THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 MAY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993833
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 26, 1973

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : EIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
The President's Daily Brief
26 May 1973
L5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
26 May 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Iceland(
(Page 1)
Yugoslav
(Page .2)
The North Vietnamese theoretical journal, Hoc Tap,
claims that Hanoi had no choice but to mount a big
unit war and admits that the Paris Agreement was
the best Hanoi could do in view of the "balance of
forces between us and the enemy." (Page 3)
'In Chile, the costly strike at the El Teniente cop-
per complex is entering its sixth week. (Page 4)
In response to the US paper on MBFR, Bonn has ten-
tatively opted for an initial reduction of 10 per-
cent in stationed ground forces followed by a cut
in indigenous ground forces. (Page 5)
At Annex, we discuss the weakening economic and po-
litical situations in Chile.
25X1
25X1
25X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ICELAND
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
YUGOSLAVIA
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese theoretical journal, Hoc
Tap, has published a candid and somewhat defensive
explanation of the "main force" strategy of party
First Secretary Le Duan. The article claims that
Hanoi had no choice but to mount a big unit war in
the South in the face of heavy US involvement. It
admits that the Paris Agreement was the best Hanoi
could do in view of the "balance of forces between
us and the enemy."
The article contains the usual praise for the
"major military efforts" that contributed greatly
to the Communists' "success." Its principal mes-
sage seems to be, however, that the over-all goal
of the war was US withdrawal, and with that accom-
plished Hanoi intends to pursue different tactics.
The article gives no indication that Le
Duan's own position is endangered.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
The costly strike at the El Teniente copper
complex is now entering its sixth week. It has
severely damaged the Allende government's chances
of improving its shaky foreign exchange position.
The domestic political fallout now involves an ef-
fort by the opposition Christian Democrats to im-
peach the ministers of mining and labor.
This is only a small sampling of the prob-
lems now converging on Allende. The weak-
ening political and economic situations
in Chile are examined in greater detail
at Annex.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY - MBFR
In response to the US paper on MBFR, Bonn has
tentatively opted for an approach that calls for an
initial reduction of 10 percent in stationed ground
forces followed by a cut in indigenous ground forces.
Other NATO members who have commented on
the paper are leaning toward this view.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Ung Pursat
Kompong Chhnang
CAMBODIA
BA IE DE
KOMPONG SOM
Kampot
OUTH ET
MILES 25
_ -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Argentina: President Campora's cabinet is com-
posed primarily of moderate Peronists. The economic
portfolios in particular have gone to well-known
figures who have advocated avoiding radical change.
Peron's private secretary, Jose Lopez Rega, who has
been named Minister of Social Welfare, is likely to
be the conduit between Campora and Peron and could
emerge as the strongest member of the government.
China:
Lop Nor nuclear test site shows that test prepara-
tions at GZ-5--the new ground zero--are well along.
Cambodia: The arrival of reinforcements and
munitions has eased the situation at the government's
Mekong River base at Neak Luong. Small Khmer Commu-
nist units continue to shell and probe government
positions on both sides of the river near Neak Luong
and around Prey Veng City to the north, but all po-
sitions are said to have held. Intercepts continue
to reflect Communist intentions to carry out coordi-
nated attacks against Routes 2, 3, and 4 near Phnom
Penh; some messages suggest the attacks will start
early next month.
USSR-Egypt: The Soviets have announced that
their trade with Egypt dropped by about 20 percent
in 1972, the first such decline since the 1950s.
The Soviets did not list the causes, but a number
of largely unrelated factors appear to have been in-
volved, including a drop in Egyptian crude oil pro-
duction, a decrease in economic aid shipments, and
the diversion of some Egyptian cotton from the USSR
to hard currency markets. The Soviet military with-
drawal last summer was also a factor, because the
USSR records some military-related shipments in its
non-military trade figures.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE: CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DETERIORATION
The demonstrated ability of the Chileans to re-
treat from the brink of political chaos may be ap-
proaching its most severe test. Even political vet-
erans like the Chilean Communists fear that tensions
are near the breaking point and that the economic
strains of the coming winter months may set off wide-
scale violence and perhaps a military coup.
At the heart of the matter is the interaction
among a variety of disruptive economic and political
factors. None is new, but many are more pressing
now than they were during the strikes and shutdowns
last October when President Allende coped with his
worst crisis to date.
--Economic disintegration continues in all sec-
tors. Most nationalized enterprises are losing
money. They are poorly managed and their work-
ers undisciplined. Strikes are prevalent.
--The most costly strike--at the big El Teniente
copper complex--is entering its second month.
It has already cost Chile millions in lost ex-
ports.
--The copper miners have long been Chile's high-
est paid workers, and Allende cannot give in to
their wage demands without touching off similar
demands from other workers.
--Inflation is running at a rate of over 200
percent a year.
--Food shortages continue and will grow worse
in the coming months.
--Political bitterness is mounting as Chileans
become more rigidly polarized into pro- and
anti-government camps. Opposition losses in
the March elections have led many to despair
of legally recapturing political power in the
presidential elections of 1976.
--Both the government and opposition camps in-
clude violence-prone fringe groups.
The increasing political polarization, of
course, has reduced Allende's ability to exploit the
Chilean predilection for political compromise. His
room for maneuver even among the contending politi-
cal factions in his own coalition has been reduced
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
A
X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
as a result of the elections last March. The strong
showing by the more radical Socialists and the grow-
ing influence of leftist extremists have made it
more difficult for him to consolidate power through
the relatively cautious means he and the pragmatic
Communists have favored.
For its part, the opposition still has a slim
majority in Congress, but it is not a cohesive
force. On the extreme right is the Fatherland and
Freedom Group, which is now renewing its plotting
with civilians and military officers for Allende's
overthrow. It has little support in the National
Party and is anathema to the Christian Democrats.
Its activities seem likely to accomplish little be-
yond bolstering the government's claim that Chile
is threatened by fascist sedition and civil war.
Leaders of the armed forces are caught in the
middle. They retain their firm commitment to con-
stitutionality and their gratitude to Allende for
improving substantially the armed forces' material
benefits as well as in enhancing their role in the
country. Yet they are being drawn more and more
to the conclusion that Allende's policies are ruin-
ous and that the military will ultimately be called
to play a crucial role in setting things right.
25X1
25X1
25X1
The key military figure is still army com-
mander General Carlos Prats, whose continued sup-
port is vital to Allende. Many of his subordinates
look to him as the only man who might be able to
stand up to Allende and force him to modify his
policies. Prats himself has probably given thought
to the idea that under some circumstances he might
actually have to replace Allende.
One of Prat's biggest fears is that an abortive
coup attempt might provoke widespread violence, crit-
ically split the armed forces and thus eliminate the
military as a restraint on Allende.
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
_ -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010047-7