THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 AUGUST 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007804
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 29, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
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August 29, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I ),12),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
August 29, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The UN Security Council debate, which begins today,
probably cannot be confined to the issue of refu-
gees. Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash says that
he simply wants a federal solution in Cyprus and
that he had been misquoted on the subject of an
independent state. (Page 1)
France)
\Greece
/ (Page 2)
We believe Hanoi may have decided to adopt more
aggressive tactics in South Vietnam, but we cannot
forecast the precise timing or magnitude of future
Communist military operations. (Page 3)
For the past four days, Israeli patrol boats have
been intercepting Soviet minesweepers that have
entered waters near Sinai claimed by Tel Aviv.
(Page 5)
Notes on Egypt-Israel, the USSR, and Laos appear
on Page 6.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CYPRUS
The UN Security Council debate today probably
cannot be confined to the issue of refugees, accord-
ing to the US mission at the UN, especially if Sec-
retary General Waldheim's report on findings during
his recent trip is presented. There is also a chance
that Moscow may try to advance its proposal to in-
volve the Security Council in a peace conference.
In Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash clar-
ified some of his views for the US embassy in Nicosia
yesterday, claiming he had been misquoted on the sub-
ject of an independent state. Denktash said he was
trying to say that he wants a federal solution, but
that if this should prove impossible, the Turkish
sector would have to go its own way. Denktash has
indeed issued a public statement that he intended no
ultimatum and was setting no deadline for the forma-
tion of an independent state. Pressure from Ankara
may be responsible for Denktash's more moderate tone.
In Athens, Foreign Minister Mavros has formally
requested that the
EC renew those aspects of the 1962 association agree-
ment that were suspended after the military coup in
1967. The Greeks are not applying for full member-
ship in the EC, but, depending on how Athens inter-
prets sentiment among the Nine, such a request re-
mains a possibility.
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FRANCE-GREECE
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ZOA I
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
We believe that Hanoi may have decided to adopt
more aggressive tactics in South Vietnam. Our as-
sessment is tentative, however, and we cannot fore-
cast the precise timing or magnitude of future Com-
munist military operations. The Communists may now
see amore favorable strategic balance developing,
based in large part on a belief that the transition
in Washington will make it difficult for the US to
maintain backing for Saigon. For the moment, Hanoi
appears more interested in probing the position of
your administration than in mounting an all-out mil-
itary offensive to topple the Thieu government.
--Following the resignation of President Nixon,
Vietnamese Communist propaganda has taken on
a distinctly more militant cast.
--This change in tone comes against a backdrop
of increased Communist attacks. Most report-
ing points toward more fighting on at least
the present scale. The Communists have made
some gains and could be in a better position
to carry out large military operations next
year.
It is possible that Hanoi is preparing to re-
turn to the strategy it followed in the mid-1960s,
which combined a high level of military activity
in the countryside with widespread shellings and
terrorism in urban areas. The Communists were
then attempting to inflict as much damage as pos-
sible on the South Vietnamese army, to erode pub-
lic confidence in the Saigon government, and to
drive the war home to the American public. Their
objectives this time would be similar. More spe-
cifically, the Communists may hope that a turning
of the screws in the South will lead to a new round
of talks between Hanoi and Washington.
(continued)
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The Communists remain prepared to achieve
their long-term objectives through major military
action. We have seen no sign, however, that Hanoi
has decided on a military confrontation along the
lines of the offensive of 1972. We continue to be-
lieve that such a move is unlikely at least until
early next year, when favorable weather prevails
in most of the country. Before it occurs, we would
expect to see, and have so far not seen, certain
indicators. Specifically:
--The Communists have not infiltrated the
large numbers of forces that would be needed
to sustain such an effort.
--Hanoi's large strategic reserve, which would
almost certainly see action if Hanoi were go-
ing to start a major offensive, still shows
no sign of movement.
Even without an all-out offensive, however,
it is clear that the South Vietnamese government
will come under increasing pressure over the next
few months.
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Soviet Minesweeping Operations in the Strait of Gubal
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(Israeli-occupied)
Al Fayyum ?
Bani Suwayf ?
Miles 50
Gulf
of
EGYPT
EGYPT
lifh-613Channel
4,v
Area of Current
Sweeping Operations
Area of
Cleared Passage
MILES ? 10
586464 8-74 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-ISRAEL
For the past four days, Israeli patrol boats
have been intercepting Soviet minesweepers which have
entered waters near Sinai that have been under Israeli
control since June 1967, The Israelis claim a six-
mile limit in the area and have shadowed the Soviet
vessels to about three miles offshore before signal-
ing them to turn around. Two minesweepers sprayed
the Israeli boats with water hoses on August 27, but
there have been no serious incidents.
The Soviets have stated that they are willing to
clear the Israeli-claimed channel, but to date they
have not formally approached Israel through the UN,
as they reportedly intend to do. Israel has indi-
cated it would permit the Soviets to sweep the area
if the operation were coordinated with Israeli de-
fense authorities. This may be an attempt by Israel
to gain de facto recognition that it controls the
inner channel.
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NOTES
Egypt-Israel: Egyptian military forces appear
to be returning to a peacetime posture reflecting
Cairo's awareness of the conclusion of Israel's
mobilization exercise. 25X1
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that at least four of the pontoon bridges across
the Suez Canal have been removed.
USSR: The Soyuz 15 spacecraft was brought
down yesterday evening after only two days in orbit.
The Soviets cut short the mission following two un-
successful efforts on Tuesday to dock with the
Salyut 3 space station.
Laos: Communist Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi
Vongvichit and his non-communist counterpart, Leuam
Insisiengmay, are jointly heading the coalition
government during Prime Minister Souvanna's absence
from Laos. Souvanna counseled Phoumi and Leuam
before his departure to concentrate on routine gov-
ernment business and to avoid controversial issues
that could disrupt the fragile coalition. Souvanna
had earlier designated only Phoumi as "acting prime
minister." He subsequently decided on a dual ar-
rangement as the best way to maintain political
equilibrium during his absence.
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Top Secret
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