THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 NOVEMBER 1974
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006007881
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 30, 1974
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DOC_0006007881.pdf | 479.72 KB |
Body:
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The President's Daily Brief
November 30, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(1),(2).(3)
declassified onlY on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
.0r. -1 It a
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
November 30, 1974
USSR:
Table of Contents
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Arab
(Page 1)
Jordan,
and
States.: War Fund for Egypt, Syria,
the PLO is not as clearly defined
(Page 3)
Libya-France: Oil reportedly going to France at
special low prices.' (Page 4)
Greece-Cyprus: Makarios conferring in Athens before
-traveling on to Cyprus; Cypriots bracing for
trouble upon his return.. (Page 5)
Venezuela: President Perez to announce nationaliza-
tion of US-operated iron ore concessions.
(Page 6)
Notes: Persian Gulf; Arab States - USSR; Israel-
Egypt; Turkey; Argentina; Chile (Pages 7 and 8).
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USSR
(continued)
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ARAB STATES
the
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Arab
and
War
the
Fund for Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion
is
by no means clearly defined
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Arab
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League representatives are scheduled
to meet next Tuesday to iron out kinks
in the economic measures adopted at the
Rabat summit. The kinks are large ones;
the meeting will be difficult and the
outcome is uncertain.
Even the total amount of the fund is in doubt.
As of November 25, only $1.4 billion, some 60 per-
cent of the amount allocated at Rabat, had been
firmly pledged by Persian Gulf oil producers. North
African Arab producers are uncommitted. Libya,
which sent only low-level representatives to Rabat,
undoubtedly is expected to contribute a sizable
share of the more than $900 million remaining to be
pledged.
The duration of the Rabat War Fund seems to
be another unsettled question. The fund was first
reported to be a multi-year commitment; it has since
been described by Arabs both as a one-year alloca-
tion renewable annually, and as a longer term pro-
gram subject to annual review.
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LIBYA-FRANCE
Crude oil production from one of
Libya's nationalized fields, which had
been running below 30,000 barrels per
day, was suddenly increased to 125,000
barrels per day in early November, with
the additional oil reportedly going to
France at special low prices.
A US embassy source indicates that the Libyans
have offered the French more crude oil if favorable
financial terms can be reached. Libya may have re-
duced its price in an effort to market greater
amounts of crude; this at least raises the possi-
bility that the Libyans may be willing to lower the
price to oil companies for oil sold during the
fourth quarter of this year.
High prices along with weak demand have made
it difficult to sell Libyan crude. Oil production
declined to slightly over 1 million barrels per day
in October. This was less than one third of Libya's
peak production, which was reached in 1971, and a
ten-year low.
The French have made it their policy to nego-
tiate government-to-government oil deals whenever
possible. They currently are attempting to buy
400,000 barrels per day from Saudi Arabia over a
ten-year period.
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GREECE-CYPRUS
Archbishop Makarios arrived in Athens
yesterday for talks with Greek and Greek
Cypriot leaders before traveling on to
Cyprus next week.
The talks will be aimed at hammering out a com-
mon Greek position for negotiations with the Turks.
Acting Cyprus President Clerides will try to obtain
a firm commitment from Makarios and from Greek Prime
Minister Karamanlis to allow him a free hand in try-
ing to negotiate a Cyprus settlement with his Turkish
Cypriot counterpart, Rauf Denktash.
Clerides, who recently has taken the line that
the Greek side has little choice but to accept the
Turkish demand for a biregional federated state,
has stated that he will stay on as negotiator only
if Makarios agrees not to interfere. Makarios, how-
ever, is firmly and publicly on record rejecting
the Turkish position, and he is unlikely to reverse
himself unless Karamanlis applies considerable pres-
sure.
Even if Makarios should agree to stay in the
background, his mere presence on the island will be
disruptive. The Turkish military is prepared to
conduct a rescue operation in the event that fight-
ing between pro- and anti-Makarios factions threatens
the lives of Turkish Cypriots still stranded in the
Greek sector. This could involve a temporary take-
over of the whole island by the Turks.
Greek Cypriot officials are already bracing
for violence within the Greek community in anticipa-
tion of the Archbishop's expected return on December
6.
some anti-
Makarios activity, including bombings and revenge
killings, is expected. The Greek government is
alert to the possibility of an assassination attempt
against Makarios while he is still in Athens.
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VENEZUELA
President Perez will announce nation-
alization of US-operated iron ore conces-
sions early next week. Perez' action will
be popular with Venezuelans and the popu-
larity of his administration, already high,
will increase.
A transition period of one year Is planned
before the take-over is completed. During that
time, the US companies will continue to operate the
mines, but general mining policy will be decided by
the government.
It is hoped that retention of the US companies
as operators during the transition will avert any
major disruption in production that might occur if
inexperienced Venezuelan technicians were to take
over. The government will also use the time to try
to work out a satisfactory labor agreement with the
miners, who receive much higher pay and more bene-
fits than workers in other industries the government
runs.
Following the initial year of operating the
mines, the US companies will probably provide "tech-
nical services"--engineering assistance and manage-
ment advice--for an indefinite period.
Venezuela will produce about 25 million tons of Iron
ore this year, most of which is exported to the US.
Venezuelan mines provide about a third of US iron
ore imports and 11 percent of total US consumption.
A final side effect of the nationalization is
likely to be a harder push by Venezuela for the
formation of a producers' cooperative. Although
Venezuela's proposal for an OPEC-type organization
of iron ore exporters failed to win much support at
a recent meeting in Geneva, the Perez administration
is expected to revive its proposal in January, when
iron ore producers meet in New Delhi to prepare for
a ministerial-level meeting in the spring.
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Ras al
Khaimah
al Qaiwain
Ajman
Sharjah
Dubai
UNJITED ARAB EMI
Abu Dhabi
556900 11-74
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NOTES
Persian Gulf: Saudi Arabia will host a meet-
ing of Arab States of the Gulf area early next week;
the rulers of the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar,
and Bahrain will attend. In announcing the meeting,
the Saudis have said only that the Arab leaders will
discuss regional affairs. Presumably, one major
topic will be greater cooperation in defense mat-
ters. Recent Arab pronouncements concerning coop-
eration in the Gulf region have pointedly omitted
any reference to Iran. It seems likely, in fact,
that the Shah's pretensions to a dominant role in
the area may be moving his Arab neighbors, who are
historically suspicious of Iran, toward greater
cooperation.
Arab States - USSR:
alaLlEsaza: Both countries have increased
their air activity along the disengagement area
over the past few weeks; they are now flying recon-
naissance missions near the Suez Canal almost daily.
The Israelis in particular are showina sensitivity
to air activity by the other side.
(continued)
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Turkey: President Koruturk will probably turn
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ment in the wake of the resounding defeat of the
proposed Irmak cabinet in parliament yesterday.
The deteriorating do-
mestic situation may have convinced the Democrats
that the two-and-a-half month stalemate must be
broken and that new elections will be necessary to
secure a clear mandate to govern. There is a grow-
ing fear among the politicians that if they are un-
able to form a workable government, the military
will,
Argentina: Encouraged by recent successes in
their offensive against terrorism, security offi-
cials think they may now be able to inflict serious
damage on the main terrorist organizations. The
army and police seem to have obtained enough leads
from captured extremists to justify the government's
optimism. Many subversives are still being rounded
up by units acting under the broad state-of-siege
powers decreed by President Peron earlier this month.
The terrorists have clearly been put on the defen-
sive, at least temporarily. Whether they can be
held down. over the longer run will depend largely
on the ability of government forces to follow up
on recent successes.
Chile: Relations between themilitary govern-
ment aria-The Christian Democratic Party are near
the breaking point. The government and the party
have been close to the brink before, but former
president Frei's involvement in the latest dispute
makes it the most serious. Frei has joined other
Christian Democrat leaders in public protest against
the deportation of the leader of the left wing of
the party who was accused of violating the ban on
political activity. Hardliners in the government,
who would like to see a split between the armed
forces and the Christian Democrats, will be pushing
for a stern government response to the protest--
outlawing the party, for example. In similar con-
frontations in the past, cooler heads have prevailed,
but this time Frei's participation gives the party's
protest the appearance of direct challenge to the
junta. An outright break with the party would
greatly narrow the government's political base and
could lead to further restrictions in the area of
human rights.
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Top Secret
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