THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 3 JULY 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005996433
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: July 3, 1963

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3 JULY 1963
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1. Test Ban Treaty a. At the end of his speech
in East Berlin yesterday, Khrushchev
dropped his long-standing insistence
that an indefinite moratorium on
underground testing accompany any
agreement to ban nuclear-testing in
the atmosphere, outer space and under
water.
b. With this abrupt shift and
another favorable comment on the
President's 10 June speech, Khrush-
chev gives forthcoming Moscow talks
the appearance of greater promise.
c. The new proposal, however,
calls for a NATO -Warsaw Pact non-
aggression treaty to be signed "simul-
taneously" with the partial test ban
agreement. This we are inclined to
view as a bargaining tactic which
Khrushchev eventually may modify or
drop.
d. Khrushchev, it would seem,
wants to hold the door open to the
West against the prospect of an even
sharper deterioration of intra-bloc
relations following the upcoming
Sino-Soviet talks.
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2. Cuba-USSR.
-3. Cuba
a. Subsequent events have
shown us wrong on two points relat-
ing to Soviet commerical flights to
Cuba.
b. ?Sekou Toure has assured us
that last week's TU-114 flight from
Moscow via Conakry vas "exceptional"
and that it did not represent the
inauguration of a regular Aeroflot
schedule using this route. We note
that a TU-114 from Moscow to Havana
today is taking the usual northern
route.
c. Apparently the Soviets have
not inaugur ted regular twice-weekly
flights to Havana. There is still
only one regular flight (on Mondays),
but there have been a large number'
of special flights recently.
a.
(Cont'd)
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4. South Korea
C
d.
a. Reports of coup plotting
persist.
b. We now have word that secur-
ity chief Kim Chae-chun plans to give
it a try, possibly this weekend.
(Cont4d)
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c. He has been slipping lately
in his contest with the clique of
former security chief Kim Chong-pil
for control of the government's
political apparatus.
d. Kim Chong-pil has been
known to fabricate charges of coup
plots in order to remove rivals, and
he may be putting out this word him-
self to justify removal of Kim Chae-
chun.
e. Either way, however, revela-
tion of the plot might be used to
justify an extension of military rule
beyond late this year, when Korea is
supposed to return to civil adminis-
tration.
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NOTES
A. Italy The Socialist Party's decision yesterday
to abstain in the confidence vote, expected Friday,
assures the surviv 1 of Leone's minority government,
but only for the time being.
B. Yugoslavia The election yesterday of Rankovic as
Vice President under the new Yugoslav constitution
seems to settle the question of Tito's succession.
The somewhat more pro-Western Kardelj is no longer
in the running. Ambassador Kennan expects Tito to
take longer and more frequent leaves, allowing Ran-
kovic greater control over day-to-day affairs, but
does not anticipate substantial changes in policy.
C. Argentina With general elections four days off,
tension is running high. Several groups, mostly
Peronists, are reportedly plotting to disrupt the
elections, but still lack cohesion. The armed
forces, taking no chances, are implementing a com-
prehensive security plan which is to be kept in ef-
fect until the critical period h s passed.
?
D. Venezuela
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REVIEW ITEM
World Commentary on the President's Trip
1. Soviet coverage of the President's trip this past
week has been moderate both in scope and tone. At-
tention is concentrated on the West German visit
and commentary keyed to the stock theme of disarray
in the Western camp.
2. Much is made of the contention that the President
failed in his "main aim" of creating a NATO nuclear
force.
3. Moscow concludes "regretfully" that the visit left
no ground for optimism over prospects of a German
settlement, but its comment on the German question
was routine and displayed no sense of urgency.
4, East European media toed the line, with East Germany
as might be expected, providing the most comprehen-
sive coverage and most vehement censure of the West
Berlin stop.
5. China and the Asian satellites paid much less atten-
tion to the trip, but what they had to say was char-
acteristically more virulent in picturing the Presi-
dent's "provocative and aggressive" speeches.
6. Cuban media, too, picture the speeches as "aggressive
and warmongering." Again NATO disunity is stressed.
(Cont'd)
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7. In Europe, noncommunist commentators generally agree
that the President succeeded in strengthening NATO
unity and gained popular support for the US. The
reaffirmation of US obligations for the defense of
Europe is stressed.
8. This concensus is shared by most noncommunist com-
mentators in Asia and the Far East and by the few
commentators dealing with the subject in the Middle
East, Latin America and Africa.
9. Questions are raised by most, however, over the ex?
tent to which differences in attitude toward the
multilateral nuclear force were overcome.
10. West German media are unanimous in their praise and
express the view that reassurances of US support show
that the US, in dealing with the Soviets, will not
do so at the expense of Western Europe.
11. British papers generally express gratification that
a decision on multilateral nuclear force has been
postponed, at least for Britain, while other means
are examined.
12. The French are inclined to picture the trip in terms
of a contest with France for influence in Europe.
They concede the President's success in Germany and
will be measuring De Gaulle's visit against it.
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DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST
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