THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 30 JANUARY 1964

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005996804
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: January 30, 1964

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
30 JANUARY 1964
-TOP?SE-CR.E1_
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1. South Vietnam
a. This morning's bloodless
coup in Saigon was undertaken to
checkmate certain leading generals
alleged by the coup leaders to be
receptive to French proposals for
a neutralized South Vietnam. The
coup group, friendly to the US, also
felt that the war effort was lagging.
b. Today's coup was led by
General Nguyen Khanh, commander of
the I Military Corps in the north.
He had the direct support of General
Khiem, who commands the corps area
surrounding Saigon, and the agree-
ment of the other corps commanders.
c. The coup leaders seem to
have been particularly suspicious
of the strong French ties of Generals
Don and Kim, who had been relying
on generals recently returned from
France while leaving the corps com-
manders out in the cold.
d. Khanh has assumed the top
position formerly held by "Big"
Minh. Khanh is a vigorous military
man with little political experience.
He has said he will look to the US
Embassy for guidance. Khiem will
take over Don's job as armed forces
commander.
(Cont'0)
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e. Minh, Don, Kim, the ambi-
tious Minister of Interior Ton That
Dinh, and police director Xuan
are all under
arrest.
f. Minh's refusal--so far--to
lend his considerable prestige to
the new order is a clear liability.
g. The changeover comes at a
time when Minh's junta was just be-
ginning to get its counterinsurgency
effort rolling. This effort is
bound to suffer at least temporary
dislocation, and the Viet Cong may
again take advantage of the confu-
sion.
2. Cyprus a. The talks in London are
still limping along.
b. Turkey has joined Greece
in agreeing to establish an inter-
allied police force. However, the
Greeks think the Greek and Turkish
contingents on the island could then
be removed, while the Turks contend
that at least the Turkish one would
have to be reinforced.
(Cont9d)
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C. The situation in and around
Nicosia has lost none of its tense-
ness. Ambassador Wilkins, who visited
several leading Turkish Cypriots in
their enclave the other day, found
them in a state of "traumatic shock"
with absolutely no confidence in the
Greek Cypriots.
d. Makarios, who is being dif-
ficult about an international peace-
keeping force, is trying to create
the impression that he has arranged
for some sort of Soviet support.
e. What the Soviets are ac-
tually up to is pretty murky, but
we suspect they are egging him on.
f. The Greek Government, is
getting a bit fed up with Makarios.
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3. East Africa
4. China-France
a. The highly unstable atmos-
phere in Zanzibar favors a Communist
takeover.
c Zanzibar could thus turn
into a most useful Communist base
from which to fund, arm and direct
the sort of thing that happened in
Zanzibar anywhere from the Horn to
the Cape.
d. This has not been lost on
the leaders of the three mainland
states. They all suspect that the
Chinese Communists and the Cubans
had a hand in their own troubles.
a. The China recognition
tangle stayed on dead center yester-
day. The next round may not be fired
until De Gaulle's press conference
tomorrow.
(Cont'd)
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b. The Chinese Nationalists
are sitting tight but are not easy.
There is still a strong feeling in
Taipei circles that a break with
the "perfidious and deceptive" French
will be necessary.
c. We are not entirely clear
how the French got cau ht in their
present bind.
d. The French experience seems
?to be giving other countries second
thoughts. Lopez Mateos, for example,
now says that there will be no dip-
lomatic relations with Peiping while
he is President of Mexico, which
will be until December.
e. The Ethiopians, who have
been most tempted, now say that their
decision depends on the outcome of
Haile Selassie's talks with Chou be-
ginning today.
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5, Panama
a. The next few days in Panama
may see a quickening in the tempo
of violence and sabotage against US
installations.
b.
at least two extremist groups
will have a hand in this. One of
them has received several months'
training in Cuba.
c. Panamanians who can afford
to leave are preparing to do so in
increasing numbers.
d. On the diplomatic front,
Chiari shows every sign of accept-
ing the pressure put upon him from
all sides to "hold fast."
e. He seems also. to have accepted
advice to drop bilateral talks with
the US. ?At least he has asked for an
emergency OAS meeting to air his
complaints.
f. He has been trying to line
up support for such a step for the
past several days. Several OAS mem-
bers showed reluctance, but most
will probably agree to a meeting in
the end
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6. Indonesia-
Malaysia
7. Congo
a. The five-day cease-fire in
Borneo is showing its fragility.
b. Already the Malaysians have
charged the Indonesians with violat-
ing it.
c. U Thant, concerned that
such an incident may wreck the tri-
partite talks in Bangkok, has once
again urged the countries concerned
to ask specifically that he appoint
observers to keep an eye on the
cease-fire.
d. A dat not been fixed
for the talks
a. What started as leftist
demonstrations in Stanleyville last
week led to a mutiny by elements of
the local gendarmarie.
b. The Congolese Army had to
move in to disarm the mutineers.
The entire gendarmarie unit has been
confined to camp, and Stanleyville
itself is under a dawn-to-dusk curfew.
(Cont'd)
)
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? c. We have not established a
direct connection between the trouble
in Stanleyville and the guerrilla
warfare in Kwilu Province, but we
suspect there is one.
d. Leopoldville has been slow
in responding to the threat in Kwilu.
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NOTES
B. Communist China - USSR Communist China could be
free of its long-standing debt to the Soviet Union
by year's end. Peiping's export surplus in its
trade with the USSR last year was larEe enough to
reduce the debt by half.
C. ?North Vietnam - USSR Hanoi is sending a high-
powered delegation of party leaders to Moscow to
exchange views with the Soviets on matters of "com-
mon concern." Among these are certain to be issues
at dispute with the Chinese, and the trip could be
yet another Soviet attempt to rescue Hanoi from Pei-
ping's clutches.
-D. Laos The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese support,
have gained control over the key Na Kay area in
south-central Laos. As usual, the rightist/neutral-
ist forces abandoned their positions in the area in
the face of Communist pressures.
E. Burma Ethnic minority resistance to the Ne Win
? regime, always a problem, appears to have taken a
turn for the worse in the last two months. There
have been a series of recent shooting scrapes be-
tween the Burmese Army and the insurgents involving
more than a hundred men on each side.
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