THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 SEPTEMBER 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993928
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 11, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
11 September 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
11 September 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's chances are
good for gaining cabinet approval to sign the agree-
ment with the Communists thisFriday. (Page 1)
A North Vietnamese military recruitment campaign
which began last month could provide some indication
of Hanoi's intentions in South Vietnam for the next
dry season, which runs from October to May. (Page 2)
The Soviet Union's Ryad program to develop a series
of third-generation computers is at least three
years behind schedule. (Page 4)
Notes on Iceland, China, and Norway appear on Page 5.
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LAOS
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has scheduled
a cabinet meeting for today at which he intends to
press for approval to sign the agreement with the
Communists on September 14.
His chances of gaining approval appear
good; the two ministers who had voiced
the principal opposition to signing
dropped their objections yesterday.
The waning of rightist opposition has re-
sulted from several days of adroit maneu-
vering on Souvanna's part.
Souvanna arranged two meetings between
Lao Army generals and Pathet Lao repre-
sentatives to discuss the military por-
tion of the protocol. Although the meet-
ings produced no substantive Communist
concessions, they seem to have allayed
the generals' apprehensions about Commu-
nist interpretations of the agreement.
One of Souvanna's most vocal military
critics, Army Deputy Commander in Chief
General Kouprasith, and several other
influential officers have now pledged
their support to the Prime Minister.
During the course of seven months of ne-
gotiations, Souvanna has been close to
signing several times but was forced to
back down at the last moment. This could
happen again, but the odds for signing
are better this time.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi apparently began a substantial military
recruitment campaign in August which, if past pat-
terns are followed, will continue through this month.
Recent North Vietnamese propaganda has reminded
the population that military conscription must con-
tinue "in peacetime," as well as "in wartime or
emergency cases." More conscription messages were
noted in North Vietnamese civil communications during
August than in all of the previous six months. The
total is comparable to that of January 1973, when
Hanoi completed its large winter induction cycle.
After January, most young men reaching draft age
apparently were assigned to civilian reconstruction
jobs.
The extent and duration of the current
conscription drive could provide some
indication of Hanoi's intentions in South
Vietnam for the next dry season, which
runs from October to May. If a heavy pace
of inductions is continued during Septem-
ber, it will provide Hanoi with a large
pool of manpower which could be ready for
infiltration as early as November. Allow-
ing for time to travel south and for inte-
gration into existing forces, these troops
could be committed to combat around the
turn of the year.
If conscription tapers off in September,
however, it would mean a relatively small
induction drive. This, coming on the
heels of unusually small recruitment cam-
paigns in the spring and summer, would
suggest that Hanoi has no plans for large-
scale fighting in the first few months
of 1974.
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CHILE
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USSR
After more than six years of work, the Soviet
Union's Ryad program to develop a series of third-
generation computers is at least three years behind
schedule, and large-scale production is not likely
for several years. The Soviet goal apparently had
been to produce 3,000-5,000 Ryads per year by 1975.
Only a few hundred machines actually will be pro-
duced by then.
As a result, the Soviets have abandoned plans
to phase out production of the Minsk-32--an obsolete
second-generation computer. The Minsk-32 will be
the foundation of the automated management systems
to be set up during 1973-75.
By modeling Ryad computers after the IBM-360
series, the Soviets had hoped to save both time and
money and make use of the large stock of IBM soft-
ware. The program has been hampered by shortages
of high-quality components, out-of-date production
and testing techniques, and ineffective direction
and coordination.
Western help will be critical in deter-
mining how fast the Soviet Union can mass-
produce reliable Ryad models, The US,
France, the UK, and Japan already have
supplied machinery and technology to manu-
facture key Ryad components. Moscow now
is seeking to purchase complete automated
plants for the manufacture of key compo-
nents, such as integrated circuits and
disc drives.
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NOTES
Iceland: The cabinet probably will approve
resolutions today calling for a review of Icelandic
participation in NATO and--in the event of further
incidents at sea--a break in diplomatic relations
with London. The hardened attitude toward the Brit-
ish stems from recent rammings--one resulting in
the death of an Icelandic seaman--and British recon-
naissance flights over the disputed fishing area.
Growing tensions and the resultant public pressure
in Iceland may make compromise difficult in negoti-
ations later this month on retention of US forces
at the Keflavik base.
China: Officials of the China National Textile
Import and Export Corporation have indicated they
expect the US to become Peking's major cotton sup-
plier. Representatives of at least three major US
cotton exporters have either traveled or been in-
vited to China in recent weeks to negotiate sales
of cotton from the 1974/75 and 1975/76 crops. The
Chinese have so far purchased about one-eighth of
the amount committed for export from the 1973/74
crop and would like to buy more. Regular sales of
large quantities to China would require an expan-
sion of US cotton acreage and ginning capacity.
Norway: The returns in Norway's two-day elec-
tion are so scattered that a permanent stable gov-
ernment may be difficult to achieve. Although it
lost some seats, the Labor Party, Norway's largest,
is still the best bet to form a government either
alone or in coalition with the Socialist Electoral
Alliance--the Communist Party, the Socialist People's
Party, and the anti-EC Laborites. Even if the final
tally should give the non-socialists a majority, it
is doubtful that this diverse group could cooperate
to form a government.
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1.?
Top Secret
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