THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993914
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 27, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
27 August 1973
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declassified only on approval of
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 August 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt and Libya are still at odds over a formula
for merger, although Qadhafi's unexpected flight
to Cairo on Saturday is presumably an effort to
work out some arrangement. Any agreement that
emerges will nevertheless contain more shadow than
substance. (Page 1)
Khmer insurgent attacks over the weekend closed two
key highways leading to Phnom Penh, but there were
no attacks in the immediate area of the capital.
Plans for an offensive have apparently not been
dropped, however. (Page 2)
Negotiations between West Germany and Czechoslovakia
on establishing diplomatic relations have stalled,
jeopardizing Brandt's planned trip to Prague. Bonn
feels it cannot afford further concessions, and So-
viet pressure on Prague has kept the Czechs standing
pat. (Page 3)
Notes on continuing tension in Chile and the stale-
mate between Iceland and the UK appear on Page 4.
At Annex we explore the divergent aims with which
Sadat and Qadhafi are approaching the issue of unity.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT-LIBYA
With the deadline for union less than a week
away, Egypt and Libya have yet to agree on a final
formula for their merger. Controversy continues
over the structure of the union, its implementation,
and its leadership, and there is a less pressing but
far more serious disagreement over the ultimate di-
rection of the unified state.
Presidents Qadhafi and Sadat have attached
considerable personal prestige to this much-
heralded step toward Arab unity, and the
chances are still reasonably good that they
will reach a settlement in time for a for-
mal proclamation on September 1. Both
Qadhafi and his Prime Minister left unex-
pectedly for Cairo on Saturday to consult
with Sadat.
Any agreement that emerges will, nonethe-
less, probably embody little more than the
trappings of unity and the first few in-
terim steps toward substantive integration.
The present state of play between the two
leaders is examined at Annex.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAUODIA
Khmer insurgent attacks over the weekend closed
two key highways leading to Phnom Penh--Routes 4 and
5--about 30 miles from the capital, and government
units began moving yesterday to reopen the roads.
Route I had been closed briefly but was quickly
cleared. No attacks occurred along the major de-
fense lines north and south of the city, however.
Coordination problems and flooding are probably
hampering insurgent efforts to launch attacks in the
immediate capital area. Nevertheless, plans for an
offensive have apparently not been dropped; an in-
tercepted message of August 26 claimed that "the
battlefield around Phnom Penh will be fully engaged
within two or three days." Another message alluded
to plans for sapper attacks within Phnom Penh.
Meanwhile, insurgent forces maintained heavy
pressure on the provincial capital of Kompong Cham,
45 miles northeast of Phnom Penh; its airstrip was
briefly closed on Friday, and the city's defenses
were shelled over the weekend. An intercepted mes-
sage discussed insurgent plans for a major push
against the city on August 30.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GER1A1Y - CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The stalemate in negotiations on establishing
diplomatic relations has jeopardized Willi Brandt's
trip to Prague, planned for early next month. Dur-
ing three days of talks last week Bonn continued to
insist that its prospective embassy in Prague be
authorized to represent West Berlin institutions,
but the Czechs still say rm. /
Bonn's firm reaction is more than a nego-
tiating tactic. The Brandt government is
worried that opposition parties will be
able to argue effectively that it has
bent too far if it fails to get the East
Europeans to acquiesce in Bonn's right to
represent West Berlin institutions abroad.
This is a loose end that West German of-
ficials now regret having left untied in
the treaty with Poland three years ago.
Negotiations with Bulgaria and Hungary
are stalled over the same issue.
Prague wants to normalize relations with
Bonn, and can be expected to make a strong
effort to prevent Brandt's trip from fall-
ing through. Much depends on the Soviets,
who are largely responsible for the un-
yielding position the East Europeans have
taken. A combination of pressures from
West Germany and Eastern Europe may even-
tually move the USSR far enough to permit
a satisfactory compromise, but for the
present the East is standing fast.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MIES
Chile: The situation in the capital is quiet
but very tense, with the government, the civilian
opposition, and the military all maneuvering behind
the scenes. The Communist and Socialist parties
seem to be cooperating more, in view of Allende's
precarious position, while the President seeks a
way to regain the initiative to head off the mili-
tary. - He has placed General Herman Brady, one of
the few pro-government army generals left, in com-
mand of troops in the Santiago area. Announcement
of a new cabinet may be delayed several days, how-
ever. There is as yet no sign whether Allende will
offer the armed forces a role, or whether he will
be prepared to satisfy the military's probable de-
mands if he does invite their participation.
Iceland-UK: Spokesmen for both sides agree
that there is little chance of an early settlement
of the Cod War, and a British Foreign Ministry of-
ficial said last week that under no circumstances
would London consider making concessions just to
help the US negotiate retention of the Keflavik
base. The impasse bodes ill for the negotiations,
scheduled to begin late next month. Most Icelanders
dislike military bases on principle, and are sus-
ceptible to the argument--being pushed by the Ice-
landic Communists--that the base should go since
it has failed to protect the country from British
"aggression."
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT-LIBYA
The controversy between Qadhafi and Sadat over
possible forms of merger is continuing right down
to the wire. Paradoxically, President Qadhafi has
been the most formidable obstacle to the unity scheme
that he himself originated. His refusal thus far to
approve anything less than a "complete and immediate"
union has virtually nullified over 13 months of plan-
ning. In public, he has protested that Sadat must
assume leadership of the union, but in the actual
negotiations he has been unwilling to accept a posi-
tion that would give him any less political clout or
military authority than his Egyptian partner. His
fervent espousal of his own brand of Islamic radical-
ism, particularly his cultural revolution, has deep-
ened misgivings about the merger at home and in Egypt.
Finally, his brinksmanship--most notably the "march
on Cairo" and his brief but dramatic retirement--has
convinced the wary Egyptian leadership that it cannot
afford a full partnership. Despite this, the Libyan
leader continues to bargain for concessions from
Cairo and apparently means to do so right down to the
deadline of September 1; the Egyptians reportedly re-
main steadfast in their decision not to cave in.
Cairo originally entered the union project un-
enthusiastically. Sadat saw certain political and
financial benefits to be gained, but Cairo has in-
volved itself in ill-fated unity schemes in the past,
and has therefore been wary. Sadat is particularly
concerned about the post Qadhafi would assume in a
merged state. He wants Qadhafi in a position of re-
sponsibility because he feels he can control him
better in office than out. He also believes that
Qadhafi's presence in the government would please
elements in Egypt who admire the Libyan's dynamism.
At the same time, Sadat does not want to relinquish
control of any facet of Egyptian policy, either for-
eign or domestic.
A second problem for Egypt is the role Libya's
cultural revolution might play in the state's inter-
nal policy. The Egyptians are somewhat disdainful
of the cultural revolution, which they regard as an
embodiment of the governmental immaturity that they
believe they overcame 2O years ago. Their disdain
is tinged with apprehension, however, at the disrup-
tion that such a revolution could cause in Egypt.
(continued)
Al
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A number of scenarios for union have emerged
from the ongoing negotiations. Virtually all in-
volve some kind of announcement of merger on Septem-
ber 1 and the initial integration of a few minis-
tries, to be followed by fuller union at some un-
specified time. All have been modeled on the Egyp-
tian concept of preserving substantial autonomy for
both regions. The most recent plan may become the
basis for a compromise settlement; it calls for one
capital, one cabinet, one military establishment,
and one political party. President Sadat would be
nominated for the presidency with Qadhafi as the
vice-presidential candidate. A referendum would be
held in both countries to approve the proposal, af-
ter which a unified cabinet would be formed. At the
bureaucratic level, however, only the foreign minis-
tries, defense establishments, and perhaps the in-
terior ministries would be integrated--at least
initially. This unity scheme would sound realistic,
but the actual functioning of the departments in-
volved could continue virtually unchanged.
The Egyptians are apparently willing to dress
up this scenario with a proclamation that it repre-
sents "complete" merger. Qadhafi is dissatisfied
with what he considers to be mere cosmetics, however,
and has continued to withhold his approval. Sadat
is unlikely to compromise further. He believes he
has commitments from other Arab states--notably
Saudi Arabia--of political and financial support
that could compensate for the loss of a partnership
with Libya.
In the face of Egypt's refusal to accept the
Libyan blueprint, Qadhafi seems likely to compro-
mise. A frustrated Qadhafi could fall back on an-
other dramatic ploy to get his own way, but he will
not act without calculating potential gains and
losses, and this time he stands to jeopardize his
drive toward Arab unity, a cause he most fervently
believes in. For him, merger is the first critical
step in the "battle" to restore Palestine and the
campaign to rejuvenate Arab dignity. Sadat no doubt
strikes Qadhafi as an unsuitable leader for this
crusade; nevertheless Egypt--even for Qadhafi--is
considered the vanguard of the Arab people. Qadhafi
may also believe that he--or the force of his prin-
ciples--could eventually come to dominate and
strengthen the union.
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