THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 OCTOBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007831
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 2, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
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October 2, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513( I ),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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October 2, 1974
Table of Contents .
Syria-Israel:
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China: All active Politburo members, except Mao,
appeared at the anniversary celebration.
(Page 2)
Ethiopia: Factionalism seems to be growing among
the new military rulers. (Page 3)
South Yemen - Egypt:
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Note: World grain production. (Page 5)
Annex: Chinese Leadership and Succession Examined
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SYRIA?ISRAEL
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CHINA
All active members of the Politburo
except Mao were present to mark the 25th
anniversary of the founding of the People's
Republic of China. Ailing Premier Chou
En-lai presided and made a speech at a
reception on September 30, but he was ap-
parently still not strong enough to join
other Chinese leaders for a walk in Pe-
king's parks the following day.
The huge leadership turnout was highlighted by
the return to public view of several long-absent mil-
itary officials who were under severe attack earlier
this year and by the rehabilitation of a considerable
number of civilian and military officials purged dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. The new round of reha-
bilitations includes_ a number of provincial party
leaders and .central ministers who fell early in the
Cultural Revolution, as well as several figures ac-
tive in the early purges who were themselves dis-
graced in later phases of the convulsion. This sug-
gests that an .attempt is being made to build the
widest possible consensus among the second-echelon
leadership... in .anticipation of a transition period
in which China's two top leaders are no longer active.
Peking's major publications issued a joint edi-
torial that gave heavy _play to .the unity theme but
offered little in .the way of policy. guidance. The
editorial made it clear that the divisive anti-Con-
fucius campaign, which has been toned .down since
this summer, is to remain in low gear. Although
the campaign is to continue "for a long time," its
main emphasis is on study rather than on attacking
party officials, and the campaign is to be used to
boost production.
Consensus and continuity were also apparent in
the brief treatment of foreign affairs in the Na-
tional Day joint editorial. A reference was made to
Mao's "revolutionary policy in foreign affairs," a
code phrase for the opening to the United States.
The editorial also incorporated the slogan "dig tun-
nels deep"--a reference to possible war with the So-
viet Union that was a prominent propaganda theme in
1972 and 1973, but has appeared less frequently re-
cently as the Chinese stressed the notion that Moscow
was merely "feinting" to the East while preparing for
war in the West.
We examine :today. at Annex the question of the.
Chinese leadership and succession in greater detail.
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ETHIOPIA
There are signs of increasing dissen-
sion among factions in the Armed Forces
Coordinating Committee that now runs Ethi-
opia.
Armed forces units in the capital were placed
on alert yesterday during an emergency session of
the committee, according to press reports. Air
force jets made several passes over the Fourth
Divi-
sion Headquarters, where the ruling military group
usually meets,-. Air force officers, who have been
among the more radicalmembers of the committee,
have been eclipsed by moderates in the past few
months. The flyover suggests the air force is try-
ing to reassert its influence.
The current discussions of the military commit-
tee reportedly,center on the issue of whether the
Military should take over operation of the govern-
ment from civilians, Late yesterday,. the committee
announced that it will continue to rule through a.
civilian cabinet.
The status of General Aman was probably also
discusse& On September 28, the committee announced
that Aman had been replaced as _chief of staff of the
armed forces but that he retained the. posts of titu-
lar head of government, prime minister, and defense
minister.
The committee's rescission yesterday of appoint-
ments made two days earlier of Aofficers well regarded.
by Aman appears to substantiate reports that Aman has
lost some status.
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SOUTH YEMEN ? EGYPT
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NOTE
World Grain Production: The world grain situa-
tion for l74/75 has tightened further. We now fore-
cast a decline of 4 percent in grain production from
last year's record level. World wheat production is
estimated to fall about 5 percent, while the supply
of feedgrains, especially corn, will be even shorter
than wheat. Production of corn in the major export-
ing countries is likely to be down by 11 percent.
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THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND SUCCESSION EXAMINED
Premier Chou En-lai's return to the
hospital some time in August suggests
that we may be on the verge of the post-
Chou era in Chinese politics. The Chi-
nese themselves seem to be considering
the possibility with considerable real-
ism, but with apprehension as well, be-
lieving as they do that his international
prestige and legendary administrative
abilities are irreplacable assets. They
are, moreover, aware that Chou's death
or permanent incapacity could further
roil the troubled waters of Chinese pol-
itics.
Chou Not Yet Down for the Count
The Premier is, however, not yet out of the
picture. He has made three appearances in the past
two weeks. He talked with Imelda Marcos for over an
hour on September 20;
Whether he will again tackle many of his duties as
Premier and senior vice chairman of the party will
obviously depend on the progress of his recovery.
As long as Chou is not permanently hospitalized,
he is likely to retain a large measure of influence,
even if he is not so immediately engaged in day-to-
day duties as in the past. But some of Chou's in-
fluence has derived from his well-known ability to
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master the detailed problems of running the Chinese
bureaucracy, and this aspect of his authority is cer-
tain to be diluted in any event.
It is equally important that Mao can now no
longer count on Chou to carry on with current Chinese
domestic and foreign policies after the Chairman's
own demise. Mao Tse-tung has put a great many eggs
in Chou's basket in the past several years, but he
is now forced to consider the real possibility that,
even should Chou outlive him, the Premier may not
have the physical capacity or the willpower to carry
through on difficult and controversial programs. In
the past two months we have seen the first veiled
signs that concerns of this sort have begun to
trouble Mao. Chou's uncertain health itself makes
him a less useful instrument to the Chairman. Mao
must consider that the prospect of the Premier's
demise will almost certainly intensify jockeying for
position at lower levels--a development he cannot
afford to ignore, but may now have to manipulate
without Chou's assistance.
Despite all these uncertainties, Chinese policy
is unlikely to change greatly in the shorter run even
if the Premier is incapacitated or dies. Mao remains
the core of Chinese politics. Chou has pursued the
policies with which he has been identified in recent
years in tandem with the Chairman, not in opposition
to him, and there is no evidence that the "great
helmsman" desires a marked departure from the current
line, domestic or foreign. On the contrary, he seems
anxious to nail down present policies even more firmly.
Interim Successors
Most of Chou's duties as premier have already
devolved--on a temporary basis at least--on two
lesser and slightly younger Politburo members, Li
Hsien-nien and Teng Hsiao-ping. Both appear to have
Mao's trust, although neither is likely to monopolize
the Chairman's ear to the extent that Chou has in
recent years. Both also appear to lack the broad,
long-term perspective that has characterized Chou's--
and Mao's--view of the world and of China's internal
development.
Li is a long-time lieutenant of Chou, concerned
primarily with economic and financial matters. Teng,
a somewhat more complicated personality with a solid
reputation as an administrator, was for many years
secretary general of the party and was the second
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most important man purged during the Cultural Revo-
lution. He had a. number of disagreements with Chou
in the early 1960s, but the Premier was instrumental
in arranging for Teng's "rehabilitation" in early
1973; Teng has been singing a "chouist" tune on pol-
icy matters since his return to prominence, and he
has a well-established record of opposition to Mos-
cow. Neither man is likely to press for major de-
partures in policy should Chou become incapacitated,
but both are more likely to be followers rather than
initiators in the style of the Premier.
Chou's party responsibilities are also likely
to be fragmented should he fade further from the
scene. Thus far, no obvious stand-ins for the Pre-
mier have emerged in this field, but many of his
duties are probably being performed by two men from
Shanghai who rose to prominence during and after the
Cultural Revolution, Chang Chun-chiao and Wang Hung-
wen. Both are suave, bright, and apparently compe-
tent, but neither has more than a mere fraction of
Chou's long experience in party affairs, and they
may lack the Premier's famous instinct for adjust-
ment and compromise.
Although both were associated with the manic
phase of the Cultural Revolution, neither now seems
wedded to the "radical" approach to policy questions
characteristic of the late 1960s. Both seem to have
developed ties to the more "conservative" old-line
party administrators as a complement to their initial
links to the "radical" wing of the party. They ap-
pear, however, to operate under some disability.
Although Chang has apparently been slated for the
vacant job of party secretary general for over a
year, he has not been formally named to the post,
apparently because of some sort of opposition. Wang
has been rumored to be ultimately destined for Mao's
position as party chairman--he is now the third-rank-
ing member of the party--but he is only 39 and a con-
siderable number of older party officials resent his
meteoric rise. Both Wang and Chang appear to have
Mao's trust, but he probably recognizes that they do
not have the experience and--in Wang's case at least--
the perspective of Chou En-lai.
In these circumstances, it is likely that greater
day-to-day responsibilities for the management of Chi-
nese policy will revert to Mao. Should this in fact
happen, the strain could well begin to tell fairly
quickly on the Chairman, who is approaching 81
Moreover, in overseeing Chinese policy, Mao
will find himself without Chou's unique combination
of skill and foresight, and without a fully reliable
institutional instrument capable of implementing his
policies.
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Input of the Cultural Revolution and the Anti-Con-
fucius Campaign
The party and government bureaucracies are
still rent to some degree by factionalism engendered
during the Cultural Revolution; both have lost some
of their elan, and, in each, several crucial posts
have remained unfilled for a number of years. The
military, the third leg of the tripod supporting
the Chinese state, is also fissured; it played an
extremely important role during the Cultural Revo-
lution, but it has since been badly tarnished by
the putative coup attempt mounted by former defense
minister Lin Piao in 1971. It is a major target of
the current anti-Confucius campaign. The divisions
within these three institutions have clearly been
exacerbated by the anti-Confucius campaign, which
has tended to revive factionalism in the provinces
and at the national level.
At this point, the campaign itself is merely
sputtering along. It has been in low gear since
early summer; significantly, this waning began in
June when Chou became seriously ill. Given the un-
certainty regarding Chou's active future, it would
be surprising if important forces in Peking were not
anxious to compose differences--to the extent possi-
ble--rather than to continue to push ahead with a
movement that is in many senses divisive. Those
who believe they may ultimately become victims of
the campaign obviously have personal reasons to ar-
gue for such a course of action. But Mao's acute
sense of his own mortality tends to cut in the other
direction; he almost certainly believes he has lit-
tle time left to imprint indelibly his own order of
priorities on the leadership, the bureaucracy, and
the Chinese populace.
In the past two months, both these lines of
thought have been evident in the Chinese press. A
number of authoritative editorials have strongly
stressed the theme of unity in political matters,
arguing forcefully against "entanglement" in divi-
sive issues. At the same time, a series of arti-
cles--some almost certainly emanating from Mao him-
self--couched in the Aesopian language of historical
analogy have touched directly on the sensitive suc-
cession question, arguing that after the death of the
supreme leader current "progressive" policies are
likely to be reversed unless the struggle is carried
through to the end.
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In fact, these two lines of argument are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. A close reading
of the editorials calling for unity suggests that
an attempt is being made to damp down the quarrels
between "left" and "right" within the Chinese lead-
ership which have helped fuel the anti-Confucius
campaign--while pushing ahead with the effort to
reduce the military's influence in politics, perhaps
an even more important aspect of the campaign. This
order of priorities is not surprising. Both Mao and
Chou--and presumably other civilian leaders as well--
were shocked by Lin Piao's attempt in 1971 to "step
outside the system" and settle political quarrels
with the help of military muscle. The Chairman
would certainly wish to ensure that this episode
cannot be repeated once he himself is gone.
Internecine sniping between "left" and "right,"
however, has by no means died out. The so-called
"radicals," who have fallen on evil days since their
period in the sun during the Cultural Revolution,
have been attempting to shore up their position by
making use of their continued access to the press
to issue covert and carefully worded appeals to
their supporters in the lower echelons of the bu-
reaucracy; they, like their putative opponents,
are obviously anticipating the eventual demise of
both Chou and Mao. In particular, Chiang Ching,
Mao's wife, has successfully warded off attempts
to circumscribe her control of cultural affairs
by claiming that any criticism of her is, in effect,
a criticism of Mao. Some of her manifestos, couched
in esoteric, historical analogy, have been picked
up by Western newsman and commentators, who have
probably attributed to her greater strength than
she actually possesses. In fact, while she seems
to have hit upon some effective defensive ploys,
"leftist" rhetoric has had little impact on policy
decisions. Except for some relatively minor ad-
justments in the educational sphere, Chinese policy
has been impervious to "radical" pressures.
The uncertainties inherent in this general sit-
uation are clearly intensified by the possibility
that Chou will die before Mao. A powerful voice ar-
guing for "moderation" and relatively pragmatic pol-
icies will be lost, and Mao will have to take into
account a somewhat different balance of forces among
his associates and underlings. Even so, his own
charismatic authority should still provide consid-
erable drive to Chinese policy. It is his own
death?in the event that Chou dies first--which
promises to be the real watershed in Chinese poli-
tics.
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'Factors for Short-Term-Immobility After Chou--and
'Mao
Chou's early incapacitation should not in it-
self prove crippling to China, but the odds would
be less than even that the Chairman will be able
to achieve to his own satisfaction a full consensus
on the issues now troubling Chinese politics. Among
the major questions now under debate are:
--how to provide an acceptable definition of
the legacy of the Cultural Revolution which
assesses the gains and losses engendered by
that upheaval;
--how to remove the military from political
administration without alienating influential
military commanders and to "rehabilitate" and
restore to authority experienced old-line of-
ficials purged during the Cultural Revolution
without overly upsetting younger officials
who were promoted as a result of those purges;
--how to preserve the revolutionary fervor
that brought the communists to power, while
training and encouraging technical experts
who can modernize China and expand its indus-
trial base; and
--above all, how to cope with the wide range
of problems deriving from the presence of a
hostile Soviet Union on China's northern bor-
der.
This last problem is one that seems to be par-
ticularly troubling to the Chairman recently. While
it is highly unlikely that any influential figure is
arguing for a rapprochement with Moscow, propaganda
associated with the anti-Confucius campaign suggests
that Mao believes that some important individuals--
perhaps within the military--think it is in China's
interest to reduce the present high level of Sino-
Soviet tension. Paradoxically, Mao seems willing to
risk the divisiveness caused today by the anti-
Confucius campaign in order to weed out or neutral-
ize such suspected opposition and, thereby, ensure
that the Chinese leadership will present a united
front to the Soviet menace after his death. Since
the Lin Piao affair, Chinese officials at all levels
have frequently expressed apprehension that Moscow
would try to meddle in Chinese domestic affairs,
attempting to exploit leadership differences, once
Mao was no longer on the scene.
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In fact, arrangements the Chinese are known to
have made in the wake of the Lin imbroglio, together
with less definite signs that these arrangements are
being modified in the wake of Chou's illness, indi-
cate that Peking expects to establish some sort of
collegial leadership once the Chairman and the Pre-
mier have either died or become permanently incapac-
itated. In the absence of a leader of Mao's unique
stature or of an obvious primus inter pares such as
Chou, the Chinese would almost certainly find it ex-
pedient to resort to some kind of consensus policy-
making. But in these circumstances the chances are
good that Chinese policy will in fact- be no policy
at all. In the initial succession period, there
will almost certainly be no single individual--and
perhaps no group of individuals--with sufficient
,authority and firmness of purpose to reverse current
policy trends or .even to push ahead in directions
already charted. Even while Mao and Chou are on the
scene, the Chinese have been unable to agree on a
formally designated party secretary general or a
minister of defense; such impasses are likely to be
multiplied in the. early succession period. A general
immobility on policy issues--at least the major ones--
might persist for several years.
Moreover, persistent difficulties facing the
Chinese--population pressure coupled with the lim-
ited availability of arable land, industrial moderni-
zation, and the security of a Chinese state militar-
ily inferior to the superpowers, to name but a few--
are surely not going to vanish in this period. The
political history of the past decade indicates there
is a wide range of views within the regime on how
best to tackle these problems; differences in ap-
proach are almost certain to be intensified and ex-
acerbated by personal frictions and even hatreds
arising from the Cultural Revolution and its after-
math. In such a situation, a struggle for supremacy
is quite likely, and policy questions could easily
become entangled in the fight for personal advantage.
In short, a period of partial immobility could be
followed--although this is of course by no means
certain--by a period of rapid and wide swings in
policy of the sort that characterized China in the
late 1950s and 1960s.
The Long-Term Prospect is Better
In the longer perspective, however, and despite
these immense obstacles, the trend is likely to be
in the direction of "moderation" and relative pragma-
tism. And even if pulling and hauling does develop,
it is most unlikely that China will come apart at
the seams. The regime survived the enormous strains
of the Cultural Revolution intact and has absorbed
the blow of the Lin "coup" (mounted by Mao's desig-
nated successor) with relative ease. The forces
that pull China together are much strohger than
those that push it apart, and this will continue to
be true when neither Chou nor Mao is politically
active.
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