THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 SEPTEMBER 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007811
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 7, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
September 7, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declauified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 7, 1974
Table of Contents
I.EarIzIEN.: Iraqis make gains against Kurds; Iran's
involvement deepens. (Page 1)
China: Status of Chou En-lai's health.
artEa: Some progress in talks between
and Denktash. (Page 4)
South Vietnam:
The military situation.
Or anization of American States: Early
sanctions against Cuba foreseen. (Page
(Page 3)
Clerides
(Page 5)
removal of
7)
Arab Oil Producers: Arabs plan to acquire
tankers to carry crude. (Page 8)
new
Zaire-Portugal-Angola: Presidents Mobutu and Spin-
ola to meet to discuss Angola. (Page 9)
EmILLE2E2,2_=_1222.11: Tensions grow. (Page 10)
Annex: _Iraq:,, Iran, and the Kurds
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556550 9-74 CIA
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IRAN-IRAQ
The Iraqi ground and air offensive
that began last month has dealt a seri-
ous blow to the rebel Kurdish forces,
but deep penetrations into Kurdish-held
territory by the Iraqi army have prompted
increased intervention by Iran.
Iraq has now committed over half its army,
some 50,000 men, to the campaign against the Kurds.
This force has made progress toward its two major
objectives: splitting the Kurdish forces so that
they can be dealt with piecemeal, and cutting off
supplies from Iran.
Last month, the Iraqis drove a wedge between
Kurdish units in the north and those in the north-
east. As part of their strategy to establish a
fortified line parallel to the Iranian border, the
Iraqis also cut a main supply route from Iran.
The Kurds' strategy has been to stage delaying
actions along the front, while maintaining harass-
ing attacks in the rear of the main battle areas.
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//If the Kurdish military posi-
tion continues to deteriorate, however, they will
require not only more arms from Iran but also
greater direct support by Iranian forces.
The main Iranian supply point now has been
moved to Piran Shahr, some ten miles inside Iran.. .
Two villages nearTiran Shahr were struck yesterday
by Iraqi SU-r7 fighter-bombers. Press reports from
Tehran claim that 15 people .were killed. The air
attack probably was not just an attempt to disrupt
Kurdish supply lines but also a warning to Iran.
Tehran has submitted a complaint to the UN
Security Council about this and other similar in-
cidents and may even make some military response.
After some border incidents last month, the Shah
ordered his troops to retaliate for any. Iraqi vio-
lation of Iranian territory.
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An assessment of the broader political implica-
tions of Iraq's war against the Kurds is presented
at Annex.
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CHINA
Press reports from Peking Thursday
night alleging a sudden downturn in the
health of Chou En-Zai were exaggerated
because they were based largely on inac-
curate information. Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping did tell the visiting US del-
egation, however, that the Premier's con-
dition has deteriorated since last July,
when Chou received Senator Jackson in a
hospital room.
Teng has been standing in for Chou over the
last few months, and there is little reason to doubt
his statement on the Premier's health. Chou has
been out of public view for five weeks. On Wednes-
day, he was absent for the first time from a meeting
between Mao Tse-tung and a visiting head of state
(in Wednesday's case, the President of Togo).
Although they are not trying to conceal Chou's
illness, Chinese officials seem anxious to avoid
alarming the populace over the Premier's condition.
Earlier this week the official party newspaper
carried a message from the Togolese President wish-
ing Chou a speedy recovery. In addition, the media
have carried a number of messages, signed by Chou,
to foreign governments; this seems to be part of an
effort to convey the impression that the Premier is
still functioning.
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CYPRUS
Greek Cypriot leader Clerides report-
edly believes that conditions are nearly
ripe for him to enter into political talks
and that the Greek government will support
most of his conditions for negotiation.
Clerides is said to be prepared to agree
to the Turkish demand for a federated state,
provided the Turks:
--Pull back from a section of Famagusta and per-
mit Greek Cypriot refugees to return there.
--Withdraw from some of the other territory they
now hold and agree that the final boundary is
negotiable.
7-Withdraw a portion of their mainland troops
now and announce their intent to consider addi-
tional troop withdrawals later.
derides met yesterday with the Turkish Cypriot
leader, Rauf Denktash, and the two set up arrange-
ments for the relief of prisoners and detainees on
both sides. Priority will be given to the sick and
wounded, as well as to those under 18 years of age
and those over 50. The two leaders also agreed to
exchange lists of missing persons and attempt to
trace them. In compliance with .the Geneva convention,
they agreed to forward lists of prisoners and.de-
tainees to the International Red Cross.
According to the US embassy in Nicosia, senior
UN officials.are.hopeful that-Clerides and Denktah.
will begin to examine political questions after agree-
ing on humanitarian and relief matters. If repre-
sentatives of Greece and Turkey can be brought .into_
the talks at that stage, UN officials. .hope that it
may be possible .within a month to formulate the out-
lines of an overall solution, which could then be .
ratified at a reconvened Geneva conference.
The agreements on humanitarian problems came
after a comprehensive.survey,of conditions on the
island compiled by representatives of the Red Cross.
The report concludes that the Turks have failed to
meet even the minimum requirements of the Geneva.con-
vention. It notes that the 20,000-25,000 Greek
?Cypriots in Turkish-controlled areas have almost no
freedom of movement and lack food and medical atten-
tion. Most of the 35,000-40,000 Turkish Cypriots in
predominatly Greek areas were found to be leading
reasonably normal lives.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Battlefield action has lessened
throughout the country during the past
few days, but substantial fighting prob-
ably still lies ahead in September.
The focus of Communist attacks remains in the
northern provinces where North Vietnamese troops are
concentrating on government positions south of Hue.
Although this area has been the scene of repeated
and somewhat inconclusive combat since last spring,
the government commander in Military Region 1 is
concerned that the North Vietnamese may try to make
a major push toward Hue. He has brought up addi-
tional forces from Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces
as a reserve.
The communists may have sought to force just
such a shift of government forces. The government
units involved in the shift had been on operations
designed to recover ground lost earlier to the enemy
in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. With their logistic
position substantially improved since the cease-
fire, the communists may attempt such whipsaw efforts
against the government with greater frequency and
impact.
To the South
North and west of Saigon, a new round of com-
munist attacks is still expected in September after
the completion of current communist supply opera-
tions and troop repositioning. Government positions
near Tay Ninh City and northwest of Bien Hoa City
are likely targets.(
The communist strategy in the Tay Ninh area
appears to be to gain new footholds relatively close
to the city and along the key logistic routes from
Saigon. The communists would then be in a position
during their next military campaign to bring sub-
stantial pressure on the relatively populous areas
that lie near the roads, extending through Tay Ninh
Province.
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The Weather Factor
As always in Vietnam the weather is an impor-
tant factor in determining both the level and aoca-,
tion of military action. Heavy rains .are under way
in the central highlands and will start soon along
the northern coast. On the coast, this period ini-
tially favors the communists because the cloudy
conditions hamper government air operations but do
not deter ground action until the rains intensify.
In the southern half of the country, where weather
conditions will soon begin to favor air operations
and troop movements, the government's capabilities
will gradually improve.
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OAS
Early removal of OAS sanctions against
Cuba, probably at an inter-American for-
eign ministers meeting at Quito on Novem-
ber 11, is foreseen by Latin American gov-
ernments on both sides of the issue.
Panama's recent resumption of relations with
Cuba brought to seven the number of OAS members
that now have diplomatic ties with Cuba. This de-
fiance of the Rio Treaty, under which the sanctions
were imposed, has heightened concern for the con-
tinued integrity and effectiveness of the OAS.
Even governments still hostile to the Castro regime
now believe continuation of the sanctions policy
could destroy the OAS.
A contributing factor is the widespread Latin
sensitivity about outside interference in matters
of national policy, which leaves the anti-Castro
forces somewhat chagrined at obstructing sister
republics that want to open the door to Cuba. Gov-
ernmental changes in Washington, moreover, have
increased concern that the US will alter its Cuban
policy and leave the anti-Castro governments dip-
lomatically isolated.
The sponsors of the resolution to review the
sanctions policy have been careful to couch it in
terms of a changed world situation and a spirit
of detente. They recognize a continuing difference
of opinion within the OAS regarding the Cuban sub-
versive threat. For this reason, as well as to
avoid provoking Castro, they hope to refrain from
any discussion of whether Havana is continuing to
export revolution. Using the co-existence argu-
ment, the sponsors are confident that they can
secure the necessary two-thirds majority vote of
the 23 members. They expect that a number of the
governments once constituting a blocking one third
plus one (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US) will now abstain.
The Castro regime sees no benefit in a reacti-
vation of its suspended OAS membership and, despite
Castro's stated interest in reconciliation with the
US, the Cubans want no part of the OAS. They reject
it as a tool of the US for dictating to Latin Amer-
ica and will continue to work toward its destruction.
They would prefer to secure further diplomatic rec-
ognition in defiance of standing OAS sanctions and
thus weaken the organization.
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ARAB OIL PRODUCERS
An oil transport company owned jointly
by the Arab oil producing nations is re-
portedly requesting bids on six new tankers
worth about $165 million. These ships will
further efforts of the oil producers to
become more involved in the total range of
oil-related business and industry.
By the end of the decade, the transport company
plans to acquire a 10-million-ton fleet, costing
about $2 billion. This fleet together with the pro-
spective national fleets of the Arab countries would
total about 20 million tons. The ships would be able
to carry about 2 million barrels per day on the Per-
sian Gulf - Rotterdam route.
For purposes of comparison, the world tanker
fleet by the end of the decade probably will exceed
400 million tons. Arab oil production in the early
1980s could range between 15 and 25 million barrels
per day.
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ZAIRE-PORTUGAL-ANGOLA
A meeting between Zairian President
Mobutu and Portuguese President Spinola
that was postponed late last month is now
? set to take place in the Cape Verde Is-
lands on September 14.
The Portuguese ambassador to the UN is "vir-
tually certain" that the meeting will be attended
by Holden Roberto, leader of the Zairian-based Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola, and by
the leader of the smallest of the three Angolan
nationalist organizations. According to the ambas-
sador, the Portuguese hope to persuade the other
major rebel group, the Popular Movement for the Lib-
eration of Angola, to attend the meeting.
The Angolan liberation movements are long-stand-
ing and bitter rivals, and in recent years have been
seriously weakened by organizational problems of in-
ternal feuding. The Portuguese apparently hope that
Mobutu can influence them to reconcile their differ-
ences and negotiate for the territory's independence.
Mobutu, a principal supporter of Angolan liberation,
is determined that an independent Angola be governed
by leaders friendly to Zaire. He will attempt to
convince the Portuguese that Holden Roberto is the
dominant nationalist figure in Angola.
9
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SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN
The raid yesterday
morning on the Japanese embassy in Seoul by
a group of South Korean youths and a large
demonstration there today are only the most
dramatic of a series of developments that
have intensified strains between the two
countries.
Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura's initial re-
sponse to the attempted assassination of President
Pak on August 15 was viewed in Seoul as unsympathetic.
Over the past week, Kimura has become the focus of
South Korean anger because of other statements which
Seoul believes cast doubt on Japan's commitment to
the security of South Korea and, more important, on
the continuing primacy of the South in Japan's policy
toward the two Koreas.
Seoul is pressing hard for redress from Japan
in the form of public statements and diplomatic ac-
tions, including an expression of policy from Prime
Minister Tanaka himself before he leaves late next
week to visit Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and the US,
where he will meet with you on September 21.
Further Strains in the Offing
A Japanese Socialist Party delegation which ar-
rived in Pyongyang on September 5 can be expected to
provide loud support for the North Korean cause.
There is also an anti-Pak campaign under way in Japan
which is pointed toward a massive leftist rally in
Tokyo on September 19. The South Koreans will find
still further fault with Japan on October 2 when a
high-level North Korean delegation arrives for a
meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the first
time North Korea has participated in the work of that
body.
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IRAQ, IRAN, AND THE KURDS
Although Iraqi forces have made gains
over recent weeks, Baghdad will probably
not be able to destroy Kurdish forces be-
fore late October, when bad weather will
ground Iraqi aircraft and halt mechanized
military operations. The Kurds' ability
to withstand the Iraqi drive hinges in
large part on the Shah's willingness to
do whatever is necessary to keep the dis-
sident movement alive. If the Kurds' mil-
itary position continues to deteriorate,
they will require not only stepped-up de-
liveries of arms from Iran, but possibly
more direct involvement by Iranian forces.
Despite the recent setbacks, Kurdish morale
appears good. There are more volunteers ready to
join the Kurds than there are weapons to supply
them. Reports from Kurdistan indicate that the
rebels are more unified than ever; large numbers
of educated Kurds, who in the past have been cool
to Barzani's conservative leadership, are now re-
ported to be joining rebel forces.
Later this year the Kurds may be able to re-
take some of the positions they have lost recently,
but they will need more equipment in order to hold
them next summer. Even with poor equipment, the
Kurds are likely to fight on. They fought the last
war against the Iraqis in 1970 despite severe sup-
ply deficiencies.
The Iranian Role
For some time Iran has provided the Kurds with
equipment, munitions, and military advisers. It
also provides food, medicine, and money, and main-
tains refugee camps for Kurds who flee the fighting.
Tehran admits only to providing humanitarian aid.
According to the Iranians, the current fighting
has pushed the refugee total over 70,000.
Iraq's recent successes have prompted the
Kurds to ask for increased support, and Tehran has
made a positive but limited response. Iranian army
and gendarmerie units along the border have been
reinforced/ and used in show-of-
force maneuvers\
Al
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Of greater significance, however, was the move-
ment last month of Iranian artillery to the border
where, for the first time, it was used to support
a Kurdish counterattack against Iraqi armor in the
Qalat Dizah area.
The Shah's Options
Unless the Shah reverses himself, the likeli-
hood of direct clashes between Iraq and Iran in-
creases as Baghdad's troops push closer to the bor-
der. The Shah might deepen Iran's involvement if
he concludes that this is the only alternative to a
crushing defeat of the Kurds. The use of Iranian
artillery represents a step in that direction and
shows that the Shah considers continued Kurdish re-
sistance important enough to justify a more direct
Iranian role. The Iranians, of course, will do their
best to ensure that this military aid remains un-
provable in international forums.
Barring a sudden collapse of the Kurdish re-
sistance, Iran's most likely course is to intensify
what it is already doing. It could increase artil-
lery support from Iranian territory, provide heavier
and more sophisticated weapons, and even stage diver-
sionary border incidents farther south to draw off
Iraqi forces. Border violations such as the Iraqi
bombing yesterday of two Iranian villages near Piran
Shahr--the main supply depot for the Kurds--could be
used by Tehran to justify launching a limited mili-
tary action along the border. The Shah might also
agree to send more Iranian personnel in mufti to
help the Kurds.
Open intervention by Iranian ground forces seems
unlikely. This would force Arab governments, recently
courted by Iran, to choose between it and Iraq--a
fellow Arab state. It also would undermine Iran's
efforts to strengthen ties with neighbors who al-
ready are apprehensive about its growing military
power.
Bilateral Relations
The Shah believes his interests are well served
by Baghdad's preoccupation with the Kurdish problem
and by Iraq's isolation in the Arab world. He there-
fore wishes to keep Kurdish resistance alive, and
shows little interest in a rapprochement with Iraq,
with whom he has long been at odds.
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The Iranians believe the greatest threat to
their goals in the Persian Gulf is the growth of
radicalism, and Iraq is seen as its chief sponsor.
The Kurdish rebellion puts domestic political strains
on the Baghdad regime, drains resources, and inhibits
Iraqi efforts to sponsor subversion against the Shah
and other traditional Gulf rulers.
Iraq, on the other hand, is under pressure from
several Arab countries to seek an accommodation with
Iran as a prerequisite for resolving the Kurdish
problem. Moreover, domestic political divisions have
been deepened as a result of the current fighting
and threaten the stability of the Iraqi regime.
There have been some signs over recent months
that the Iraqis were seeking rapprochement with Iran.
Baghdad took the lead, for example, in starting pre-
liminary bilateral talks on a range of outstanding
issues, including border demarcation, in Istanbul
last month. After two weeks, however, the meetings
ended with not much sign of progress.
Baghdad's View'
We do not know whether the Iraqi air strike near
Piran Shahr signals a radical change in Baghdad's
policy. The bombing was apparently intended in part
as a warning to the Shah against stepping up deliver-
ies of military equipment to the Kurds and against
increased involvement of the Iranian army on the
?side of the rebels. The strikes indicate that the
Iraqis are probably prepared to use air power against
Iranian artillery, mortar and anti-tank units along
the border suspected by Baghdad of having given fire
support to the Kurds.
The Iraqis are aware of the risks incurred in
carrying out air strikes against Iranian territory.
With a large part of their ground forces tied down
against the Kurds, the Iraqis are not able to engage
in major ground actions against Iran. Hence, Baghdad
will seek to avoid an outright military confrontation.
Implications for Iraq
The unending war with the Kurds could become an
increasingly onerous political liability for the re-
gime. If the army gets bogged down later this year,
political infighting could grow in Baghdad. There
could be an open power struggle at the top between
President Bakr and Baath Party strongman Tikriti,
who have been at odds for some time. Other possibil-
ities include a move against the two leaders by Baath
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Party critics with army support, or an independent
move by the army. In the past two months, there have
been signs of increasing military dissatisfaction
with the prolonged, inconclusive war.
Tikriti put his reputation on the line when the
fighting began in March by promising the Baath Party
that the war would be over in September, but his
position remains strong. He controls the party secu-
rity apparatus, which gives him early warning of po-
tential troublemakers both within the party and the
army.
Even if the Iraqi regime were overthrown, there
probably would be no sudden shifts in domestic or
foreign policy--except perhaps for the handling of
the Kurdish question. The Iraqis are so heavily
dependent on the Soviet Union for deliveries of
sophisticated weaponry that any regime that takes
power is unlikely to loosen ties with Moscow.
Soviet Stakes
Moscow's interest in protecting and improving
its position in Iraq has led it to become deeply in-
volved in supporting Baghdad against the Kurds, de-
spite significant misgivings about Iraqi policy.
Soviet military assistance and advice have played a
major role in the successes the Iraqi military has
achieved. r
_// During the past ten days, Soviet air
transports have apparently delivered sorely needed
arms to Iraq.
The Soviets are concerned that Iranian involve-
ment will lead to increased Iraqi demands for support,
and eventually endanger Soviet-Iranian relations.
Soviet support for Iraq has impeded Moscow's attempts
to improve ties to Tehran.
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