THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 SEPTEMBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007816
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 14, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
September 14, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
0 S
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 14, 1974
Table of Contents
Syria-Israel: Syrian chief of staff acknowledges
violations of disengagement agreement. (Page 1)
Israel - Arab States: Israelis open mining complex
in Golan Heights. (Page 2)
South Korea - Japan: Deadlock continues over word-
ing of proposed letter from Tanaka to Pak.
(Page 3)
szaa: Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders make
progress on humanitarian issues and tackle
political issues. (Page 4)
Ethiopia: New military government settles down to
business as capital returns to normal. (Page 5)
Western Europe: Political and business leaders are
increasingly pessimistic about Europe's abil-
ity to cope economically. (Page 6)
Mozambique: Order is largely restored but racial
tension remains high. (Page 7)
Notes: USSR; North Vietnam (Page 8)
Annex: The Palestinians
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SYRIA-ISRAEL
US Ambassador Murphy in Damascus has
pointed out to Syrian Chief of Staff Shi-
habi Syrian violations of the Disengage-
ment
Shihabi initially questioned the accuracy of the
report, but volunteered to check. Yesterday he ac-
knowledged to the ambassador that some local field
commanders had in fact violated the accord "uninten-
tionally," and said that the artillery pieces would
be removed. Shihabi may have, confused the new SA-6
unit in question with another SA-6
derline case as a possible violation.
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and is a bor- 25X1
The violations probably were committed by local
commanders without the knowledge of Shihabi or Pres-
ident Asad. We doubt that Syrian leaders would want
to risk damaging their credibility with your admin-
istration at this time. Moreover, the Syrians'
cooperativeness is probably designed to undermine
the impression the Israelis have tried recently to
create that Syria is on the verge of renewing the
fighting.
1
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/Valli' al Litarli
Tyre
Lebanon /
/-1
naytirah
8,ar notA
lrbid
Reisi
G;nol
Mediterranean
Sea
IAMPAAN
Latrun
Salient Jeusa1e
......0/ ithil hat urnran
/". (Site al ead Sea
DeadSscreaald Caves)
,
1949
Armistice
Line
Beersheb
556609 9-74
A Israeli settlement
0 10 20 Kilometers
10 20 Miles
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ISRAEL - ARAB STATES
The Israelis have inaugurated a new
mining complex in the Golan Heights just
west of Al Qunaytirah, near the Israeli-
Syrian disengagement line. Minister of
Commerce and Industry Haim Bar-Lev, who
officiated at the opening on Wednesday,
said the $9503000 complex would be "an-
other anchor" for the Israelis in the
Golan Heights.
As if to underscore the political importance
of Israeli activities in the area, Bar-Lev pointed
out that the separation line with Syria would have
been drawn differently--presumably giving more
territory to Syria--were it not for the Israeli
settlements on Golan. the
semiofficial Jewish Agency said this mining com-
plex--near Kibbutz Merom Golan--together with a
planned Israeli rural center, would help fill the
gap between settlements in the northern and south-
ern Golan Heights.
Meanwhile, Jordanian newspapers are claiming
that two groups of Israelis are planning to estab-
lish unauthorized settlements on the West Bank.
Government-sponsored dailies in Amman have carried
reports that 300 orthodox Jewish settlers are "as-
sembled and organized" to build a settlement near
Jericho. The newspapers also cite reports that
another group, which attempted last July to estab-
lish an unauthorized settlement in the heavily Arab
northern West Bank area, will try again during the
Jewish holidays over the next two weeks. The
would-be settlers hope that the government will
hesitate to break the sanctity of the holidays by
forcibly removing them.
The Jordanian press articles reflect the in-
tense concern Israeli settlement activities in oc-
cupied territories generate in the Arab world,
where they are seen as evidence that Israel is not
prepared to return these territories to the Arabs.
King Faysal, especially, has made it a point to
express to US officials his disquiet over such Is-
raeli actions.
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SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN
Seoul and Tokyo remain deadlocked over
the wording of a proposed letter from Prime
Minister Tanaka to President Pak in which
Tokyo is attempting to satisfy strong Korean
demands concerning responsibility for last
month's assassination attempt on Pak.
The Japanese have stated publicly that there
will be no more concessions on the substance of the
letter; the Koreans have warned both publicly and
privately that unless a more accommodating draft is
negotiated they will take diplomatic action against
Tokyo. Such action--probably including the recall
of Seoul's ambassador to Tokyo--seems likely soon,
barring some last minute face-saving arrangement.
Anti-Japanese demonstrations continue in Seoul,
No significant protest materialized,
however, when Tanaka arrived in Mexico on September
12, and Seoul's capacity for sparking demonstrations
in other Western Hemisphere capitals is limited.
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CYPRUS
Acting President CZerides and Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash made some progress
yesterday in their third weekly session on
humanitarian issues. In a later session,
they reportedly tackled broader political
issues, including prerequisites for open-
ing formal peace negotiations.
The two Cypriot leaders agreed--in a meeting
with UN representatives--to begin releasing sick
and wounded prisoners Monday and to follow with
the release of special categories of prisoners.
They deferred action on a general release of pris-
oners and on reunification of families.
Most differences between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots now involve timing rather than substance.
The Greeks concede that some form of federated
state organized along geographic lines is now the
only realistic solution, but they refuse to nego-
tiate until the Turks make some concessions. The
Turks, for their part, appear willing to withdraw
from some of the territory they occupy and to per-
mit some Greek Cypriots to return to their homes--
particularly in Famagusta. They see these, how-
ever, as concessions to be made in the course of
negotiations, not as preconditions for talks.
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ETHIOPIA
The new military government appears
to be settling down to business as Addis
Ababa returns to normal. Tanks have been
withdrawn from the capital; military and
police patrolling has decreased; and the
airport has reopened.
The government has announced a few more cabinet
changes, but the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee
has directed most civilian ministers, diplomats, and
officials to stay on until further notice.
There is no sign that Crown Prince Asfa Wossen,
the military's choice as a figurehead successor to
Haile Selassie, has decided to return from Geneva
The Crown
Prince and his 21-year-old son, Prince Zara Yacob,
the second in line to the throne, are reported to
be pondering their next move.
The military may have designated Asfa Wossen
with the realization that he might be reluctant to
return home. The committee may have hoped this ap-
parent move to preserve the monarchy would mollify
those opposed to the removal of Haile Selassie.
The most immediate problems to be faced by the
military government may come from radical youth and
students who are scheduled to return to classes
later this month. The students are already unhappy
with the committee's announcement that they should
hold themselves ready to participate in development
and drought-relief projects in the countryside.
The military ignored violations of its ban on dem-
onstrations by students who favored the removal of
Haile Selassie, but it might react differently if
faced with student protests on other matters.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Political and business leaders in
Western Europe, searching for solutions
to inflation and large payments deficits,
are becoming increasingly pessimistic
about Europe's ability to cope econom-
ically. Many are afraid that a Zack of
concern in Washington for Europe's prob-
lems, coupled with the inability of the
European Community to provide leadership,
will discourage countries from seeking
joint approaches to these problems.
British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis
Healey,warned recently that, because of their inter-
dependence, European countries, cannot all hope to
reduce their trade deficits soon; cutthroat com-
petition would only doom the weaker countries to
economic and political chaos. Referring to the
anti-inflationary policies of the US and West Ger-
many, he added that strong efforts to reduce domes-
tic demand could precipitate a global economic
slump.
West German Chancellor Schmidt, who has become
increasingly preoccupied with Europe's economic
problems, confided to Ambassador Hillenbrand earlier
this week that he too is deeply pessimistic about
the prospect for economic stability in Western
Europe. Despite efforts by Bonn to help Italy cover
its oil bills, the Chancellor feels that Italy--
and perhaps Great Britain--are approaching bank-
ruptcy. This, in his view, could lead to a serious
recession in Western Europe or even a depression
that West Germany could not escape. The Chancellor's
gloom is reinforced by his belief, as an economist,
that the new approaches suggested so far hold little
promise.
Schmidt made an explicit plea that the US take
Europe!6-problems into account when framing eco-
nomic policy. He complained that high US interest
rates not only draw money from German banks but
attract Arab dollars which are sorely needed in
Europe to cover the huge trade and payments deficits
resulting from the high cost of petroleum.
Chancellor Schmidt characterized French Presi-
dent Giscard's effort to restore movement to the
European Community as largely psychological. He
said his meeting with Giscard in Paris last week
was disappointing because the French leader showed
little willingness to join in formulating a Community-
wide energy policy. Schmidt sees little chance for
reducing oil prices without joint action.
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MOZAMBIQUE
Order has been largely restored in
Lourenco Marques after several days of dis-
turbances, but racial tension is likely to
remain high for some time.
Security forces have been mopping up after the
rioting that came when blacks reacted to the short-
lived rebellion by dissident whites last weekend.
Local authorities are delivering food supplies to
the black suburbs where most of the violence oc-
curred. Stores and markets there, virtually all
white-owned, were looted and burned during the
rioting. Many whites have fled to South Africa and
Swaziland.
White resentment could flare up again with the
arrival, expected soon, of officials of the Front
for the Liberation of Mozambique to take up posi-
tions in the transitional government that will pre-
pare Mozambique for full independence next June.
Security forces, however, are likely to move quickly
to check any fresh outbreak of violence. The Por-
tuguese high commissioner, who will govern jointly
with a front-appointed prime minister until June,
arrived Thursday in Lourenco Marques.
Although the ?front has pledged to build a multi-
racial society in Mozambique, many whites are likely
to remain skeptical. Neither the front nor the
Portuguese show any desire to allow anti-front po-
litical organizations--white or black--a role in
running the country.
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NOTES
USSR:
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USSR: We now estimate that the Soviet grain
crop this year will come to 198 million tons. Al-
though lower than the original goal of 205.6 mil-
lion tons, this would still be the second highest
crop in Soviet history. The amount of wheat pro-
duced this year, however, is likely to be much
less than last year--85 million tons compared with
110 million tons. There are no indications so far
that the USSR intends to purchase large quantities
of grain on the world market. Grain prices this
year, unlike 1972, are high, and the Soviet Union
should have large stocks on which to draw after
last year's bumper harvest.
North Vietnam: North Vietnamese fighter air-
craft, which were recently sent to the southern
part of the country, have been in the air almost
daily since early this month. Some have flown
very close to the Demilitarized Zone. Many of the
recent flights probably have been for training and
area familiarization in connection with the reopen-
ing of bases in southern North Vietnam. The shift
of fighters to the south may also reflect North
Vietnamese concern that Saigon might send aircraft
across the Demilitarized Zone in retaliation for
widespread communist attacks along the north-cen-
tral coast during July and August.
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THE PALESTINIANS
The chairman of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization, Yasir Arafat, faces
a dilemmas he must make concessions to
Jordan's King Husayn on negotiating Is-
rael's withdrawal from the West Bank or
risk exclusion from the next round of
Middle East peace talks in Geneva. Al-
though he has been advised to be less
adamant by the Egyptians, the Syrians,
and the Soviets, Arafat is holding to
the position that the Palestinians alone
can negotiate the return of the West
Bank and that they should be allowed a
separate delegation at Geneva. He would
like to delay making concessions to Jor-
dan as long as possible so that he can
make a strong case that they were forced
on him by other Arabs. This would en-
able him to withstand more easily the
inevitable attacks by Palestinians who
object to any dealings with Husayn.
This annex
will treat the divisions within the
ranks of the fedayeen and the relative
influence of moderates and radicals.
The Moderates
Yasir Arafat, as chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, holds a post of uncertain
tenure, but for the moment he is in a fairly strong
position to commit the PLO to negotiations should
the Palestinians be invited on what Arafat regards
as acceptable terms. He is supported by his own
fedayeen organization Fatah, the Syrian-controlled
Saiqa, and the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine.
The long-range policies backed by these groups
have for some months included three basic elements:
--Willingness to create a Palestinian govern-
ment-in-exile.
--Willingness to attend the Geneva talks.
--Willingness to accept a truncated Palestinian
state.
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As long as Arafat is backed by Saiqa, the feda-
yeen group second in size to his own Fatah, he will
be free to work toward Palestinian participation in
the peace talks. Despite his personal disputes
with Saiqa chief Zuhayr Muhsin, Arafat will receive
at least reluctant support from that organization
as long as Syria remains willing to work toward a
peaceful settlement of Middle East issues.
The Marxist-oriented Popular Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine is small, but is
admired by many Palestinians for its ability to
mount terrorist attacks on Israel. It backs Arafat
in his inclination to seek, through negotiations, a
Palestinian state limited to the West Bank and Gaza,
but is not inclined to support any overtures by the
Palestinians to the Jordanians. Nayif Hawatmah,
head of the PDFLP, advocates the overthrow of King
Husayn rather than rapprochement with him. Hawatmah
has close ties to the Jordanian Communist Party and
to radical groups on the West Bank.
The moderates won only a vague and heavily
qualified endorsement of their policies from the
Palestine National Council, the legislative arm of
the PLO, at its session in Cairo last June. It
was an endorsement, however, that Arafat can and
will interpret to his own ends if he is invited to
take an active part in negotiations.
The Palestine National Council also approved
Arafat's proposal to expand the PLO's powerful
Executive Committee from nine to fourteen members.
Four of the five new members are sympathetic to
Arafat's policies, with the result that he is now
firmly in control of the committee.
The Rejection Front
The three most radical fedayeen organizations
within the PLO are the Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine--General Command, and the
Arab Liberation Front. They continue to oppose
all proposals for Palestinian participation in
peace talks. Cooperating loosely under the guise
of the Rejection Front, these groups have mounted
a propaganda campaign to undercut Palestinian sup-
port for Arafat's policies
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In mid-August, the three radical groups issued
an ultimatum to PLO leaders that they end their co-
operation with Egypt in seeking a formula under
which the Palestinians would be able to participate
in negotiations. The radicals threatened to with-
draw from the PLO within three weeks if their de-
mand was not met. The deadline passed without the
threat being carried out, but it remains likely
that they will withdraw should Arafat commit the
PLO to attendance at the talks.
The radicals' reluctance to follow through on
their threats or to challenge Arafat directly prob-
ably stems from their lack of confidence in the Arab
states that support them. Neither the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine nor the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Com-
mand have direct ties to any Arab government and
are almost always in some financial difficulty.
They must rely on unpredictable levels of financial
and operational support from Libya, Iraq, and pri-
vate Persian Gulf sources. The radical leaders
almost certainly fear that their Arab backers
would be of little help to them in any military en-
counter with the larger fedayeen groups or the se-
curity forces of the conservative Arab states.
The small Arab Liberation Front, unlike the
other radical groups, is almost totally controlled
by the Iraqi government. This assures it constant
support? but also leaves it vulnerable to the va-
garies of Iraqi policies. Baghdad opposes an Arab
settlement with Israel, but its interest in keeping
on reasonably good terms with the established lead-
ers of the PLO, the major Arab states, and the So-
viet Union tempers its willingness to allow the
ALF to work vigorously against Arafat's diplomatic
initiatives.
Resort to Terrorism
The two independent radical groups will almost
certainly increase their international terrorist
activities if the moderate leaders of the PLO de-
clare that they will accept a compromise with Jor-
dan or enter into peace negotiations. These groups
have the capability to mount terrorist operations
both inside Israel and abroad.
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Were Arafat convinced that their activities
constituted a threat to the PLO and should be re-
stricted, he--or the Lebanese, with his complicity--
could force the closure of several of their bases
in Lebanon. This could virtually end their ability
to mount cross-border raids into Israel, but it
would be much less effective in preventing inter-
national terrorist incidents. Such incidents could
still be planned and supported from Libya, Iraq,
the smaller Gulf states, and probably from Beirut
itself.
The less radical fedayeen groups--Fatah, Saiqa,
and the PDFLP--have for the present abandoned spec-
tacular forms of international terrorism presumably
to demonstrate their responsibility while working
toward some role in negotiations. At the same time,
they are continuing to mount occasional attacks
inside Israel, both to confirm their activist cre-
dentials to other Palestinians and to keep the pres-
sure on Arab and Western governments to deal with
the Palestinian question.
Should the PLO finally be excluded from the
peace talks and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan pursue
?a settlement without the Palestinians, it is virtu-
ally certain that Arafat and his supporters would
revert to terrorist tactics. The current restraint
of such leaders as Salah Khalaf, head of Fatah's
Black September Organization, for example, is
clearly based on the opportunistic premise that
the Palestinians stand to gain more from joining
in negotiations than from opposing them. Should
this assessment be proved wrong, they will feel
that the only way they can keep their positions
is to demonstrate through the use of terrorism
that no solution to the Middle East problem is pos-
sible without a solution to the Palestinian problem.
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--
Top Secret
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