in any Soviet dis-
cussion of arms reduction. Milshtein alluded to
the dilemma faced by the USSR in seeking to main-
tain an "assured destruction" capability against
China. He said McNamara's "assured destruction"
doctrine was effective when at least 25 percent of
a nation's population and 50 percent of its indus-
trial complex could be destroyed, but he noted,
semi-seriously, that for China a 25-percent popula-
tion loss might be viewed as an incentive, not a
deterrent, to attack.
Milshtein a retired lieutenant general and
former dean of faculty at the General Staff Academy
who apparently still moves in high military circles,
also said that the harder line on the troubles in
Western society taken recently by Soviet military
publications was to be expected. One could not
preach uninterrupted peace and harmony, he said,
and expect military vigilance and combat readiness
to remain at acceptable levels. He added, however,
that the Soviet military has never spoken out
against any agreement reached by the government
and has kept its personnel aware of the process of
detente.
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USSR
Press coverage of the US has become
more critical and strident, probably as
a direct result of the generally adverse
Soviet reaction to the restrictive clauses
affecting the USSR in the recently passed
foreign trade legislation.
Moscow media have published a lengthy catalogue
of US economic and social ills and are scoring the
US in unusually explicit terms for alleged interfer-
ence in the Middle East, Vietnam, and elsewhere.
The campaign appears to be primarily a reaction
to restrictions on the amount of credits available
to the USSR and the well-publicized efforts of some
in the US to link the legislation to Soviet conces-
sions on emigration policy. Moscow may also have
decided that by playing up problems in the US and
the West in general, it would be easier to maintain
discipline at.home and convince Soviet allies of the
need to stand firm on ideological issues.
Despite the increased criticism, there has been
no public questioning of the importance of continued
detente. Izvestia on December 29 observed that "re-
liable peace. isunthinkable without a fundamental
normalization of US-Soviet relations," and the New
Year's message to the Soviet people gave full praise
to improved relations with the West.
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LATIN AMERICA
With the next meeting of the hemi-
sphere's foreign ministers just over two
months away, Latin Americans are growing
less and less receptive to an inter-
American dialogue with the US.
One of the carrots that sustained Latin Ameri-
can faith in the eventual productiveness of the
hemispheric talks, the US Trade Reform Act, now
looks like a stick to Latin American eyes. Many
governments have denounced the inclusion of re-
strictions aimed against members of OPEC and other
cartels, and the reaction has begun to go beyond
rhetoric.
Ecuador has announced that it would not at-
tend the Buenos Aires meeting in March if the leg-
islation becomes effective. President Rodriguez
probably will lobby for a boycott, especially on
the part of fellow OPEC members. Venezuela's Pres-
ident Perez has complained about developed nations
calling for dialogue while "threatening" less for-
tunate countries. Government-influenced media in
Panama and Peru have also protested the trade bill
as a violation of US commitments to Latin America.
Trade is but one source of growing frictions.
The US is being criticized over numerous other eco-
nomic issues and over political issues such as the
sanctions against Cuba and CIA's clandestine activ-
ities. Restrictions on US firms abroad exporting
to Cuba can have seriously adverse effects on rela-
tions with particular governments. Mexico, for
example, has been pressing US companies to partici-
pate in Mexican-sponsored trade missions to Cuba.
In Argentina, a congressman is calling for an in-
vestigation of CIA activities and for the expul-
sion of all CIA personnel. This kind of problem
may spread after the publication of a Spanish ver-
sion of a book by former CIA employee Agee.
Editorials from usually friendly Uruguay have
been critical, claiming that the "famous new dia-
logue has been shown to be totally nonproductive."
Talk in Montevideo and other capitals has begun
to suggest the wastefulness of a foreign ministers'
(continued)
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meeting in March and an OAS general assembly the
following month. Various governments have empha-
sized the Hnoninstitutional" aspects of the for-
eign ministers' sessions and suggested that the
OAS should be beefed up as a more enduring vehicle
for inter-American cooperation.
The overall feeling among Latin Americans of
increasing distance from the US probably will make
alternative cooperative efforts more attractive.
Venezuela and Mexico, for example, have begun to
make some inroads on the skepticism that first met
their call for a Latin American economic system
that would exclude the US. Various Latin American
summits have taken place recently and more are
scheduled for 1975, all aimed at unifying Latin
America and increasing Latin pressure on the US.
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LEBANON-SYRIA
Lebanese President Franjiyah yester-
day held a hastily scheduled private meet-
ing with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam
near the border, according to unconfirmed
reports in the Arab press. The two sup-
posedly discussed military cooperation
to defend southern Lebanon against in-
creasingly serious Israeli attacks.
In addition, Beirut radio announced yesterday
that Syria's President Asad will visit Lebanon next
Tuesday. This activity is unusual, as the Lebanese
are perennially suspicious of Syrian motives ?and
offers of assistance. Syrian aid activity in Leb-
anon is usually limited to Palestinian fedayeen
groups in the southern part of the country, who
themselves pose a significant threat to the Leba-
nese army.
Syria last month promised Lebanon "full sup-
port"--presumably meaning military assistance--in
its difficulties with the rgraplis
his return from a one-day visit to Damascus. This
offer was made in response to Beirut's call for
Arab aid to help prevent Israeli incursions into
Lebanese territory.
Lebanon has appealed for outside assistance
before--usually to assuage the government's left-
ist and Muslim critics--but has always backed away
from accepting subsequent offers of sophisticated
arms or foreign troops. President Franjiyah's per-
sonal involvement this time suggests that Beirut
may go further and accept limited help from the
Syrians, probably in the form of anti-aircraft
weapons.
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Backfire at Soviet Naval Aviation Training Base
Speed 1,150 kts.
Combat radius 2600-3050nm
Will carry air-to-surface missiles
557056 1-75 CIA
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NOTES
Soviet
The So-
viets probably plan to allocate 100 to 150 of the
aircraft to naval aviation. Most of these planes
will probably be assigned an anti-ship strike role
in areas peripheral to the USSR; a few will prob-
ably be used for maritime reconnaissance.
China appoints more civilians to top provin-
cial party posts once held by military officers.
New appointments in Fukien and Kiangsi are
the fourth and fifth provincial vacancies filled
in the past year, leaving only three provinces
without publicly identified party leaders. The
appointments seem to be part of a package worked
out in Peking in preparation for the long-awaited
4th National People's Congress. Kiangsi and Fukien
are badly factionalized provinces where armed
clashes occurred between rival power groups during
the anti-Confucius campaign. The new appointees,
who are veteran civilian officials purged during
the Cultural Revolution, face tough assignments
in establishing their authority and reducing ten-
sion in these provinces.
(continued)
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Jordan
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Top Secret
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