THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 SEPTEMBER 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993919
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 1, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700040001-3
The President's Daily Brief
1 September 1973
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700040001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700040001-3
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 511(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700040001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011700040001-3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
1 September 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Chou En-lai's report to the Tenth Party Congress
reaffirms China's post - Cultural Revolution foreign
policy and uses the harshest terms Peking has em-
ployed to date in describing the Soviet regime. On
domestic affairs, the report focuses on the Lin. Piao
affair and glosses over other contentious issues.
(Page 1)
Prime Minister Souvanna may sbon have to decide
whether to override rightist objections to the draft
agreement he has worked out with the Communists or
permit suspension or breakdown of the negotiations.
(Page 2)
The Tanaka government faces a political dilemma
caused by the opposition's exploitation of public
resentment over the South Korean kidnaping incident.
(Page 3)
The political turmoil in Chile seems to be easing.
(Page 4)
King Husayn has agreed to meet personally with the
Egyptian and Syrian presidents. (Page 5)
South Vietnam is disappointed by delays in promised
Japanese economic aid. (Page 6)
The USSR is about to conclude a major uranium enrich-
ment contract with a West German firm. (Page 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA
Chou En-lai's political report to the Tenth
Party Congress. was a reaffirmation of Peking's
post - Cultural Revolution foreign policy.
The Soviet Union was clearly depicted as the
principal threat to China. Using the harshest
terms Peking has employed to date, Chou described
the Soviet regime as fascist rather than communist.
Although Chou repeated the now-standard Peking
argument that the US and the USSR are contending
for world hegemony, he described the Soviets as ex-
panding their presence in the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean, while circumstances have forced US
imperialism to "decline."
Chou obviously tried to head off criticism of
Peking's efforts to improve relations with the US
by reminding his audience of the difference between
"necessary compromises" between revolutionary and
imperialist countries, and "collusion and compro-
mise" between the USSR and the US.
Chou cautioned that US-Soviet detente is tem-
porary and that in the long run the interests of the
two powers are incompatible.
The Premier reaffirmed Peking's intentions to
play a leading role in world affairs by characteriz-
ing the awakening of the Third World as a major
event in contemporary history which China should
exploit to form the broadest front possible against
the "hegemonism" of the two superpowers.
The Lin Piao affair dominated Chou's discus-
sion of domestic affairs. He linked Lin's "revi-
sionism" to the Soviet Union and stressed the cor-
rections in party policies that have been made
since the ninth congress. Although he called for
continuation of the campaign against the conspira-
tors, he offered a note of reassurance by indicat-
ing that they form a "tiny" group isolated from
the rest of the party and the army.
Chou announced that the long-overdue National
People's Congress will be held "soon." This body
will probably ratify the decisions of the party con-
gress, decide whether there should be a new head of
state, and fill top vacancies in government ministries.
The report contained only bland statements on
a number of contentious domestic policy issues. This
supports the impression that the abbreviated congress
did not engage in a full discussion of issues that
were being debated in the press even as the congress
met.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
The deadlock between Prime Minister Souvanna
and right wing elements continues to delay a set-
tlement with the Pathet Lao. Five rightist minis-
ters have threatened to resign if Souvanna signs
the draft protocol implementing the Lao agreement
of February 20. At a cabinet meeting on August 30,
the rightists presented a substitute draft based
on Lao Army objections. Souvanna agreed to present
this document to Pathet Lao negotiators, but empha-
sized that he was reserving the option of signing
the agreement already worked out between himself
and the Communists.
The Communists are not likely to make
further significant concessions. If a
settlement is not reached next week, the
senior Communist negotiator, Phoumi
Vongvichit, is planning to return to Sam
Neua. Souvanna therefore may now be
forced to make a choice between acting
decisively to break the impasse or per-
mitting a suspension or breakdown in ne-
gotiations. Souvanna, who returned from
the royal capital of Luang Prabang on
August 29, appears to believe he has the
support of the King for any course of ac-
tion he adopts. Should Souvanna sign the
agreement, the right wing would seem to
have little choice but to accept his ac-
tion.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA
The kidnaping of South Korean opposition leader
Kim Tae-chung three weeks ago is creating domestic
political difficulties for the Tanaka government.
The opposition is skillfully exploiting popular
resentment over the kidnaping. By concentrating on
the government's handling of the case, opposition
political parties have stalled Tanaka's legislative
program ever since they returned on August 23 after
a month-long boycott of the Diet.
Tanaka's dilemma is real. He must either
get some action from Seoul to satisfy his
leftist opposition--which appears unlikely--
or he runs the danger of being forced to
take some action against Seoul on his own.
Any really significant economic or politi-
cal sanctions would antagonize conservative
elements in his party as well as Japanese
businessmen who have extensive interests
in South Korea.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
The political turmoil seems to be easing.
--The opposition Christian Democrats have agreed
to reopen a dialogue with the government. The
decision came at the urging of Cardinal Silva
and President Allende's new interior minister,
the relatively moderate Carlos Briones.
--Shopkeepers in Santiago have ended their
strikes after the economy minister, a Communist,
agreed to consider their demands.
--The government has resumed negotiations with
the striking truck owner-drivers.
--The widescale terrorism of a week ago has
diminished.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
JORDAN-EGYPT-SYRIA
King Husayn has agreed to meet personally with
Presidents Sadat and Asad to discuss greater politi-
cal and military cooperation in the struggle with
Israel. The meeting, which seems likely to take
place soon after the nonaligned conference, will be
a further extension of Sadat's drive toward greater
Arab unity.
Egypt, determined to improve its relations
with other Arab states, hopes to bring Jor-
dan back into the fold. If Husayn gets his
way on handling the fedayeen issue, and his
annual subsidy of over $40 million is re-
stored, he would clearly come out ahead.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ZTES
Japan - South Vietnam: The $50 million in
economic aid which Japan had promised Saigon this
year willnow be delayed, perhaps until 1974,
largely for Japanese domestic political reasons.
The postponement is a major disappointment to
South Vietnam, which had been hoping for additional
balance-of-payments assistance during the next quar-
ter. Saigon's reserves of gold and foreign exchange
are down, and commodity prices have spiraled some 40
percent since last December.
USSR - West Germany: The Soviets are close to
concluding a $10-million contract with a West German
utility company under which they would enrich uranium
for the rest of the decade at 5-percent less than the
US price, and also guarantee to hold prices below the
US level through the 1980s. Moscow would gain not
only foreign exchange but political mileage. The
agreement would underscore the West's energy crisis
and European dissatisfaction with a recent US price
increase. The Soviets already have a much smaller
contract with the French and possibly another with
the Italians. Further Soviet attempts to enter the
European enrichment market, however, will run up
against the current EC effort to increase its own
uranium enrichment capabilities.
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Top Secret
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