THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 AUGUST 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007800
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 24, 1974

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP19T00936A012200010048-9
The President's Daily Brief
August 24, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
August 24, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cypriot President Clerides and Greek Prime Minister
Karamanlis have failed to open the way for a resump-
tion of the Geneva peace talks, and the Greeks have
accepted the Soviet proposal to take the Cyprus is-
sue to the UN.
(Page 1)
A majority of the Egyptian cabinet is convinced that
President Sadat is favoring the US too heavily and
should seek more of a balance in Egypt's relations
with the super powers. (Page 3)
The Egyptian civilian network has stopped transmitting
weather broadcasts, a step which is highly unusual and
could be interpreted as an indication of impending hos-
tilities. We have no reasonable explanation for any
Egyptian initiation of hostilities at this time.
(Page 4)
Cairo
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Vietnamese Communist propaganda has become more mil-
itant since President Nixon's resignation; Hanoi is
calling for the forceful overthrow of President Thieu
for the first time since the signing of the Paris ac-
cords. (Page 6)
In the wake of Panama's unilateral decision to renew
relations with Cuba, several Latin American govern-
ments are interested in expediting reconsideration
by the OAS of its sanctions against Cuba. (Page 7)
Notes on USSR-Israel,
South Korea, and
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, Algeria, Laos, 25X1
begin on Page 8, 25X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS
The discussion yesterday between Cypriot Presi-
dent Clerides and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis
failed to open the way for a resumption of the peace
talks in Geneva. The two leaders continue to demand
that Turkey withdraw its forces to positions held
before the second round of fighting.
Despite derides' apparent rejection of early
peace talks, he reportedly will go ahead with his
meeting with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash to dis-
cuss humanitarian issues. Their meeting, however,
will be postponed from today until at least next
Monday. In a press conference last night, Greek
Foreign Minister Mavros claimed that the two Cypriot
leaders could probably resolve the problem if Denk-
tash were not "a prisoner of the Turks." Seeing
little hope for such bilateral talks, Mavros an-
nounced that the Greeks have accepted the Soviet
proposal to turn the Cyprus issue over to an en-
larged peace conference sponsored by the UN.
On Cyprus, the US embassy in Nicosia has heard
that another demonstration is planned today to de-
mand action on the refugee problem. No major cease-
fire violations were reported yesterday, but Turkish
forces continue to expand their holdings modestly.
There have been no further signs of a build-up
of a Greek expeditionary force for deployment to
Cyprus, and the new chief of the Greek armed forces
has said that there would be none, pending comple-
tion of a study on the precise mission and the prob-
able survival rate of such a force.
Growing Greek concern over future procurement
of military supplies--particularly naval and air
force equipment--has been noticed by US military
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representatives in Greece. Officers of the US mil-
itary assistance group have found their Greek coun-
terparts cordial and cooperative in recent days.
As awareness of the long-range repercussions
of a withdrawal from NATO sinks in, the Karamanlis
government may begin seeking a face-saving way to
reverse its decision. Domestic political problems
will make this difficult, however.
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EGYPT
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A majority of the Egyptian cabinet is convinced
that President Sadat is favoring the US too heavily
and should seek more of a balance in Egypt's rela-
tions with the super powers.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT
The Egyptian civil weather broadcast network
stopped transmitting domestic weather forecasts
last night and reports of weather abroad early this
morning. These weather broadcasts are normally
scheduled hourly. The failure to transmit them is
highly unusual and could be interpreted as an indi-
cation of impending hostilities. Similar silences
have occurred twice in the past year--once just
before the October war and once in November during
the post - cease-fire war of attrition.
The Egyptians are currently conducting what
they have told us is a four-day exercise on the
Suez front involving artillery and possibly air
defense units.
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EGYPT-FRANCE-USSR
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Vietnamese Communist propaganda has become
more militant since President Nixon's resignation.
The basic theme is that the transition of power in
Washington, compounded by US economic difficulties,
affords Hanoi political and military opportunities.
A Viet Cong broadcast of August 12, for example,
claimed that President Nixon's resignation was a
hard blow for "the Nguyen Van Thieu clique" and
that the people of the South should seize the op-
portunity "created by the enemy's crisis" to deal
it "grave setbacks."
Hanoi has begun publicly calling for the force-
ful overthrow of President Thieu for the first time
since the signing of the Paris accords. This con-
trasts with the Communists' earlier public line
that the Thieu government would be replaced in due
course through tripartite negotiations involving
all the parties in the South.
These statements do not mean that the Commu-
nists have ruled out political means as a way to
secure Thieuts ouster. Indeed, there have been
reports that the Hanoi leadership is anxious for a
new round of talks with the US. It is evident,
however, that Hanoi has become increasingly dis-
enchanted with its political prospects in the South
and may now have decided to try to force Thieu, and
the US, into negotiations through military means.
At the least, the shifts in Hanoi's propaganda
suggest a continuation of the relatively heavy mil-
itary pressure now being placed on government forces.
They could also mean that the Communist high command
has decided on a policy of gradually increasing the
intensity of its attacks to test the firmness of US
support and the effectiveness of government forces.
Such sustained military pressure could ultimately
culminate in a large-scale offensive, although the
available evidence indicates that such a campaign
is unlikely at least for the rest of the year.
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LATIN AnERICAN - CUBA
In the wake of Panama's unilateral decision to
renew relations with Cuba, several Latin American
governments are interested in expediting reconsid-
eration by the OAS of its sanctions against Cuba.
Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica believe
the organization must act soon to prevent further
defections from the sanctions policy, moves which
they see as undermining the foundations of the
inter-American system. They believe that the sanc-
tions policy may have outlived its justification,
but that it is better to reconsider that matter in
an orderly way rather than watching Castro pick off
OAS members one by one.
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Soviet Minesweeping Operations in the Strait of Gubal
S I N A 1
(Israeli-occupied)
Al Fayyum ?
Bani Suwayf
Miles 50
Gulf
of
Suez
04.
cs
*42/
AREA
M_J Red
A Inner Channel
Aga/
Area of Current
Sweeping Operations
Area of
.2 C Cleared Passage
Sea
56464 8-74 CIA
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NOTES
USSR-Israel: On August 21, Soviet minesweep-
ers began operations in the main channel of the
Strait of Gubal in areas toward the east that Is-
rael presumably views as under its control. No
Israeli reaction has been reported thus far. No
clearing has begun on the inner channel situated
still further to the east and entirely within Is-
raeli-held territory. Since the minesweeping op-
eration began in July, Israeli fighters have re-
acted to but have not challenged Soviet helicopters
that apparently intruded into the Israeli-controlled
area. Israel may overlook any intrusions now, how-
ever, since clearing of this section of the strait
will benefit Israeli shipping as well as that of
other nations. Tass announced on August 16 that
a two-nautical-mile-wide passage, which is entirely
within Egyptian territory, had been completely
cleared.
Algeria: President Boumediene--a leading
spokesman for Palestinian rights--this week re-
iterated his country's support of the Palestinian
cause and rejected a role for Jordan in Middle East
peace talks. Boumediene's stand will further com-
plicate President Sadat's efforts to accommodate
Palestinian and Jordanian approaches to negotiations.
Indeed, Boumediene's position appears less compro-
mising than that of Palestinian leader Arafat and
will strengthen those Palestinians who oppose him.
(continued)
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Laos: The Lao Communists proposed earlier this
week that the long-delayed exchange of prisoners of
war begin on September 12. Non-Communist members
of the responsible government commission have gen-
erally concurred in the plan. Neither side has
mentioned which nationalities of prisoners will be
released, but the first group on both sides will
probably be Laotian. An estimated 170 North Viet-
namese prisoners are held by the non-Communist side,
while the Pathet Lao hold some 640 Thai soldiers
and one American, civilian contract pilot Emmet Kay.
The chances for the latter's release are slim, how-
ever, because the Pathet Lao have consistently main-
tained that Kay was captured after the Laotian cease-
fire agreement was signed. In return for Kay's re-
lease, the Communists may want to obtain political
concessions from the US, such as a cessation of US
aerial reconnaissance flights over Laos.
South Korea: President Pak yesterday ordered
the immediate lifting of two of the four "emergency
decrees" that have provided the legal basis for re-
pression of dissent in South Korea since early this
year. The action was accompanied by a presidential
statement appealing for unity and "national consen-
sus" to meet the continuing threat from the North.
The newly elected leader of the main opposition
party, who is considered a strong critic of Pak,
welcomed the action but called for further moves
to open the domestic political dialogue. Pak's
latest move may ease many of the domestic and for-
eign pressures that have afflicted him in recent
months, but many of his domestic opponents will not
be reconciled so easily. Pak, of course, retains
ample means of containing and suppressing them.
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