THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 OCTOBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007840
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 12, 1974

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
The President's Daily Brief
October 12, 1974
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B( I 5,(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
-1T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR:
October 12, 1974
- Table- of Contents
25X1
(Page 1) 25X1
USSR-Egypt: Foreign Minister Fahmi will probably
be unable to relieve strains in relations dur-
ing his visit to Moscow. (Page 2)
UK: The Labor Party won the general election by a
considerably smaller margin than opinion polls
had predicted. (Page 3)
Greece: The Greek Communist Party has reportedly
received more than $2 million from the USSR
for its election campaign. (Page 5)
Turkey-Cyprus:
(Page 6)
Oman: A major government offensive is planned against
insurgent forces. (Page 7)
Brazil: A seemingly minor incident involving the ar-
rest of a US citizen may have an adverse impact
on US relations with Brazil. (Page 8)
Pakistan: Prime Minister Bhutto wants to visit Wash-
TE7iton soon. (Page 9)
Note: China (Page 10)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-EGYPT
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi, who
visits MOSCOW beginning Monday, will prob-
ably be.unable to relieve the strains in
Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Fahmi will be accompanied by chief of staff
Gamasi; a resumption of full Soviet military deliv-
eries is sure to be the prime subject of his dis-
cussions, The Egyptian planning minister will also
accompany Fahmi to review differences with Moscow
over economic issues.
Recent Soviet comment has suggested that, de-
spite Moscow's desire to avoid an open rupture with
Sadat, it sees little need to improve its ties with
Cairo in any significant way. The Soviets are prob-
ably calculating that a stalemate in the Middle
East peace talks, economic problems, and the arms
embargo will eventually bring Sadat around. Yes-
terday, in Moldavia, party boss Brezhnev 'took note
of the lack of further progress toward a Middle
East settlement, and Pravda recently said that dis-
illusionment in Cairo-TaTE-Western investment had
led to the beginning of the "first sobering-up
period."
Egyptian Prime Minister Hijazi told US Ambas-
sador Eilts last week that Moscow's attitude led
him to suspect that the Soviets intend to make
Fahmi's trip a failure. A Soviet involved in
Egyptian affairs reportedly has said that Moscow
plans to make the visit unproductive, in the hope
that it will lead to the removal of Fahmi--who the
Soviets view as too close to the US. He said the
Soviets would save specific agreements for an
eventual Sadat-Brezhnev summit.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
UK
The Labor Party's narrow victory
in the general election on Thursday was
by a considerably smaller margin than
most opinion polls had predicted.
Prime Minister Wilson is expected to form the
new government on Monday, at which time he may an-
nounce its program. No major changes are likely
in his cabinet.
Tory. leader Heath's political career will prob-
ably not survive this latest defeat.
The Conservatives netted only 276 seats to Labor's
319, which was one more than necessary for a majority.
The Liberals lost a seat, finishing with a total of
only 13. The Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties
picked up some seats, but not as many as had been
anticipated.
Economic problems will command the immediate at-
tention of the new Wilson government. The Prime Min-
ister is certain to move toward increased government
participation in industry. In view of the small size
of Labor's majority, however, Wilson may be able to
plead caution and soften the more radical demands of
the party's left wing.
Wilson is expected to make every effort to per-
suade labor to abide by the program of voluntary wage
controls known as the -"social' contract." The success
of Labor's anti-inflation program will depend largely
on the cooperation of trade union leaders and their
ability to control rank-and-file workers.
The broad question of Britain's membership in
the EC and a proposed referendum--expected within the
year--could cause dissension within the Labor govern-
ment. During the campaign, Wilson faced opposition
from influential cabinet members Shirley Williams and
Roy Jenkins, who declared that they would leave the
government if Britain opted out of the Community.
According to recent public opinion polls, the odds
are about even that Britons will vote to pull out.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The election outcome is unlikely to change the
status of the UK defense review. Official decisions
on the size of the cuts in the defense budget are ex-
pected to be announced sometime. this fall. Some cuts
in Britain's NATO-committed forces appear inevitable.
The new government will need to pay greater at-
tention to the demands of the regional parties, nota-
bly the Scottish Nationalists. With their small but
respectable total of 11 seats and the prospect of
considerable wealth flowing into Scotland from the
North Sea oil fields, the Scottish Nationalists will
have a stronger voice in Parliament.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
GREECE
the Greek Communist Party
The party will compete in the November 17
election in a newly formed "Unified Left" alliance
that includes a dissident communist party and the
former communist front known as the United Demo-
cratic Left.
The alliance, which is not likely to last be-
yond the election, probably was joined by the Mos-
cow-backed party as a result of Soviet pressure and
financial inducement. The Moscow-backed group pre-
viously had refused to cooperate with the United
Democratic Left, and was feuding with the dissident
communist party over who had the right to call it-
self the Communist Party.
A unified campaign by these parties will en-
able them to exploit the government's policy of
giving equal time on national TV to all major po-
litical groups.
the Uni-
fied Left may pull 10 to 15 percent of the vote.
The Moscow-backed party's main problem is finding
candidates with sufficient prestige; most of its
leaders lost their citizenship because of their
support for communist guerrillas at the time of
World War II. In contrast, Andreas Papandreou,
who has not joined the new left grouping, may be
able to attract as much as 25 percent of the vote.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25
X1
#
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
TURKEY? CYPRUS
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Oman Government Prepares for Offensive
" AI HutAilniA15
. .
?f.-% .?
UNITED ,ARAB EMIRATES
? r-
=
v.A1' Tbaylah
?
. SAUDI' ,zARABIA;Z:_s':4F.
' ? ? ? ??? ? - :?? ? ??? ?
..? ???
? .?? ..??1- ?
? ? ' .:;r;
%4,- ? ? ?
? ?
?
? ?
Al Masirah
??..
DHOFAR
--,-/
.4..
S. dwIay Airfield r
?1%
YEMEN
supply
'
? /
Unsurfaced road
---- Track or trail
50
MILES
100
?
Arabian Sea
SAUDI ,
ARABIA
SUDAN
INDIA
sr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
OMAN
A major government offensive aimed
at regaining control over western Dhofar
Province from insurgent forces of the
leftist Popular Front for the libera-
tion of Oman is set for early November.
The. Omani foreign minister announced on Thurs-
day that Omani forces were taking over positions
previously occupied by Iranian forces, "who are now
returning home"--presumably a reference; to a 1,400-
man Iranian contingent that has been in Oman for
some time. -The announcement apparently was an At-
tempt to counter sharp.criticism by some radical
Arab states of the involvement of non-Arab Iran in
Oman.r
Rebel forces now in western Dhofar are be-
lieved to number fewer than 500, including militia.
Supplies reportedly are inadequate and morale is
low. South Yemen has given the rebels strong sup-
port in the past, but the leftist regime in Aden
is not expected to become further involved in the
coming fighting.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15: CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
BRAZIL
A seemingly minor incident involv-
ing the arrest of US citizen Frederick
Morris has grown into a highly publi-
cized affair that may have an adverse
impact on US relations with Brazil.
? Foreign Minister Silveira has reacted strongly
ancipublicly to the embassy's efforts to protect
Morris, who was arrested two weeks ago on charges
of subversion.- During a recent press conference,
the foreign minister charged in effect that Brazil's
sovereignty was being challenged by the embassy's
actions. A media campaign protesting the ambassa-
dor's personal efforts in the case has apparently
been fed by the Foreign Ministry.
, It is unclear, just why the Brazilians :have
chosen to dramatize the incident. It seems likely,
however, that the foreign minister welcomed the
opportunity to demonstrate'Brazil's--and his--will-
ingness to stand up to the US. Silveira may be
under some pressure from the military, which ap-
pears to have mishandled the case from the start.
Brasilia's handling of the matter indicates
that, despite normally close relations with the US,
nationalist sentiment can occasionally lead to
friction. This is likely to become more evident
as the government seeks to assert its "independence"
in world affairs.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PAKISTAN
Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto
has inquired about the possibility of
a visit to Washington soon. He told
US Ambassador Byroade that he had known
former president Nixon quite well and
felt uncomfortable about not being
personally acquainted with you.
Following up on Bhutto's request, Foreign Secre-
tary Shahi told Byroade that Bhutto would like to come
to Washington some time in November. The Washington
trip would follow Bhutto's expected visit to Moscow
around October 20 and Secretary Kissinger's end-of-
the-month trip to Pakistan and several neighboring
countries. Shahi claimed the following as the reasons
for Bhutto's interest in coming here:
--Domestic support for Pakistan's present pro-US
orientation is eroding, and to arrest this trend,
Bhutto wants more tangible evidence of US sup-
port.
--During Bhutto's Moscow visit, he will be
pressed to go along with the USSR's long-stand-
ing desire for a Soviet-sponsored Asian collec-
tive security system. Bhutto will adopt a
"stalling position" in Moscow but might even-
tually have to go along with the Soviets, given
their strong position in India and Afghanistan
and the lack of US arms aid to Pakistan.
--While Pakistan recognizes its limited impor-
tance to the US, it could help US interests in
the nearby Persian Gulf area.
For these reasons, according to the Foreign Sec-
retary, Pakistan feels that it could convince the new
US administration that the time has come for the US
to back up its declarations of political support for
Pakistan by easing restrictions on military assistance.,
While the Pakistanis genuinely--and increasingly--
feel the concerns voiced by Shahi, their strong desire
for a change in US arms supply policy is not new. We
believe Bhutto would think carefully before jeopardiz-
ing his friendly ties with the US and China by trying
to move closer to Moscow.
9
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
10
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2
7-;
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010017-2