THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 MAY 1973
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993814
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 4, 1973
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The President's Daily Brief
4 May 1973
18
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I h(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 May 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Early this morning Lebanese Government and fedayeen
leaders concluded a second cease-fire in the two?
day-old,battle, but the durability of the truce is
in doubt (Page I)
On Page 3/
Middle East
Western Europe will have trouble agreeing on a com-
mon response to the US call for a new Atlantic Char-
ter'. (Page 8)
In their initial negotiating sessions Pathet Lao
and government representatives have made no headway
toward implementing the Lao peace agreement.
(Page 6)
Non-Communist interest in providing reconstruction
aid to North Vietnam has all but disappeared.
(Page 7)
In Chile, the Allende governments problems are
mounting on several fronts. (Page- 8)
The EC .decision on farm price supports for the corn-
ing year will improVe,the prospects for US grain
exports. (Page 9)
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GOVERNMENT FEDAYEEN CLASHES
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Israeli-occupied
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LEBANON
Early this morning government and fedayeen lead-
ers concluded a second cease-fire in the two-day-old
battle between their military forces.
Fighting in Beirut had intensified yesterday
following the break-down of the first cease-fire,
and late in the day Lebanese aircraft were called
into action over refugee camps near the city. Leba-
nese Army units also for the first time engaged Pal-
estinian elements in several areas of the Arkub re-
gion in southeastern Lebanon. The government claims
a 1,000-man fedayeen force moved into the area from
Syria.
The possibility of direct Syrian involvement,
along with the reported introduction of additional
fedayeen forces from Syria prompted a Lebanese call
for US assistance.
/Syrian officials denied that fedayeen
units had crossed the border.
The cease-fire is a shaky one. Although
Fatah leader Yasir Arafat has called re-
peatedly for an end to the fighting, some
aggressive fedayeen units may be reluc-
tant to abide by the agreement. The kill-
ing of two fedayeen military leaders may
strengthen their resolve to continue
fighting. The Lebanese Army has shown a
considerable zeal for the fight and it,
too, may be reluctant to cease firing.
Indeed, the fedayeen are claiming that
Lebanese forces early today launched air
and land assaults against fedayeen posi-
tions in southern Lebanon.
Should the 'truce again break down, other
Arab states will be quick to offer their
mediation.
Other Arab mediators--
the secretary-general of the Arab League
and a representative of the Iraqi Presi-
dent--were due in Beirut today to help re-
solve the crisis.
(continued)
1
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The Israelis have shown little reaction beyond
keeping a close watch on their own border with Leba-
non. They are undoubtedly pleased with the further
evidence of inter-Arab dissension, and apparently
expect it to continue.
The cease-fire may at least have forestalled
a further Lebanese Government crisis. The newly
appointed Prime Minister, Amin Hafiz, announced his
intention to resign late yesterday, but apparently
reconsidered as the situation eased. Hafiz' resig-
nation would confront President Franjiyah with the
additional difficult task of finding a successor,
who reportedly would come from the ranks of the
military.
2
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EGYPT
frustration and bitterness
now pervades official thinking in Cairo.
They see a
more difficult and dangerous period ahead and are
preparing for any future talks with the US by at-
tempting :to establish a unified Arab stance against
US interests in the Middle East.- In-addition, Cairo
is intensifying anti-US propaganda and raising Mili-
tary tensions in order to focus world attention on
the Middle East.
Events subsequent to
the Israeli attack on Beirut, have in-
creased the bitterness, the
measure of this deepening frustration is
the recent talk in Cairo of initiating
limited military operations against Is-
rael to force big-power intervention.
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EC-US
Western Europe will have trouble coming up with a
common response to the US call for a new ?Atlantic
Charter before the President's visit. The European
countries have managed to establish joint policies
and effective institutions on few matters other
than trade; they still Zack an identity of view
regarding Europe's future relationship with the US.
France in particular fears that a trans-Atlantic
dialogue risks US meddling in European decision-
making processes and the dilution of European unity.
Paris opposes an early EC debate on the Atlantic
Charter suggestion, in part because it would inhibit
Pompidou in speaking freely about the question when
he meets with President Nixon.
Few Europeans deny that political, military, and
economic issues are interrelated. They worry, how-
ever, that the commitment to Europe's defense re-
newed in Dr. Kissinger's address may mask demands
for concessions in economic areas. Even the Germans
share British reservations about burdening negotia-
tions in one area with problems belonging to another.
Europeans are also puzzled by:
--how the new approach will affect existing in-
stitutions that are already exploring one or
another of the problems cited by Dr. Kissinger;
--how specific a new Atlantic Charter ought to be;
and
--how the US proposes to bring in Japan.
5
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LAOS
In their initial negotiating sessions Pathet
Lao and government representatives have made no
headway toward implementing the Lao peace agreement.
Senior Lao Communist envoy Phoumi Vongvichit, who
last week returned from lengthy consultations in
Sam Neua, reportedly again presented several de-
mands that had stalled earlier talks.
The delay in. reaching agreement may be a
result of North Vietnam's ideas as to the
proper timing.f
In an effort to speed up the talks, Sou-
vanna and Pheng Phongsavan have now taken
personal charge of the negotiations.
Talks that produced the agreement in Feb-
ruary appeared similarly stalled until
Souvanna worked
out an agreement that he presented to his
cabinet as a fait accompli, The Prime
Minister seems prepared once again to
reach a compromise settlement with little
regard to the views of the rightists in
his government.
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NORTH VIETNAM
Non-Communist interest in providing reconstruc-
tion aid to North Vietnam has all but disappeared.
Hanoi, in fact, has received only small amounts of.
aid, mostly for humanitarian purposes. The Japanese,
who were among the most eager to improve economic'
and political ties with Hanbi, now have,a much more
cautious outlook. The only result from a recent
Foreign Ministry mission to North Vietnam was: agree-
ment to begin working level talks on establishing
diplomatic relations./
Tokyo presumably does not want to jeopar-
dize its stake in South Vietnam by making
unnecessary political concessions to the
North.
Japan, along with most of the European
Community countries, is waiting until
Hanoi and Washington make some decisions
on aid, and the prospect for peace seems
more solid. To date, Sweden, which has
promised $100 million, is the only non-
Communist country committed to substantial
economic aid to the North.
Hanoi apparently has much to learn about
seeking aid from non-Communist countries.
The North Vietnamese have tended to pre-
sent potential donors with sweeping pro-
posals, often without back-up information,
and they insist on control of all aid
projects.
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CHILE
? The Allende government's problems are mounting
on several fronts:
--A new wave of strikes has hit the country,
including one at the huge Teniente copper
complex.
--Transportation, petroleum, and government
workers are also threatening walkouts.
--The Christian Democrats are taking an in-
creasingly stiff stance toward the government.
They boycotted the officially backed trade
union confederation's May Day celebrations,
and probably will encourage the strikes now
planned.
--Street disorders persist.
Allende and his pragmatic Communist al-
lies believe that the escalating wage de-
mands and falling production threaten the
government.
8
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NOTES
EC: The EC Council reached agreement on farm
prices for the coming year, but only after the most
difficult, confused, and bitter meeting in EC ex-
perience. As a result, sentiment has increased for
a thorough review of the common agricultural policy's
(CAP) operation. The very modest increase in most
grain support prices will not encourage greater pro-
duction and, therefore, should improvip prospects for
US exports of grain. No action was taken on adoption
of a CAP for soybeans, despite recent French demands.
Iran-Iraq:
Iraq severed diplomatic
ties in late 1971 in protest against Iran's occupa-
tion of three disputed islands at the mouth of the
Persian Gulf, and there have been frequent border
incidents since. Recent Iraqi indications of a de-
sire to ease the tensions may have resulted from
Soviet prompting.
Argentina: Peronist president-elect Campora
met for the first time with the governing military
junta yesterday in discussions prompted by the ter-
rorist assassination of a retired admiral last Mon-
day. Campora's willingness to meet with the junta,
and to do so again, reflects his sensitivity to the
military's increased concern over terrorism.
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