THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 MAY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993812
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 2, 1973

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010026-0
The President's Daily Brief
2 May 1973
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010026-0
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category SBO M2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011600010026-0
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
- A
May 2, 1973
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
2 May 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Egyptian officials continue to stress the need for
military action against Israel in order to force
intervention by the great powers and the imposition
of a settlement acceptable to Arab governments.
On Page 3
Eglr
(Page 1)
? Recent authoritative Chinese statements on Indochina
hint that Peking may be urging the Indochinese Com-
munists to show a greater effort at compliance with
the cease-fire agreements. (Page 4)
France
(Page 6)
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EGYPT
Ever since President Sadat announced in late
March that the time had come for "all-out confronta-
tion" with Israel, Egyptian officials have been
stressing the inevitability of a fresh outbreak of
fighting.
They say Egypt's
objective is not a military victory, but to force
the intervention of the great powers to impose a
settlement that Arab governments could then live
with.
In his May Day speech yesterday, Sadat did not
speak so shrilly of war as on some past occasions,
but did describe the present cease-fire as working
to Israel's advantage. Sadat reiterated that Egypt
would move to end the "present inactivity," but
added that diplomatic efforts would continue.
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Sadat's tough talk has been accompanied by mil- 25X1
itary moves that could be signs of an end to the
cease-fire. Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq have sent
jet fighters to Egypt. 25X1
Several factors have caused Sadat to be-
come more militant. The diplomatic "of-
fensive" he initiated early this year
achieved nothing, serving only to under-
score the bleak outlook for a political
settlement. Reports of promises of new
US military aid for Israel eroded Egyptian
hopes that the US would pressure Israel
to break the impasse in negotiations.
Fedayeen terrorism, the Israeli shootdown
of a Libyan airliner, and Israel's raid
on Beirut have made the Egyptian outlook
even gloomier.
(continued)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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At this stage, Sadat appears to be working
to give credibility to his threats. The
coming discussion in the UN of the Middle
East could provide him an excuse to delay
exercising a,military option. Later, he
could manufacture other excuses. It is
nonetheless possible that Sadat may be
convinced that in the end only military
action will generate movement toward a
settlement, and Egypt's recent moves could
well be preparations for such a contin-
gency.
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EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA
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CHINA-INDOCHINA
Recent authoritative Chinese statements
on Indochina hint that Peking may be urging
the Indochinese Communists to show a greater
effort at compliance with the cease-fire
agreements. The Chinese pronouncements
follow visits to Peking by ranking Vietnam-
ese, Lao, and Cambodian officials and what
seems to have been a major review of Chi-
nese policy on Indochina.
A People's Daily editorial on April 25, for ex-
ample, and a message to the 1970 Indochina Summit
participants signed by Chou En-lai referred to the
Vietnam and Lao agreements as having "created con-
ditions" for the Lao and Cambodian people "to settle
themselves their internal affairs free from foreign
interference."
The Chinese may have privately advised
Hanoi and the Lao Communists that there
is much to be gained by moving ahead on
the formation of a new Lao government.
The return last week of a high-ranking
Lao Communist negotiator to Vientiane
may reflect this. The Chinese may have
suggested too that although renewed mil-
itary pressure might gain some new ter-
ritory, it would also raise the threat
of US retaliation.
With respect to Cambodia, the People's Daily
did not mention the hard settlement terms being
pushed by the Khmer Communists, and it softened
China's own demands. Instead of insisting, as Chi-
nese spokesmen have in the past, on an end of all
US "interference" in Cambodian affairs, the People's
Daily demanded "that the US Government stop all
bombing and all its military interference in Cambodia.
Peking )could believe that this less com-
prehensive demand would be more attractive
to Washington and Phnom Penh.
Peking may be advocating a more flexible
position because it fears that recent mil-
itary and political developments threaten
the prospects for defusing Indochina as an
issue in major power politics.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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FRANCE
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NOTE
USSR-China: May Day passed quietly in the two
major Communist capitals. In Moscow, Brezhnev's
speech emphasized economic progress and the Soviet
contribution to peace. Brezhnev sought to leave
his listeners with the impression that the Soviet
leadership views the future--domestically and inter-
nationally--with confidence. In Peking, for the
second consecutive year, the festivities were low-
keyed. Peking avoided making any major policy
statements by forgoing the traditional speeches,
slogans, and joint editorial.
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Top Secret
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