THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 JULY 1974
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006004756
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 5, 1974
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The President's Daily Brief
July 5, 1974
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1),(3),(3)
declauified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
July 5, 1974
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Arab League Secretary General says that sev-
eral secret resolutions were adopted in support
of Lebanon and the fedayeen. A Beirut paper, how-
ever, will indicate that Lebanon rejected all of-
fers of aid. (Page 1)
General Galvao de Melo, a member of Portugal's
junta and a olose associate of President Spinola,
recently approached the US deputy chief of mission
on Portugal's pressing need for economic aid from
the US. (Page 3)
(Page 4)
Emperor Haile Selassie has agreed to military su-
pervision of the government and to acceleration of
constitutional changes that will make him a figure-
head. (Page 5)
In Laos, the cabinet again postponed recognition
of the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment, prompting a fresh Communist threat to
pull out of the coalition. (Page 6)
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ARAB STATES
In a vaguely worded statement issued at the
conclusion of the two-day Arab League Defense Council
meeting in Cairo, Secretary General Riyad said that
several secret reolutions were adopted in support
of Lebanon and the Palestinians. Although Riyad did
not elaborate, he said the Arab states agreed to pro-
vide Beirut and the Palestinians with military, fi-
nancial, and political support.
According to a correspondent's dispatch from
Cairo to a usually well-informed Beirut newspaper,
however, the Lebanese--in closed meetings of the
council--rejected all offers for financial and mil-
itary aid for both Lebanon and the Palestinians.
The Lebanese apparently made it clear that they
did not want either the Arab troops or the sophisti-
cated air and air defense equipment that was offered
by other Arab states, for fear that this would pro-
voke direct hostilities with Israel. There had been
earlier indications that Beirut would seek at least
financial assistance for a long-range defense program
that it could plan itself.
The Lebanese also reportedly succeeded in turn-
ing aside Palestinian demands for aid. The dispatch
quoted fedayeen leader Zuhayr Muhsin as saying that
Beirut vetoed requests both for financialaid for
the construction of shelters in Palestinian refugee
camps and for additional SA-7 missiles to augment
the Syrian-manned missile units sent last week to
defend the camps in Lebanon.
The delegates from Lebanon apparently.felt.that
accepting assistance from other Arabs at this time
would place their government under an obligation to
states that do not share its inclination to remain
relatively uninvolved in Arab-Israeli affairs. They
probably felt that permitting aid to the fedayeen
would infringe on their sovereignty--already a-sore
point in Lebanese-fedayeen relations.
(continued)
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Lebanon's reported unwillingness to accept aid
could have broad and serious consequences. The feda-
yeen, under pressure from Lebanon and other moderates,
pledged earlier this week to suspend cross-border
raids into Israel. The fedayeen may now feel that
Lebanon's position at the Cairo meeting releases
them from this pledge.
Many Arabs, including the Egyptians, will be
apprehensive that the Lebanese position weakens Arab
clout and could strengthen Israel's propensity for
expansionism. Egypt's offer two weeks ago of planes
and pilots for Lebanon's defense was intended, as
was the Defense Council meeting itself, to remind
Israel and the US that the Arabs can back their words
with action when they feel it necessary. The appar-
ent failure of the Arab states to come up with a
unified position, however, belies that warning.
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PORTUGAL
General Galvao de Melo, a member of Portugal's
junta and a close associate of President Spinola,
recently approached the US deputy chief of mission
on Portugal's pressing need for aid. Emphasizing
that he was raising the matter officially, Galvao
de Melo said the most important immediate require-
ment from the US is economic assistance. He en-
dorsed President Nixon's suggestion that the forum
for discussing such aid could be the current nego-
tiations on the US base in the Azores.
In the course of the same conversation with
the US embassy officer, Galvao de Melo said that he
plans to leave the junta soon in order to found a
centrist political party. The party will campaign
for Galvao de Melo himself as vice president and
for General Spinola as president of the republic.
The party will have the support of the armed forces
chief of staff, General Costa Gomes. Galvao de
Melo did not indicate, and perhaps does not know,
whether the party will have the crucial support of
middle-echelon and junior officers.
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ETHIOPIA
Emperor Haile Selassie has agreed to military
supervision of the government and to acceleration
of constitutional changes that will make him a
figurehead. The agreement, reached on Wednesday,
leaves the Endalkatchew government intact but pro-
vides for "close collaboration" between the cabinet
and the military. A revised constitution, now being
prepared by a committee appointed last March, is ,
expected to establish a constitutional monarchy and
a parliamentary cabinet.
The military scored a major gain by securing
the appointment of General Aman Mikael Andom as the
new chief of staff. Aman, who enjoys wide respect
in the military, has long advocated the political
and social changes that the military have now forced
the Emperor to accept.
Haile Selassie also agreed to grant amnesty to
political prisoners and to all political exiles who
left the country because of differences with him.
While the moderates who now dominate the mili-
tary can enforce their views when they intervene in
the political process, they are not a tightly knit
group and therefore will not be able to provide
firmness and continuity in the direction of the gov-
ernment.
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NOTE
Laos: For the third time in as many meetings,
the Lao cabinet on July 3 postponed recognition of
the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment. The Communist minister of foreign affairs,
Phoumi Vongvichit, reiterated the Pathet Lao threat
to pull out of the coalition government if the pro-
posal to recognize the PRG is not accepted. The
non-Communist ministers successfully argued that the
entire 18-point program the Communists pushed through
the Joint National Political Council must first be
debated. One of these 18 points calls for recogni-
tion of world revolutionary movements--a category
that would include the PRG.
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..?
Top Secret
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