THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 NOVEMBER 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993979
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 7, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
7 November 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( 1).(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
7 November 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cease-fire violations were reported from both fronts
in the Middle East yesterday; Israel gave out some
casualty figures for the first time; there is growing
pressure for a UN Security Council meeting soon;
Faysal will push hard for Israeli
concessions including Arab control of Jerusalem
as many
as three Arab summits may be in the otting; the EC
nine passed a slightly pro-Arab resolution,yesterday.
(Page 1)
North Vietnamese may be preparing major attacks in
South Vietnam. (Page 4)
Soviet October Revolution keynote speech was restrained
in treating relations with the US. (Page 5)
Soviets developing fast-reaction ABM similar to US
Sprint. (Page 7)
Bonn thinks Scheel visit to Moscow was moderately
successful but all problems remain. (Page 5)
CSCE, in six weeks, has not moved beyond general dis-
cussions and business not likely to be completed by
early 1974. (Page 9)
A note on International Monetary Developments.
(Page 10)
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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL
Cease-fire violations were reported from both
fronts yesterday.
Damascus charged that Israeli aircraft attacked
Syrian positions in the central and southern sectors
of the front, using what it described as Shrike mis-
siles--a US missile used to destroy radars. The Syr-
ians claim to have repelled the attacks, while an
Israeli spokesman contended he had "no information"
on them. The attacks cannot be confirmed.
The Syrian front has been relatively quiet
since the cease-fire, and this attack is the first
major violation to be reported.
On the Egyptian front, an Israeli military
spokesman reported one minor incident in the Second
Army sector yesterday and two others in the Third
Army area. According to Tel Aviv, the Egyptians
initiated all three incidents but broke contact when
the Israelis opened fire. No casualties were re-
ported. A UN observer also reports seeing an Egyp-
tian SAM fired at an aircraft near the Little Bitter
Lake.
The Israelis have agreed to permit an additional
50 trucks with nonmilitary supplies to pass through
their lines to the encircled Egyptian Third Army.
This will bring to 175 the number of trucks which
the Israelis have allowed through. Elsewhere in
the southern sector, however, UN observers report
that the Israelis have dammed the Sweetwater Canal
outside Suez City. Stagnant fresh water remains in
the canal and is drinkable with suitable treatment,
but will become less so with time because the canal
is used for sewage.
Israel announced yesterday that 1,854 of its
soldiers were killed during the war, and that an al-
most equal number of wounded were still hospitalized.
The Israelis have previously kept casualty totals
quiet, except for an announcement on October 15 that
656 soldiers had been killed in the first eight days
of fighting. While the public has suspected heavy
casualties, these figures--three times the total
during the 1967 war--will be a shock to casualty-
sensitive Israel. The figures could have a sobering
effect on those favoring a renewal of the war, and
Prime Minister Meir may be trying to prepare the
public for some concessions.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
At the UN, there is growing pressure for a for-
mal meeting of the Security Council--possibly today--
on Israel's failure to pull back to the cease-fire
lines of October 22. The nonaligned states, partic-
ularly Kenya, seem to be the chief agitators for a
public session. Movement toward a Council meeting
is no doubt intended to bring pressure on the US;
the nonaligned states used this tactic before the
cease-fire and are apparently employing it now to
underline the Arab message that there must be some
positive developments from Secretary Kissinger's
Middle East consultations.
Egypt
tied the start
of negotiations only to an Israeli pullback to the
Sinai passes. The Egyptians still demand total Is-
raeli withdrawal eventually, but this clarification
indicates that they are somewhat less rigid on the
timing than first suggested.
Syria, in the meantime, is apparently somewhat
fearful that Egypt will negotiate an Egyptian-Israeli
settlement without reference to Syria's border prob-
lems. I
Saudi King Faysal intends to push for maximum
Israeli concessions
he will
ask for complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 bor-
ders, using the oil embargo as leverage. The King
will reportedly abide by the ultimate decisions of
the frontline Arab states regarding exact border
delineations with Israel, but with respect to Jeru-
salem, he is personally committed to complete Arab
control. He might reluctantly accept UN administra-
tion of the city, but only if this is the sole means
of ensuring removal of the Israelis.
(continued)
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Plans are going forward for three summit confer-
ences involving Arab countries. The separate travels
of Presidents Qadhafi and Boumediene in recent days
were probably intended in part to consolidate plans
for the Arab summit conference which Qadhafi is urging
and Boumediene may host in the near future. In addi-
tion, Boumediene's call for a summit meeting of Or-
ganization of African Unity countries has been answered
favorably by all Arab member states and several key
African nations; Boumediene may hope to host this
conference also immediately following the Arab summit.
Still a third summit is in the mill. Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan have agreed to cosponsor a meeting in
Islamabad of the heads of Islamic Conference states
at the urging of Malaysia's Tunku Abdul Rahman, the
conference secretary general.
Arab leaders such as Sadat and King
Faysal may see this meeting as a more effective means
of advancing their cause than a purely Arab summit,
which could become a forum for Arab radicalism.
The foreign ministers of the nine EC countries,
meeting in Brussels, issued a joint declaration on
the Middle East yesterday that leans slightly toward
the Arab side. The declaration calls on the forces
of both sides to return immediately to positions
occupied on October 22 and urges negotiations within
the UN framework. The statement did not, however,
charge Britain and France, as Security Council perma-
nent members, with representing the nine, probably
because the two are more pro-Arab than many of the
other EC members.
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NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese command in charge of the
logistics and infiltration system has told at least
two subordinates, both in the Laos panhandle, that
Communist forces will soon be "striking the enemy
and systematically annihilating them," according to
preliminary field translations. The subordinates
were warned to take necessary precautions against
retaliatory strikes on the transportation network.
These messages could presage major attacks in
some areas of South Vietnam, but they may also mean
only an extension of the sharp local attacks predicted
in many parts of the South. Hanoi may believe that,
with the US heavily preoccupied by the situation in
the Middle East and domestic problems, this is a par-
ticularly good time to launch attacks on a large
scale.
One of the units known to have received the mes-
sage is located near South Vietnam's Military Region
I, where Communist offensive capabilities are great-
est, but where weather conditions are not ideal at
this time of year for large-scale military action.
No changes have been noted in the communications of
the tactical units that would be involved in such
attacks, although coverage of these units is no
longer as comprehensive as it once was.
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USSR
The keynote speech at yesterday's October Anni-
versary celebrations in Moscow was noteworthy for its
restrained treatment of Soviet relations with the US
and for the accolades given to party chief Brezhnev.
Traditionally an occasion for marking Soviet suc-
cesses, the speech delivered by senior Politburo mem-
ber Andrey Kirilenko was no exception. Kirilenko sur-
veyed the world situation as it has developed over the
past year, drawing special attention to Moscow's pol-
icy of detente and to Brezhnev's personal role in the
formulation and implementation of that policy. Accord-
ing to Kirilenko, "promising shifts" have occurred in
the political situation in Europe, most notably in
Moscow's relations with France, West Germany, and
Britain, and the outlook is for further improvement.
Among his many references to the Soviet party leader,
Kirilenko said that Brezhnev's contribution to detente
in Europe and in the world at large is "universally
acknowledged."
Kirilenko's treatment of Soviet relations with
the US was generally positive, but reflected strains
brought about by developments in the Middle East cri-
sis. He said that the USSR attaches "much importance"
to relations with the US, but he modified Moscow's
appreciation of accomplishments over the past two
years by asserting that developments are only moving
"in the direction" of detente. Similarly, citing the
major documents of the Moscow and Washington summits
and Soviet adherence to them, he said the US was also
expected to adhere to the spirit and letter of those
agreements.
Kirilenko's review of the situation in the Middle
East was fairly relaxed, though it contained customary
attacks against Israel. He maintained that Israeli
forces must be withdrawn to positions occupied at the
time of the cease-fire of October 22, and said their
withdrawal is an "urgent necessity" and a "first step"
toward settlement of the conflict. His treatment of
the Middle East was highlighted by the assertion that
prospects for stable peace in the area are better now
than ever before.
(continued)
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His discussion of the Soviet domestic situation
contained high praise for recent accomplishments and
held out promise for further achievements. He re-
peated Brezhnev's claim of a record grain harvest,
and went on to attribute this success specifically
to the policies initiated by Brezhnev eight years
ago. In keeping with his generally upbeat presenta-
tion, Kirilenko said that the prospects for fulfilling
the main indices of the Five-Year Plan are good, and
that the regime will continue to devote primary atten-
tion to improving the standard of living.
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USSR
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the Soviets are developing a fast- 25X1
reaction ABM similar to the US Sprint.
A cone-shaped missile seen at the ABM test com-
plex at Sary Shagan is of a different
size and shape from the two ABMs that have been un-
dergoing flight tests there for some time. (These
are the ABM-1B, like those deployed around Moscow,
and the SH-4, which has been flight tested period-
ically since 1971 but never deployed.)
Both the ABM-1B and the SH-4 are designed to
intercept targets above the atmosphere, where they
cannot distinguish between the chaff clouds dispensed
by an incoming ICBM and the re-entry vehicle itself.
With a high acceleration missile, the Soviets could
wait until the incoming warheads have re-entered the
atmosphere, and the chaff is dissipated, before
firing their interceptors.
The current Soviet ABM force still consists of
64 launchers near Moscow. The Soviets may be await-
ing the development of a fast-reaction ABM system
before filling out deployment to the limit permitted
under the terms of the ABM treaty.
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WEST GERMANY - USSR
Bonn is portraying Foreign Minister Scheel's
visit to Moscow last week as a moderate success, even
though the two sides appear to have made little, if
any, progress on settling outstanding problems.
On the question of handling West Berlin's legal
assistance problems in the Communist world, the So-
viets were reluctant to accept Scheel's proposal that
West Berlin and West German courts deal directly with
Soviet courts. The Soviets claimed that they had to
consult with their "allies" and to consider the ram-
ifications of this procedure for the Soviet legal
system. They did, however, suggest that the subject
might be discussed later by groups of experts from
both sides.
Moscow took the line that this "agreement in
principle to consider" the West German proposal is
a major concession to which the West Germans should
respond by resuming negotiations to establish diplo-
matic relations with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and
Hungary. Those talks broke down last summer when
the West Germans insisted that their embassies in
these countries be allowed to represent West Berlin
legal institutions. Bonn believes the Soviets were
behind the refusal of the East European countries to
yield on this issue.
The West Germans have announced that, as a re-
sult of what they call the "legal compromise reached
in Moscow," talks will begin again in the near future.
In addition to wanting to present Scheel's visit in
the best possible light, the West Germans may regard
the Soviet suggestion to reopen talks as a signal
that Moscow will not object to the pragmatic, court-
to-court solution of the legal aid issue.
As expected, the Soviets raised the subject of
low-interest West German economic credits to finance
joint economic projects. No decisions were reached,
but the two sides agreed to consider the credit issue
at the next meeting of the joint economic commission
in December.
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EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
After more than six weeks, the Geneva Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe has still not
moved beyond general discussions. The committees
and subcommittees have proceeded so slowly that many
observers now doubt that the conference can wind up
its business in early 1974.
The Soviets, who desire an early end to the
conference, have been pushing a draft on "principles
of security" that emphasizes the "inviolability of
frontiers." The West Germans, in particular, oppose
the Soviet draft. They wish to link the principle
of inviolability of frontiers with the nonuse of
force in order to hold open the possibility of an
eventual peaceful reunification of the two Germanys.
Several drafts have been considered and sharply crit-
icized by one side or the other. A Yugoslav draft
may provide the basis for an eventual compromise.
A near-stalemate has developed on the contro-
versial question of freer movement of people and
ideas between the two blocs. The Soviets insist
that specific measures must await agreement on cer-
tain general principles. These principles--sover-
eignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of
states, and respect for international laws and cus-
toms--would, if the Soviets had their way, be in-
cluded in a preamble and would have the effect of
emasculating the specific measures designed to bring
about freer movement.
The other main topic--economic cooperation--is
also at a virtual standstill. The West thought the
Eastern representatives would be making demands in
this area, but thus far they have not done so. What
has happened is that the members of the European
Community, although claiming special competence in
the economic cooperation area, have not been able
to agree on a common position of their own.
The neutral participants as well as Warsaw Pact
maverick Romania have been pressing hard for a link
between the security conference and the force reduc-
tion talks which began last week in Vienna. The
Soviets oppose any such linkage, but have been hu-
moring the neutrals by suggesting that all European
states could participate in the force reduction
talks. Several of the Eastern representatives at
Vienna also mentioned, in their opening statements,
the possibility of widening their forum. The NATO
allies have consistently opposed such moves.
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NOTE
International Monetary Developments: The dollar
continued to strengthen in active trading yesterday,
rising to its highest level relative to the other
major currencies since June. It has appreciated most
against the Dutch guilder and German mark, both of
which have fallen as a result of Arab oil cutbacks.
There are no signs of further Arab dollar sales. The
price of gold has remained relatively stable during
the past ten days.
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