THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 MARCH 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007695
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 12, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief.
March 12 1974
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. Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Ns,
P'10 FN.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
March 12, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Although Pompidou's visit to Moscow this week is
likely to be routine, the French President has strong
personal and political reasons for wanting to portray
the trip as a success. (Page 1)
The Portuguese cabinet reportedly will debate the
country's overseas policy today, specifically whether
to continue the wars in its African colonies, which
its detractors believe Portugal cannot win. (Page 2)
capability to oversee
the movement of shipping into the Persian Gulf and
apparently assures Oman of further Iranian military
help in fighting the Aden-backed rebel movement.
(Page 3)
,The ruler of Bahrain now says he favors retention
of the US Navy's Middle East Force base on the is-
land, and that a cabinet decision could come in about
:a week. (Page 4)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FRANCE-USSR
There is no evidence to suggest that PoMpidoU's
visit to the USSR this week will be other than
'routine, but the French president has strong per-
sonal and political reasons for portraying the trip
as a success.
The mere fact of the trip--like the mini-
shuffle of the cabinet ten days ago--is probably
intended to support the image of a Pompidou still
in charge in France. Although long in the mill,
the trip was finally scheduled only a few weeks
ago; the repeated delays had fostered some of the
rumors about the President's health.
The President's talks will--he hopes--also
serve the Gaullists, who are increasingly worried
about Mitterrand's Socialist-Communist alliance
as a real challenge when the presidential elections
occur. Friendly talks with Brezhnev will offset
some of the growing Communist criticism that Pompi-
dou's government has been drifting away from the
"special relationship" with Moscow that De Gaulle
had built. The talks will also offset Mitterrand's
coming trip to Moscow.
Apart from these domestic political consider-
ations, Pompidou may see intrinsic merit in trying'
to refurbish the "special relationship" at this ,
time. There have been numerous indications that
Paris has felt that Moscow has not satisfactorily
adhered to the consultative mechanisms set up under
past agreements. The French would also see some
revitalizing of their ties with Moscow as a proper
riposte to the recent sharp criticism from Washing-
ton.
To breathe new life into the Moscow relation-
ship, the French are known to have communicated
to the Russians in January their desire for im-
proved consultative mechanisms. The French might
feel this could be accomplished with some kind of
protocol to the 1970 agreement that could be con-
cluded during Pompidou's visit.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PORTUGAL
? Prime Minister Caetano may be forced to clarify
his position in the dispute over the country's over-
seas policy. At a meeting today, the cabinet report-
edly will debate whether to maintain the status quo.
or continue the wars in its African colonies, which
its detractors believe Portugal cannot win..
Caetano has been trying to appease both sides in
the controversy, but compromise no longer seems to
work.:, A cabinet reshuffle and changes in military
commands May be necessary to resolve the dispute at
top civil and military levels.
? Armed forces chief of staff Costa Gomes and his
deputy, General Spinola, have not been exiled to is-
land posts as earlier reported. It now appears that
some dissenting junior officers have been transferred
to the Azores or the island of Madeira.
Spinola, who has been a leading advocate of
greater autonomy for the overseas territories, argues
that Portugal's current policy isolates it from the
rest of the world, is too expensive, and is not work-
ing. The officer corps, particularly junior officers.
who ,are tired of repeated African tours, support Spin--
ola's argument. Reformist circles and pragmatists
who are concerned over the large expenditures required
to implement government policy are also backing him.
Meanwhile, the armed forces reportedly were
,placed on alert on March 9 because of "internal dis-
ciplinary problems,' and all trOops, according to
this account, are confined to barracks.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
IRAN-OMAN
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that the Sultan of Oman privately agreed, during his
official visit to Tehran last week, to allow the
Shah to station in Oman whatever forces he considers
necessary. In addition, Iran was assured of access
to airfields and port facilities within Oman.
The implications of this private agreement go
far beyond the public assurances, contained in a
final communique, that both countries will cooperate
to preserve stability and security in the region and
protect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
The Shah has interpreted the private arrange-
ment as giving Iran the flexibility to oversee the
movement of tankers not only in the strait, but also
in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and on toward
the Bab el Mandeb, which was blocked during the Oc-
tober war. He noted that the waterway would become
important to Iranian commerce after the Suez Canal
reopens.
The Sultan, on his side, sees the agreement as
giving him virtually unlimited access to Iranian
military help in fighting the rebel movement that is
backed by the government in Aden. The Sultan is wary
of putting too much reliance on Iranian help, in part
because he might thereby irritate King Faysal, who
has long been suspicious that the Shah hopes to dom-
inate the lower Persian Gulf.
Although the Sultan normally has been careful
to keep other Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia,
informed of his dealings with the Shah, it is un-
likely that the new private understanding was fully
cleared beforehand with King Faysal. According to
the Shah, the Sultan did receive the go-ahead from
Egyptian President Sadat to conclude whatever was
necessary for Oman.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
BAHRAIN-US
The ruler of Bahrain now says that he favors
retention of the US Navy's Middle East Force base
on the island. Last October the government served
notice that the agreement would be terminated in
one year. The matter will shortly be reconsidered
by the cabinet. The ruler spoke of .a decision in
about a week, although it may be delayed until the
termination of the Arab oil embargo.
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NOTE
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Top Secret
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