THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 5 DECEMBER 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005996703
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: December 5, 1963

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BYTHE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5 DECEMBER 1963
?1-012-5-EC7RET--
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1. South Vietnam
2. USSR
a. Viet Cong military activity
slackened somewhat during the last
week of November, but it is still
well above the level which prevailed
before the 1 November coup in Saigon.
b. The Communists have generally
been more effective, too, in that
they have inflicted heavier losses
in personnel and weapons at no ap-
parent increase in cost to themselves.
c. It has netted them, for
example, a gain of nearly 1,000 weap-
ons, possibly more, during the
month--enough to equip three regular
battalions.
d. November's activity drama-
tizes the unfavorable statistical
trends in the conflict which set in
last July.
e. Several charts are included
at the back of the book.
a. The Soviet Party Presidium--
the main policy making organ--is in
oberous need of new faces and may
get them at the end of the Central
Committee plenum which convenes next
Monday.
(Cont'd)
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PRESIDIUM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
Full Members
Age
Positions
Probable Areas of Responsibility
(Not Necessarily Complete)
Khrushchev
69
Party First Secretary
Party and government head
Premier
Chairman, RSFSR Party
Bureau
Brezhnev
57
Party Secretary
Party second-in-command
Titular head of state
Voronov
52
RSFSR Premier
Government affairs of the
Russian Republic
Kirilenko
57
First Deputy Chairman,
RSFSR Party Bureau
RSFSR party-industrial affairs
Kozlov
55
Party Second Secretary
Incapacitated
Kosygin
59
First Deputy Premier
Domestic economic affairs
Kuusinen
82
Party Secretary
CPSU relations with foreign
Communist parties
Mikoyan
68
First Deputy Premier
Senior adviser to Khrushchev,
particularly in fields of
? foreign affairs and foreign
trade
Podgorny
60
Party Secretary
CPSU relations with foreign
Communist parties (?)
Polyansky
45
Deputy Premier
Government agricultural affairs
Sus I ov
61
Party Secretary
CPSU relations with foreign
Communist parties
Coordination of world Communist
movement
Shvernik
75
Chairman, Party
Commission
Heads trial board concerned with
infractions of party discipline
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f. Personnel actions by the
Central Committee plenum may also
provide clues to the lineup of Khru-
shchev's possible successors.
g. While Brezhnev is generally
top seeded, we have been watching
party secretary Podgorny's star rise.
He is probably closer to Khrushchev
both personally and in terms of
ability and style than any of his
sidekicks.
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3. Ghana-USSR-US
a.
Moscow has
offered military assist-
ance to Ghana
?Nkrumah
has had some set backs
recently (e.g., no mediating role
in the Algerian-Moroccan dispute)
in attempts to promote pan-Africanism
and himself with it. There are also
frustrations over failure of the
cocoa conference.
(Cont'd)
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4. Laos
f. In short, he is in a frus-
trated, potentially dangerous mood,
according to Ambassador Mahoney.
?
g. It is reflected in his re-
cent cancellation of US aid to the
medical school project, in the most
violent anti-US tone in the past 20
months on the Ghana radio, and, now,
in the acceptance of Soviet military
aid.
h. Even so, London and Ambas-
sador Mahoney have reserved judgment
and are not prepared to predict that
Nkrumah intends to reduce drastically
his Western contacts.
a. The murder last night of
neutralist intelligence chief Colonel
Leuang will aggravate distrust among
the factions and could well lead to
reprisals by pro-Communists who will
try to pin the deed on Phoumi's fac-
tion.
b. Leuang, a rigid neutralist,
was strongly opposed to the current
trend of increased cooperation between
the neutralists and rightists and
was, in turn, strongly opposed by
the rightists.
(Cont'd)
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5. Italy
c. They may have done it (they
were talking of it at one time),? al-
though as is usual in Laos, the pos-
sibility of a provocation is ever
present.
a. Moro has finally managed
to get a cabinet together, but to
do it, he had to go back on earlier
commitments and give one of the
?three top economic posts (Budget)
to a Socialist.
b. The 24-man cabinet thus
has five Socialists plus Vice Pre-
mier Nenni.
c. The right wing of the
Christian Democrats does not like
the setup, and the 16 assembly depu-
ties from this faction cannot be
relied on. The same goes for some
32 left-wing Socialists.
(Cont'd)
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6. Sino-Soviet
Dispute
d. Even so, Moro stands a
good chance of surviving the con-
fidence vote which will come in the
next week or two when he presents
his government's program to the as-
sembly.
a. Behavior of the Soviets
and the Chinese Communists at the
World Peace Council session in War-
saw makes it clear that each side
went there to test the other's in-
tentions, and that each found the
other unprepared to compromise.
b. The Soviets brought all dis-
puted items to a vote and won. The
Chinese, however, submitted detailed
draft counterproposals and managed
to garner enough support from Afro-
Asian and Latin American delegates
to give color to their claim that
Peiping speaks for the underdeveloped
nations.
c. Chinese Communists have
done everything but walk out on the
meeting to disassociate themselves
from all the World Peace Council
resolutions.
d. They probably will make a
major case of this instance' of Soviet
"manipulation," but apparently are
not yet ready to form their own rival
peace front.
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NOTES
A. Venezuela Lieutenant Colonel Chenault was released
in Caracas early this morning in good health.
B. Great Britain
C. Dominican Republic
The leftist guerrilla force
has been all
but subdued by government troops, with some 40 taken
prisoner and 3 killed. Another group of 25 is still
at large. Rumors that they received training and
supplies from Cuba
?D. Iraq Baathists in position of authority are be-
? ginning to desert the ship, some under pressure.
While the non-Baathists appear to be in control, the
commander of the 4th Division, a dedicated Baathist,
is said to have surrounded Baghdad, and he may try
to reverse the trend.
Thailand Sarit has named Deputy Premier and De-
fense Minister Thanom as acting premier and at the
same time has given General Chitti the job of act-
ing commander in chief of the army. He is urging
everyone to hold together behind Thanom and they
may do so while he lives, but these two wires could
easily get crossed.
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