THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 DECEMBER 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006007613
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 4, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief.
4 December 1973
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declassified only on approval of .
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 December 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Israel and Egypt appear to be edging toward an agree-
ment to resume disengagement talks at Kilometer 101.
Some influential Israelis may be arguing for a more
flexible position regarding a possible US security
guarantee for Israel as part of a Middle East peace
package. Relatively heavy exchanges of fire occurred
on the Syrian front. (Page 1)
Seoul is pressing for an early meeting of the Mili-
tary Armistice Commission which it wants to use as
a forum for warning Pyongyang not to push its claim
to waters surrounding islands south of the Northern
Limit Line.
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A narrow majority of UN members appears to support
Prince Sihanouk's challenge to unseat the Lon Nol
government at the UN. (Page 5)
In South Vietnam, President Thieu is working on long-
range plans to strengthen his domestic position and
permit him to run for a third term. (Page 6)
China(
/Pakistan / (Page 7)
Tito's swing toward Moscow has been chiefly motivated
by the desire to insure Yugoslavia's independence
after he is gone. (Page 8)
Notes on continuing demonstrations in Korea
appear on
Page 9.
At Annex, we review Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the
outcome of the recent Tito-Brezhnev talks at Kiev,
and the effects of the shift in the Belgrade-Moscow
relationship on Yugoslavia's relations with Romania
and other Communist countries, the third world, and
the West.
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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL
Israel and Egypt appear to be edging toward an
agreement to resume disengagement talks at Kilometer
101. An Egyptian Government spokesman said yester-
day that indirect diplomatic contacts between Egypt
and Israel are under way and that results can be
expected "perhaps in the immediate future." Cairo
still insists that before it will agree to resume
talks Tel Aviv must indicate a willingness to change
its "intransigent" bargaining position on troop pull-
backs.
Israeli.Defense Minister Dayan told UN: Emergency
Force Commander Siilasvuo Sunday 25X1
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Israel's chief negotiator, General Yariv, would
"certainly" be able to resume the talks and would
be prepared to propose steps to effect a disengage-
ment of forces. Dayan warned, however, that a dis-
cussion of a return to the October 22 lines was "out
of the question" and that issues such as the re-open-
ing of the Suez Canal were best left to a peace con-
ference.
Lower level contacts between Israeli and Egyp-
tian military commanders are continuing. Local com-
manders along the front are keeping in touch and
have held meetings at Kilometer 101 to discuss such
matters as transfer of supplies to Suez city.
(continued)
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On the Egyptian front, flight .activity yester-
day returned to a high level. More than.50 Israeli
aircraft flew routine missions while some 15 Egyp-
tian aircraft carried out what were probably defen-
sive patrols and at least one reconnaissance flight.
On the grouna several ex-
c anges of small arms fire were reported. A high-
level UN official stated yesterday that the Israelis
have completed an earthen causeway across the Suez
Canal and are using it.
For the second consecutive day, relatively heavy
exchanges of fire occurred on the Syrian front. The
Syrians apparently reacted again to Israeli construc-
tion activity near the cease-fire lines with small
arms, anti-tank, and artillery fire. Damascus claimed
15 Israeli casualties; the Israelis admitted four.
Some influential Israelis may be arguing for a
more flexible position regarding a possible US secu-
rity guarantee for Israel as part of a Middle East
peace package. An Israeli journalist known in the
past to have reflected Dayan's thinking published
an article on December 2 that called for a fresh
look at the idea and additional discussions with the
US. Another Israeli journalist, who probably re-
flects the views of more hard-line groups, stated in
an article of November 30 that the Israeli Defense
Force must find a new deterrent formula to impress
upon the Arabs the hopelessness of future military
action. He said Israel must develop a doctrine,em-
ploying technological sophistication and daring
tactics that would utilize Israel's new weapons sys-
tems and the superior quality of its manpower.
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LIBYA-EGYPT
Tripoli has not officially announced the closing
late last week of its diplomatic office in Cairo, an
act which appears to be symbolic rather than a true
diplomatic break. Libya's resident minister and
staff officers are still in Cairo as is its permanent
representative to the Arab League.
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KOREA
Seoul is pressing for an early meeting of the
Military Armistice Commission, which the South
Koreans want to use as a forum for warning Pyongyang
not to push its claim to waters surrounding islands
south of the Northern Limit Line. North Korea claims
that ?these waters--and therefore presumably the is-
lands--are within its 12-mile limit. Seoul is con-
cerned that, unless Pyongyang receives clear notice
of the South Korean position, an incident could occur
during South Korea's support trips to the islands
during the next few days. By seeking to use the
Military Armistice Commission, Seoul is, in effect,
also signaling that it opposes direct discussions
of the issue with the North.
a naval incident could occur which Pyongyang
conceivably could use as an excuse for an amphibious
assault on one or more of the islands.
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UN-CAMBODIA
The General Assembly today takes up Prince Si-
hanouk's challenge to unseat the Lon Nol government
at the UN. Sihanouk's prospects have been improved
by strong Chinese and nonaligned support; the most
recent estimates show that a narrow majority--all
that is needed on this issue--supports a resolution
to seat Sihanouk's representatives. Approval of the
resolution would be an important psychological vic-
tory for the Khmer Communists and a major accomplish-
ment for the nonaligned states that have adopted the
issue as a test of their solidarity.
The Asian Working Group, a caucus of UN members
opposing the Sihanouk challenge, hopes to defer a
vote until next year--a tactic that has been used
successfully on similar issues in the past. This
year, however, Sihanouk's supporters seem determined
to mount strong opposition to postponement, and ob-
servers are predicting a close vote.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu is working on long-range plans
to strengthen his domestic position 'He is deter...7,
mined to have South Vietnam's constitution amended
to.permit him to run for a third term-in 1975. He,
also wants to limit the independence of theAudiciary
through an amendment that would make Supreme Court'
justices presidential appointees and eliminate the
legislature's'role in their selection. The Ministry
of Justice would be given more direct control over
judicial activities in the provinces.
Thieu is satisfied with his recent efforts to
weaken non-Communist opposition groups. He wants,
however, to preserve at least one "opposition" party
mainly for "appearances abroad" and, in recent months,
has shown concern that his actions might influence
the US Congress to cut aid to South Vietnam. Cur-
rently only the gOvernment's Democracy PartThas full,
legal standing. Thieu and his advisers are consid-
ering ways to allow the two main opposition parties
to achieve this status but, at the same time, strictly
limit their freedom of action. If he is not able to
work out a satisfactory system of control* he may
consider forming a puppet party:
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PAKISTAN-CHINA
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR
If any single factor has motivated Tito's swing
toward Moscow, it is his constant search for policies
that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he
is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation
toward the West and of his strivings to make non-
alignment a viable world force. He currently sees
more to gain from Moscow than from the West.?
At Annex, we review Soviet-Yugoslav relations,
the outcome of the talks at Kiev, and the effects of
the shift in the Belgrade-Moscow relationship on
Yugoslavia's relations with Romania and other Commu-
nist countries, the third world, and the West.
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NOTES
South Korea: .The ouster of South Korean CIA
chief Yi Hu-rak in yesterday's cabinet reshuffle
has not stopped campus unrest. Seven hundred stu-
dents from a major women's college staged a street
demonstration in the, center of Seoul today--.the
first major off-campus protest in the two months
of disturbances. ? The governments response remains
measured
USSR:
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YUGOSLAV - SOVIET RELATIONS
Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union are
now closer than at any time since Tito's break with
Stalin in 1948. The gradual warming trend that be-
gan in 1971 suddenly went into high gear during the
Middle East war and culminated in the exceptionally
friendly talks between Tito and Brezhnev in Kiev in
mid-November.
At the beginning of the 1970s Belgrade's foreign
policy was still deeply influenced by what happened
to Prague in 1968 and by attendant fears of a Soviet
invasion of Yugoslavia. Relations with Moscow and
its loyal East European allies had gone sour and
Belgrade's fervor for nonalignment had waned. In
the communist movement, the Yugoslav party was cul-
tivating its ties with China and Romania, who were
prominent in their defiance of the CPSU. Relations
with Western Europe and the US on the other hand,
had prospered, both in reaction to the Soviet threat
and in the hope that ties to the West would bring
economic improvements at home.
By 1971, however, Tito had come to perceive
that there could be serious drawbacks in leaning
too far to the West. Premature attempts to estab-
lish democratic institutions precipitated a crisis
of nationalism in Croatia. Economic ties to the
West created large debts to Western creditors with-
out ensuring adequate development of the Yugoslav
industrial base.
Moreover, the strategic advantages of the West-
ward tilt began to erode as the mood of European
politics shifted toward detente. As Brezhnev in-
creasingly touted his friendly ties with the rest
of Europe and the United States, Tito saw less rea-
son to maintain his anti-Soviet line. Washington's
role as the supporter of Yugoslav security began
ta fade. More important, perhaps, the new atmos-
phere gave Tito an opportunity to repair an old
breach with the Kremlin in time to win Moscow's good
graces for his successors. His meeting with Brezh-
nev in Belgrade in September 1971 set in train a
series of political contacts and expanding economic
ties that have become the core of the new relation-
ship.
The Middle East war in October provided the
final push toward Kiev. Tito immediately proclaimed
full support for the Arabs--his principal partners
in nonalignment--placing Yugoslavia squarely on the
Soviet side in a major international crisis. Bel-
grade granted over-flight rights for the Soviet air-
lift, and the regime's presses began to crank out
anti-Israeli propaganda.
(continued)
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What Tito Received at Kiev
After issuing the warmly worded communique at
the end of the visit, Yugoslav and Soviet officials
have maintained a discreet silence about Kiev.
In the realm of political cooperation, however,
Belgrade has decided to back away from its long-
standing support of China out of deference to the
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Kremlin's sensitivities. The Yugoslays may also
begin to mute their differences with the Soviets
on international issues, such as MBFR, in which
Belgrade has an interest but no real influence.
From Belgrade's point of view, the prospects
of long-term economic cooperation were probably the
most important matter discussed. Moscow had extended
a $540-million credit to Belgrade in 1972, and this
October promised to build a gas pipeline to northern
Yugoslavia. The Kiev discussions indicate, at a
minimum, the Kremlin's continuing willingness to make
solid investments in Yugoslavia.
The Soviets will probably make good on whatever
economic promises Brezhnev made to Tito. They know
that as long as the money pours in, Tito will not
risk siding against the Kremlin on any of the more
important international issues.
There is also good reason to believe that Tito
requested modernization of the Yugo-
slav armed forces with Soviet weapons.
Soviet arms shipments to Yugoslavia would go
far toward allaying any residual fears Tito may have
of a Soviet invasion. For his own part, Tito may
well have decided to seek arms in the only market
open to him.
Effects of Kiev
Belgrade must be prepared to pay some penalties
for whatever it stands to gain from the new relation-
ship with Moscow. This changed attitude toward the
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Soviet Union will generally be detrimental to Yugo-
slavia's traditional role in the world communist
movement and in the international community.
The most immediate effect, and perhaps one of
the most telling, will be a downturn in relations
with Romania. President Ceausescu, who has long
regarded Tito as both a friend and a fellow maverick
in the communist movement, is already angry. During
the Middle East war the Yugoslays attempted to pres-
sure Romania into adopting a more pro-Arab stance.
At the UN, the Yugoslays were instrumental in dis-
missing Romania's offer of troops to the UNEF. The
Yugoslav shift on the Sino-Soviet dispute will add
to Ceausescu's anger.
In the long run, differences between Belgrade
and. Bucharest over the shared basic principles that
have shaped their relations with Moscow could prove
most damaging. Ceausescu is deeply worried over
the possible growth of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia.
If he becomes unsure of Belgrade's support for his
cocky independent stance, he may feel forced to re-
vise his relationship with Belgrade and, perhaps,
review his entire foreign policy.
Belgrade can also expect to hear from those
Communist parties that have been active in opposing
Moscow's attempts to dominate the movement. Cer-
tainly, Peking will register its displeasure, as
will the Albanians and the Italian Communists. As
the results of Kiev become known, differences that
are normally aired only in private could well break
into open polemics with the Yugoslays.
Belgrade's generally good relations with West-
ern Europe have not yet been affected, though some
deterioration is possible. Tito will, however, be
careful not to rock the boat, because he wants
Yugoslavia to play a full role in European detente
and because his country is heavily dependent on
Western trade and credits.
Relations with Washington, which have already
dipped to a new low, are evidently in for some more
rough sledding. Tito's decision to side with the
radicals in the nonaligned movement dictates that
in his eyes the United States has become the ogre
in international relations.
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Independence versus Collaboration
If there is any single factor that has moti-
vated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant
search for those policies that will ensure Yugo-
slavia's independence after he is gone. This was
true of his earlier orientation toward the West and
of his strivings to make nonalignment a viable world
force. In essence, he currently sees more to gain
from Moscow than from the West.
There are limits on the degree to which he will
cooperate with the Soviets, however. He will not,
for example, permit any kind of formal ties that
would even appear to undermine his independence.
He will also avoid restrictive relationships with
CEMA that would preclude Belgrade's continued--
and lucrative--relationship with the Common Market.
At least for the foreseeable future, Tito will
work more closely with Moscow, but within the frame-
work of detente, and only so long as he believes
the Kremlin's avowals that it is dedicated to the
peaceful settlement of major European problems.
Should Moscow undertake any action that seems to
threaten detente, the Yugoslays will immediately
back-pedal toward neutralism or toward the West.
Similarly, if Moscow becomes overly confident of
its influence and begins to meddle in Yugoslav in-
ternal affairs, it will discover that the honeymoon
with Tito was very short indeed.
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