THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 JANUARY 1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007647
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 15, 1974

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The President's Daily Brief
January 15, 1974
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
January 15, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Syria
Iraq
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President Bourguiba is reported to have already de-
cided to cancel the agreement to merge his country
with Libya. He has also removed his foreign minis-
ter, probably for pushing too hard on the merger.
(Page 2)
There are indications that the North Vietnamese re-
cently held a Central Committee plenum--their first
in two years. Hanoi has accelerated troop infiltra-
tion to South Vietnam although the rate of infiltra-
tion remains significantly below that of recent years.
(Page 3)
In South Korea, President Pak yesterday announced
another emergency decree, this one aimed at under-
cutting those critics who have been calling for po-
litical reform. (Page 5)
The Soviet Union
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Soviet leaders apparently intend ostracism and public
vilification for Solzhenitsyn, rather than criminal
action, at least for the time being. (Page 7)
Notes on a British proposal to barter for Iranian
oil and on the next Brazilian president appear on
Page 9.
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MIDDLE EAST
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TUNISIA-LIBYA
President Bourguiba has already decided to can-
cel the agreement.he signed three days ago to merge
his country with Libya
In a move to tighten his control over and ensure
the complete loyalty of his close advisers, Bourguiba
also changed. part of his cabinet yesterday. Foreign
Minister Masmoudi, a long-time supporter of closer
ties with Libya, was replaced by Bourguiba's loyal.
cabinet director, Habib Chatti. Although Masmoudi!s
removal had been rumored for some time, the timing
of his dismissal suggests he pushed too hard for
union with Libya.
'The cabinet changes also affected the Ministries
of Defense, Equipment, and Social Affairs. The most
significant switch moved Minister of Equipment Khefacha,
Bourguiba's first cousin and,most-loyal minister, to
the sensitive-post-of defense minister.
This ministerial realignment is in accord with
other evidence that Qadhafi and Masmoudi overwhelmed
Bourguiba in a moment of weakness. (
/ Moreover, his three key associates--his
wife, son, and the prime minister--were absent; they
would have advised against the merger. Bourguiba
now stands to lose considerable prestige no matter
how he handles the affair.
Another union fiasco could be a severe personal
blow to Qadhafi. His move toward Tunisia was essen-
tially an effort to pull himself out of the political
isolation which has weighed heavily on him since the
failure of the Libyan-Egyptian union last fall. The
Libyan leader's strong domestic position can probably
withstand such a failure, but his personal reaction
may lead to another round of resignation threats.
The political embarrassment of publicly retract-
ing the union announcement could force both sides to
agree on a face-saving compromise. Bourguiba may
decide that a protracted period of preparations
for the merger would give him enough time to negotiate
his own terms or pull back more gracefully.
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NORTH VIETNAM
There are signs that the North Vietnamese re-
cently held a Central Committee plenum--their first
in two years.
The Central Committee meets to ratify important
leadership decisions and to adopt resolutions pro-
viding guidelines on ,key policy matters. Hanoi held
its 20th plenum in early 1972, not long before the
spring offensive. The more important, 19th plenum
in late,1970-dealt with the growing South Vietnamese
threat to Laos' and endorsed a new line on domestic
economic development. It may also have approved
early preparations for the offensive that eventually
was launched in 1972.
A text of new Central Committee resolutions is
not yet available, but if a plenum was held recently,
it will probably be mentioned in Hanoi's media be-
fore too long. Public treatment would provide in-
sights into Hanoi's line on key issues like the con-
flict in the South and the long-overdue party con-
gress.
Hanoi has accelerated troop infiltration to
South Vietnam, although the amount of infiltration
remains significantly below that of recent years.
(continued)
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Thus far in the current dry season, which began
in September, Hanoi appears to have sent about 45,000
troops south.
An intercept of last November suggested that
approximately 11,000 troops would move south to the
COSVN area and the central highlands each month from
December through April or May. If such a rate should
be maintained by the North Vietnamese, it would re-
sult in a total of 80,000 to 90,000 for the dry sea-
son.
CIA analysts believe that this total would allow
the Communists to rebuild understrength units and
build a sizable manpower pool in the southern half
of the country. DIA analysts, however, take the po-
sition that although the Communists could indeed re-
build understrength units, they could not develop a
sizable manpower pool. Neither could they replace
personnel losses at current levels of combat.
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SOUTH KOREA
President Pak yesterday announced his third
emergency decree, aimed essentially at undercutting
those critics who have been calling for political
reform. The decree lists measures to alleviate the
growing economic burden of the average South Korean
by stabilizing the cost of basic commodities and
otherwise slowing the rate of inflation. It also
rescinds some unpopular economic legislation, lowers
taxes, and provides for pay increases and more jobs.
In presenting this decree, Pak claimed that those
pressing for political change, though few in number,
have been diverting the government's attention from
measures to cope with economic difficulties.
Although the new decree will have considerable
appeal, informed South Koreans will see the govern-
ment's action as not much more than a diversionary
tactic, and the demand for basic political change
will continue. The regime is prepared to use the
full authority of earlier decrees to intimidate those
not otherwise dissuaded by conciliatory actions. It
has recently arrested and interrogated senior opposi-
tion politicians, intellectuals, and clergy. Most
have been released after several hours, however.
Pak is likely to persist with this carrot-and-
stick approach. He presumably hopes that it will
forestall a public challenge to his authority, which
in turn would precipitate a serious political confron-
tation.
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USSR
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USSR
The official press campaign against Solzhenitsyn
intensified yesterday with a lengthy Pravda article
denouncing his behavior as anti-Soviet and threaten-
ing that he "merits the fate of a traitor." Like
previous commentaries, however, Pravda carefully
sidestepped the sensitive issue of what precise pen-
alties may be in store for him.
Solzhenitsyn's action in authorizing publication
of Gulag Archipelago has put the Kremlin leaders in
an uncomfortable position. They can let him go un-
punished only at the cost of eroding their control
over Soviet intellectuals. At the same time, they
are painfully aware that strong punitive measures
against him would invite adverse reaction abroad
that could cast a shadow over Moscow's overtures to-
ward the West.
Ostracism and public vilification, rather than
criminal penalties, are apparently what the Soviet
leaders have in mind for Solzhenitsyn, at least for
the time being. A deputy editor of Pravda told US
Embassy officials on January 10 that, although
Solzhenitsyn broke the law, foreign policy considera-
tions would probably prevent strong action against
him.
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UK
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NOTES
UK-Iran: London has proposed a deal with Tehran
involving the barter this year of about $300 million
worth of steel, cement, textiles, and other products
for Iranian oil. The deal could bring the UK about
100,000 barrels a day with no cost in foreign exchange.
Iranian officials have expressed interest and may al-
ready have given the British a list of the goods they
want.
Brazil: A special electoral college will rat-
ify today the selection of retired General Ernesto
Geisel as Brazil's next president. Named by Presi-
dent Medici as his successor last June, Geisel will
assume office on March 15. Like his predecessor,
Geisel is expected to give priority to economic de-
velopment. He will probably stress an independent,
but not radically nationalistic, foreign policy and
a growing Brazilian role in world affairs.
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