THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 FEBRUARY 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007675
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 15, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
February 15, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I ),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
February 15, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow believes that the best deterrent to war be-
tween the US and USSR is reliance on a mutual threat
of massive destruction, according to a Soviet of
(Page 1)
The French appear ready to retreat from their blanket
opposition to a US proposal designed to improve NATO
political consultations. (Page 2)
Tel Aviv is not considering heavy retaliation for
the recent Syrian shelling of Israeli positions in
the Golan Heights. (Page 3)
Iran's Finance Minister claims that Tehran will soon
propose measures to invest its surplus oil revenues
in oil-importing countries. (Page 4)
Communist military activity appears to be increasing
in the Central Highlands at a time when South Viet-
namese forces there are stretched thin. (Page 5)
North Korean naval ships sank a South Korean fishing
boat and damaged another. (Page 6)
Soviet pressure may have played a part in President
Sadat's decision to postpone planned cabinet changes.
(Page 7)
Indonesia's President Suharto has moved in the past
month to impose his personal authority over broad
areas of national policy and clamp down on poten-
tially divisive elements. (Page 8)
A note on South Korea's anti-corruption drive ap-
pears on Page 9.
China
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USSR
A Soviet Foreign Ministry official has asserted
that Moscow believes the best deterrent to war be-
tween the US and the USSR is reliance on a mutual
threat of massive destruction of urban and indus-
trial centers.
Speaking to a US diplomat in Moscow on February
12, Oleg Sokolov of the Foreign Ministry's USA Divi-
sion said that Moscow is hesitant publicly to ac-
knowledge its acceptance of the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction for fear of giving the erroneous
impression that the two superpowers contemplate with
equanimity the idea of destroying each other.
Soviet leaders, said Sokolov, had decided only
reluctantly to allow the press to deal with Secre-
tary Schlesinger's statements regarding the new US
nuclear targeting options. According to the Soviet
official, the Secretary's comments on US-USSR stra-
tegic competition, coupled with recent increases in
the US military budget, forced Moscow's hand.
Sokolov's assertion that the USSR adheres to
the mutual assured destruction concept is highly un-
usual, and was probably prompted by Soviet concerns
that the US is moving away from this doctrine and
toward a counterforce strategy.
The Soviets will remain hesitant to address the
mutual destruction doctrine in public, partly because
Soviet military leaders believe that open espousal
of the doctrine might undercut their rationale for
a nuclear fighting force and breed pacifism in the
ranks. Silence on mutual assured destruction also
has the effect of preserving Moscow's options vis-
a-vis the Chinese and other nuclear powers that,
in the Soviet view, do not yet have the capability
to inflict an impermissible level of damage on the
USSR in a nuclear exchange.
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NATO
The French appear ready to retreat from their
blanket opposition to a US proposal designed to im-
prove NATO political consultations.
At an informal meeting of the North Atlantic
Council permanent representatives earlier this week,
the French representative said that his government
might be induced to agree to "occasional" COuncil
meetings attended by the political directors:of:the
members' foreign ministries, provided:
--no institutionalization of procedures re-
sults from the proposed February 28 meeting
or any subsequent ones;
--the political directors do not meet alone--
Paris wants the permanent Council representa-
tives in attendance;
--each Council member remains free to deter-
mine whom it will designate as its political
director.
Earlier, the French had indicated that they
opposed North Atlantic Council meetings "reinforced"
by the presence of the political directors because
they would duplicate and depreciate the work of the
NATO permanent representatives. What the French
really fear is that such meetings might detract
from the regular monthly meetings of the EC politi-
cal directors and furnish the US with an indirect
voice in EC political discussions.
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ISRAEL
Tel Aviv is not considering heavy retaliation
for the recent Syrian shelling of Israeli positions
in the Golan Heights, according to Foreign Minister
Eban. He told Ambassador Keating this week that
Israeli military experts do not think Damascus wants
to renew hostilities but instead is attempting to ?
force concessions from Israel.
Tel Aviv believes that the Syrians see them-
selves in a weaker military and political position
than either Egypt or Jordan.. Damascus therefore
considers it necessary to alarm, the international
community and maintain military pressure on Israel.
'Syria's discomfort has been compounded by the de-
mobilization of some Israeli forces on the Egyptian
front who would now be available for service on the
Syrian front, if needed.
Fear that a retaliatory strike would upset
attempts to launch disengagement talks with Damas-
cus also is probably restraining Israel. Eban in-
dicated that Israeli officials remain hopeful that
these efforts will succeed,.and he expressed cau-
tious optimism about, the outcome of Soviet and
French initiatives on the POW question.
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IRAN
Tehran will soon propose measures to make Iran's
surplus oil revenues available to oil-importing coun-
tries,according to Finance Minister Amouzegar. This
is the first indication that oil producers will try
to alleviate these countries' balance-of-payments
difficulties. The Shah no doubt hopes to quiet
criticism over the sharp price increases for oil,
and to show that Iran will use its surplus funds
productively.
According to Minister Amouzegar, Iran is pre-
pared to:
--lend a sizable portion of its 1974 foreign
exchange surplus to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF);
--allocate funds to developing countries through
the World Bank to enable them to purchase addi-
tional industrial products;
--purchase bonds issued by the World Bank and
other international institutions;
--increase foreign aid and invest in the de-
velopment of natural resources in both indus-
trialized and developing countries.
The Shah will present these proposals to IMP
Managing Director Witteveen and World Bank President
McNamara on February 20 and 21 respectively. If
agreement is reached, Tehran will have relatively
secure and profitable outlets for much of this year's
estimated foreign exchange surplus of $13 billion.
These new commitments presumably will not interfere
with Tehran's plans to contribute to a proposed OPEC
bank.
Other direct Iranian aid to developing countries
is not likely to be large. Tehran will probably
continue to lend funds at favorable rates to coun-
tries in which it seeks greater influence.
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555272 2-74
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SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnamese forces in the central high-
lands are stretched thin at a time when Communist
military activity may be increasing.
Communists attacked government positions north
of Kontum city on February 13, while a government
operation to retake a border outpost west of Pleiku
city has met stiff resistance. The region's only
reserve regiment, which was recently rated unfit for
combat, has been sent to reinforce the operation.
In Darlac Province, to the south, a government ad-
vance against a Communist border supply route has
stalled.
Intercepted messages reflect Communist plans
for new attacks in Quang Duc Province to draw South
Vietnamese troops from other areas in the highlands.
Government planners would be reluctant to shift
troops there, however, since they believe a more
serious threat exists in Kontum and Pleiku.
General Toan, the government's central region
commander, would like to concentrate his forces on
disrupting the Communist supply corridor that runs
along the Cambodian border. With the current limited
drives there already stalled, his troops could run
into serious trouble if they try to push even further
west.
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KOREA
North Korean naval ships from a squadron based
at Cho-do sank a South Korean fishing boat late yes-
terday in international waters northwest of the
Northern Limit Line. Another South Korean boat ap-
parently was damaged and may have been taken under
tow by the North Koreans.
Pyongyang's action appears aimed at keeping
fishing vessels out of contested waters near the
Northern Limit Line. South Korean fishing boats
usually move into these waters at this time of year.
North Korea has seized a number of these in the
past, but has usually released ships and crew later.
The evidence available thus far suggests that
?the North Koreans were not deliberately trvina to
provoke Seoul.
The South Korean Defense Ministry has already
publicized the incident and announced that it has
sent naval ships to search for survivors. A South
Korean destro er and one other shi h
the area.
H ? - ?
II ?
The incident is bound to raise tensions in the
area. Even if ?the North Koreans choose to play down
the incident, Seoul will almost certainly seize the
chance to portray it as further evidence of Pyong-
yang's aggressiveness.
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EGYPT
Soviet pressure may have played a part in Pres-
ident Sadat's decision to postpone planned cabinet
changes. A well-informed diplomatic contact of the
US Interests Section in Cairo has said that Moscow
objected to the proposed appointment of the liberal
Economy Minister Hijazi as prime minister.
During Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit
to Moscow last month, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
reportedly criticized Egypt's "turn toward the right"
and indicated that Hijazi's appointment would com-
plicate Soviet aid. According to this source, Soviet
officials asked how they could be expected to con-
tinue to underwrite assistance to a country whose
views increasingly diverge from the USSR's, and
they strongly suggested that Hijazi's appointment
be postponed.
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INDONESIA
President Suharto has moved in the past month
to impose his personal authority over broad areas of
national policy and to clamp down on potentially
divisive elements.
Suharto has reshuffled military and intelligence
personnel, ostensibly to increase effectiveness. The
net result has been to erode the power base of armed
forces deputy commander in chief, General Sumitro.
In addition, Suharto has recently created a new
political and security council to "ratify" his deci-
sions. This council includes only one ex officio
representative of the defense establishment.
Suharto's actions have caused grumbling among
the military because he failed to consult the generals
in advance. While Suharto's position within the mili-
tary government has long been that of first among
equals, he is now acting more like a man with abso-
lute authority.
Since taking over in 1966, Suharto has fostered
greater centralization of authority in the Jakarta
bureaucracies. Some generals now fear he wants to
go one step further and centralize such authority in
the presidential palace.
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NOTE
? South Korea: President Pak Chong-hui has
launched a widespread anti-corruption drive in an
effort to increase public confidence in his govern-
ment. So far, 40 officials--including five of vice
ministerial rank--reportedly have been asked to re-
sign. Since no senior officials have been removed,
however,, the political opposition is openly express-
ing its cynicism about the cleanup. The anti-
corruption campaign could easily backfire on Pak
if it should be used by his lieutenants to settle
old political scores, and particularly if it should
bring about disarray in the military, the police,
and the security services.
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China
(continued)
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(continued)
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Top Secret
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