THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 SEPTEMBER 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993937
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 21, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
21 September 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Intercepted messages show that North Vietnamese
preparations to move men and materiel southward
during the 1973-74 dry season are well advanced.
(Page 1)
Cambodian insurgents are having supply problems.
Sihanouk has blamed Hanoi for withholding arms,
but there is evidence that some Vietnamese aid is
still reaching the insurgents. (Page 2)
The East Europeans have been lobbying behind Mos-
cow's back to scuttle the Soviet proposal for a
CEMA-EC dialogue that would interfere with bilat-
eral economic relations between the countries of
East Europe and the EC. (Page 3)
Soviet
(Page 4)
Soviets
Iracl
(Page 5)
King Husayn plans to follow up his announcement of
amnesty for the fedayeen with an offer to establish
a "dialogue" with the PLO. He seems delighted with
the reception given his amnesty move, but there is
grumbling about it among officers in the Jordanian
Army. (Page 6)
Seoul has offered Tanaka a plan that could end the
controversy over the kidnaping of a South Korean
opposition leader in Japan last month. (Page 7)
Heavy intervention by the German and French central
banks was required again yesterday to maintain the
European joint float. The dollar dropped back to
its lowest levels since August 9. (Page 8)
Notes on USSR-Egypt, USSR-Cuba, Argentina, and
Japanese oil policy appear on pages 9 and 10.
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NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese appear to be well along in
their preparations for moving men and materiel south-
ward during the 1973-74 dry season, which normally
begins in October.
Recent intercepts show that way stations in the
panhandle have been told that troops will soon be
moving south. One message, from a major logistics
authority in southern North Vietnam, shows that one
infiltration group was to move through the Vinh area
each night beginning on September 19. The message
did not indicate the scope or duration of the troop
movement.
Hanoi probably does not have enough trained
replacement manpower on hand to sustain a
flow of one group per day for more than a
month. The North Vietnamese could augment
this flow, however, by sending regular com-
bat units south.
The troops being sent probably were inducted
last winter; many of these recruits have
already infiltrated south or have been used
to rebuild understrength combat units that
returned to North Vietnam. Hanoi inducted
few men between February and July, and those
recruited in a drive that began last month
will not be ready for infiltration until
late fall.
On the materiel side, intercepts show that some
6,800 tons of munitions have been moved into storage
areas north of the Demilitarized Zone since early
July. Another 1,300 tons of ordnance have been
stockpiled near the Ban Karai Pass, a major entryway
into southern Laos.
This materiel, which includes ammunition
for almost every weapon in the Vietnamese
Communists' arsenal, is sufficient to sus-
tain heavy fighting in South Vietnam for
approximately six months. The Communists
already have large stocks of weapons and
munitions on hand in the South.
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CAMBODIA - NORTH VIETNAM
During press interviews this week in Algiers
and Peking, Sihanouk maintained that victory over
the Lon Nol government will be delayed for "many
years" unless his Communist backers give the insur-
gents more material assistance. He claimed that
Hanoi is unwilling to transport Chinese-supplied
arms to Cambodia, and that the Vietnamese Communists
had moved their Cambodian arms caches to South Viet-
nam, thereby denying them to the insurgents. Si-
hanouk said he had made demarches to his allies on
the supply problem to no effect.
Sihanouk is in part using Hanoi as a
scapegoat to explain the insurgents' fail-
ure to take Kompong Cham. Nonetheless,
since last January he has been asserting
that the Vietnamese have cut off arms
and ammunition supplies. In early Sep-
tember, Sihanouk stated publicly that
Hanoi had signed an agreement under which
the insurgents would be supplied with
materiel from Viet Cong stocks, and Hanoi
would be reimbursed by the Chinese. He
is now implying that this agreement is
not working properly.
Insurgent messages and other sources have
indicated that insurgents have supply
problems in some areas, but the causes
are unclear. There is evidence that some
Vietnamese aid is still reaching the in-
surgents.
If Hanoi actually is unwilling to give
the Khmer insurgents enough materiel to
sustain military activity at a high level,
it would indicate that the North Vietnam-
ese are relatively satisfied with a status
quo in Cambodia that protects their west-
ern flank while they concentrate on South
Vietnam. At a minimum, Hanoi may see
some advantage in appearing to act with
restraint in Cambodia.
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EASTERN EUROPE - EC
East European ambassadors have been calling
on Danish officials in an attempt to undercut Mos-
cow's recent overture to establish official contacts
between CEMA and the EC. Late last month the ?Soviet
Secretary General of CEMA approached the Danes, who
chair EC bodies for the rest of the year, with a
proposal that CEMA and the EC appoint delegates to
begin negotiations. As soon as he left town the
East Europeans began insisting that he had acted
without their concurrence, and expressed their
strong distaste for bloc-to-bloc dealings.
This unusual display of defiance behind
Moscow's back shows how much danger the
East Europeans see in the latest Soviet
attempt to limit their freedom of maneu-
ver. Their actions also reflect the value
they place on developing bilateral ties
with the EC.
Romania has already worked out arrange-
ments that will enable it to benefit from
the EC's generalized trade preference
scheme.
Other East European countries share Bu-
charest's interest in expanding bilateral
economic ties with the West, and they re-
sent Moscow's own efforts to achieve this
same objective while reining in the East
Europeans. They clearly are no less eager
than Moscow to pursue the economic advan-
tages of detente--at times, as in their
approaches to the Danes, at the risk of
incurring Soviet wrath.
? West European officials have reacted coolly to
Moscow's proposal for CEMA-EC dialogue. Yesterday
the EC Council decided to tell the USSR merely that
the EC will study the suggestion, and that CEMA may
contribute to the study if it wishes.
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USSR
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IRAQ-USSR
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JORDAN-FEDAYEEN
King Husayn intends to follow up his announce-
ment of amnesty for the fedayeen with an offer to
establish a "dialogue" with the PLO. He has told
Ambassador Brown that Jordan is now internally se-
cure, has renewed relations with Egypt and will
probably do the same with Syria soon, and can af-
ford to make dramatic gestures. The King is evi-
dently delighted with the reception given his am-
nesty offer, particularly in the West Bank, and told
Brown that cables of congratulation had been pouring
in spontaneously. He is sure that the amnesty will
have a significant impact on Syria; Asad has already
welcomed the move.
The King is assuming that a follow-up offer of
a dialogue to the PLO can be kept secret while prep-
arations are being made. His idea is that the PLO
will automatically reject the move, thus further
splitting the resistance movement--as, in his view,
the amnesty action has already done.
Ambassador Brown points out that the King is
incorrect in assuming that everyone is praising his
amnesty policy. The Bedouin are already grumbling
that the Palestinians have the King under their
thumb; the Crown Prince hastily left for Morocco so
as to be out of town when the news broke; field-
grade officers of the Jordanian Army have already
expressed their unhappiness to US officials, though
the top levels have been given reassurances by
Husayn. Brown also points out that news of the
dialogue offer will almost certainly leak in short
order. Husayn is nevertheless gambling that he
will pull it off.
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SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN
The Koreans have offered Prime Minister Tanaka
? a plan for defusing difficulties caused by the kid-
naping of a South Korean opposition leader by Korean
agents in Japan last month. Tanaka, in an attempt
to placate his leftist opposition, had threatened
to cut off economic aid unless Seoul took some ac-
tion.
The Koreans have now responded. They are pre-
pared to offer the necessary public apology--but no
admission of government complicity--and undertake a
joint investigation into the criminal aspects of the
case.
Tokyo is likely to accept. The threats of
economic sanctions were probably made most
reluctantly; any significant action against
Seoul would antagonize conservative
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
Heavy intervention by the German and French
central banks in European markets was required
again yesterday to maintain the European joint float.
Total intervention by European central banks so far
this week amounts to at least $1.5 billion.
The Bundesbank's purchases of French francs
reportedly amount to the equivalent of over $800
million, including $400 million yesterday. The Bank
of France has continued to sell a similar amount of
the stronger float currencies--mostly marks. Yes-
terday Paris also raised the French bank rate to 11
percent, the highest since World War II and close to
rates elsewhere in Europe. This helped ease pres-
sures on the franc.
There is no indication that either Bonn
or Paris is nearing its intervention limit
and is preparing to alter its currency's
exchange rate. The Europeans probably
hope that some indication of progress
toward monetary reform at the annual IMF
meeting opening in Nairobi on Monday will
ease market pressures.
Some of the uncertainty rubbed off on the dol-
lar, which yesterday dropped back to its lowest
levels since August 9. The Bundesbank intervened
in small amounts to support it.
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NOTES
USSR-Egypt: Press reports that Soviet party
chief Brezhnev and Egyptian President Sadat are
meeting in Bulgaria cannot be confirmed.
Cairo, however, has publicly
denied the reports, which first appeared in the no-
toriously unreliable Beirut press, and announced
that Sadat met with university students in Cairo
yesterday. Moscow has reported that Brezhnev and
Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov--each supported by
large retinues--discussed bilateral matters yester-
day at a Bulgarian retreat some distance from the
coastal city of Varna. In Cairo, meanwhile, the
Soviet ambassador met with Sadat's national security
adviser on September 20. Both men would have been
expected to participate in a meeting of their prin-
cipals.
USSR-Cuba:
Argentina: Only Peron's margin of victory is
in doubt in Sunday's presidential election. Any-
thing over 50 percent would avoid the formality of
a runoff and provide him with a strong mandate.
The US Embassy expects he will win 55 to 60 percent
of the vote. The government's announcement Wednes-
day night implicitly recognizing the Chilean junta
has introduced the only possibly unsettling element
into the campaign. Despite widespread leftist dem-
onstrations against the coup, however, most Argen-
tines probably believe recognition will help main-
tain traditional Argentine-Chilean friendship and
keep Chile from being drawn into the orbit of arch-
rival Brazil.
(continued)
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Japan: Tokyo may be changing its position in
the current talks on a proposed worldwide emergency
oil-sharing plan. Ministry of International Trade
and Industry officials now say that, contrary to
the impression given US officials earlier this
month, Japan is not committed to a compromise on the
method of allocation. Tokyo favors a quota based
on oil consumption rather than oil imports, which
the US prefers. The Japanese also say they will
not join the oil-sharing group if it is hostile to
any of the oil-producing nations, including Libya.
They are clearly worried about aligning themselves
with a consumer bloc which might provoke the export-
ing countries.
Japan-Iraq:
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