THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 APRIL 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993802
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 20, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
20 April 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(I ).(2).(3)
declassified only on approval or
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
20 April 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cairo has taken a number of steps recently to in-
crease its military preparedness, but these activi-
ties do not indicate an intention to start hostili-
ties with Israel now. (Page 1)
In Cambodia, Republican Party leader Sink Matak
has rejected Lon Nol's proposal for an advisory
political council and has proposed instead the
creation of a four-member group, including himself
and the President, that would have full power.
(Page 2)
The return of the 312th Division headquarters to
southern North Vietnam appears to be part of a
major restructuring of Communist forces in northern-
most South Vietnam. (Page 3)
Most members of the North Atlantic Council find
Moscow's proposal to end the impasse over Hungarian
participation in the MBFR preparatory talks far from
ideal, but they are willing to accept it as the best
compromise obtainable at this time. (Page 4)
Reports circulating in the Moscow diplomatic com-
munity indicate that the Party Central Committee
will meet soon, perhaps next week, to discuss for-
eign policy or modernization of the economy. (Page 5)
Pakistan regards the recent India-Bangladesh pro-
posal ?as a basis for discussion and probably will re-
ply today. (Page 6)
Philippine President Marcos' announcement that he
wants to renegotiate all aspects of US-Philippine
relations seems to be part of an attempt to link
Philippine foreign and domestic concerns. (Page 7)
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EGYPT
Cairo has taken a number of steps recently
to increase its military preparedness. These
activities, however, do not indicate an intention
to start hostilities with Israel now.
Egypt is still ready to negotiate, but
there is increasing evidence that Pres-
ident Sadat believes that, in the end,
only military action will generate move-
ment toward a settlement. If Egypt does
resort to military action, its most likely
initial course would be small-scale raids
across the canal combined with air raids
on Israeli forces in the Sinai. These
would trigger a massive Israeli response.
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CAMBODIA
During a lengthy, frank session with Lon Nol on
April 18, Republican Party leader Sink Matak re-
jected the President's proposal for an advisory po-
litical council. Matak proposed instead the crea-
tion of a four-member group that would have full
power. Authority would be divided equally among the
members--Lon Nol, Matak, former chief of state Cheng
Heng, and former first deputy prime minister In Tam.
Matak and In Tam, who was also at the meeting, told
the President that the pro-government legislature
would have to be dissolved and new elections held
with all political groups given a chance to compete.
Lon Nol said he had no absolute objections to
the new proposals, but that he needed more time to
consider them; he promised a reply within 24 hours.
After the meeting, Matak admitted that in view of
Lon Nol's tendency to procrastinate, he might accept
some additional delay. Matak added, however, that
neither he nor In Tam would retreat from their lat-
est proposals, which Matak believes stand a slightly
better than even chance of being accepted by the
President.
Matak evidently pulled no punches during the
meeting, and claims that he criticized the President
for his excessive optimism and inept leadership.
Lon Nol listened to these accusations in unhappy
silence, according to Matak.
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VIETNAM
Radio direction-finding of April 17 places
North Vietnam's 312th Division headquarters west of
Vinh in southern North Vietnam.
Divisional headquarters was last located
in late March just north of the Demilita-
rized Zone. Location of the division's
three regiments is not known, but they
probably are following the headquarters
north.
The return of the 312th Division headquar-
ters to southern North Vietnam appears to
be part of a major restructuring of Com-
munist forces in northernmost South Viet-
nam. Three divisions and a number of in-
dependent regiments are involved in the
realignment. The 308th Division left
Quang Tri in January and is now near
Hanoi; the 304th Division apparently sent
some units north sometime after late Jan-
uary; and the 312th Division started with-
drawing in late March. Intercepted mes-
sages also indicate that at least two
antiaircraft artillery regiments have
left Quang Tri in recent weeks and are
moving south through the Laos panhandle.
The evidence suggests that Hanoi viewed
its force structure in Quang Tri as ex-
cessive. The returning divisions are
among Hanoi's best. They carried the
brunt of the fighting in Quang Tri Prov-
ince last year. The remaining force
structure is comparable to that in place
in Quang Tri when Hanoi launched its 1.972
Easter offensive.
The Communists probably view their exist-
ing force structure as adequate for de-
fending the area, conducting limited op-
erations, and forcing Saigon to keep its
airborne and marine divisions committed
in Quang Tri.
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MBFR
Most members of the North Atlantic Council
find Moscow's proposal to end the impasse over
Hungarian participation in the MBFR preparatory
talks far from ideal, but they are willing to
accept it as the best compromise obtainable at
this time.
The Soviet proposal lists Hungary as
one of eight "special participants,"
but it also provides for unilateral
statements by the two sides to make
explicit their disagreement on Hungary's
status.
The British object to the proposal but may
decide eventually to go along with other NAC mem-
bers. They believe that listing Hungary as a
special participant would represent a fait accompli
which the unilateral statements would not modify.
They think it could prevent discussion of the ap-
plication of eventual MBFR agreements to Hungary.
Bonn supports the Soviet proposal, but the Germans
too have emphasized that MBFR talks must deal with
force levels in Hungary.
Unless the British request it, the Coun-
cil will not meet again to discuss the
proposal. If London decides to accept
the Soviet plan, Council approval could
be given without an additional meeting.
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USSR
Reports circulating in the Moscow diplomatic
community indicate that the Party Central Committee
will meet soon, perhaps next week, to discuss for-
eign policy or modernization of the economy.
Circumstances would seem to call for a
Central Committee review of both subjects
in the near future. At the least, Party
chief Brezhnev will want Central Committee
endorsement of his travels to Bonn next
month and to Washington later this year.
Detente policy has caused controversy in
the past and Brezhnev wants to have solid
backing before he goes.
A year ago, Brezhnev promised that the
Central Committee would take up the ques-
tion of how to accelerate scientific and
technical progress. Now perhaps he wants
to examine the place of science and tech-
nology in the economy and to define hdw
expanded relations with the developed West
can be used to cut down industrial defi-
ciencies.
The question of technological progress is
not likely to stir controversy. It masks,
however, an issue that will be on the
minds of the Central Committee members,
but which Brezhnevwill strive to keep
from coming to debate. Earlier this month,
plans were announced--apparently without
prior consultations, with the Central Com-
mittee--for an extensive reorganization
of Soviet industry. Details will not be
released 'for six months. Brezhnev will
have to cope with unease among Central
Committee members who are worried about
how the sweeping reorganization will af-
fect their constituencies.
Brezhnev's political position is strong.
Nevertheless, the Party Politburo still
has a number of members who probably carry
grudges against Brezhnev. This raises
another possibility, that Brezhnev may
move against his enemies, just as he de-
moted Shelest at a Central Committee meet-
ing preceding President Nixon's visit to
Moscow.
In fact, Shelest may again be a target.
Recently he was harshly criticized by
name for ideological errors. Such criti-
cism of Politburo members is unprecedented.
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PAKISTAN-INDIA-BANGLADESH
Pakistan regards the recent India-Bangladesh
proposal as a basis for discussion and probably
will reply today.
/Islamabad is particularly re-
lieved at the abandonment of the demand that it
recognize Dacca as a condition for the return of
Pakistani war prisoners.
India and Bangladesh had proposed that
--195 Pakistani POWs be tried for war
crimes in Bangladesh but that all the
other 90,000 POWs be repatriated.
--Several hundred thousand Bengalis be
allowed to leave Pakistan.
--Islamabad accept about 250,000 Biharis
who want to leave Bangladesh.
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PHILIPPINES
? President Marcos told newsmen yesterday that
he wants to renegotiate all aspects of Philippine
relations with the US and suggested June as a target
for beginning negotiations. Marcos wants the dis-
cussions to consider all treaties with the US at
once--the base agreement, the mutual defense pact,
the Laurel-Langley trade agreement, and a proposed
extradition treaty.
This latest move seems to be part of a
broader attempt to Zink Philippine for-
eign and domestic concerns. Marcos is
increasingly concerned about the sluggish
economy and he apparently is convinced
more foreign aid and investment is impera-
tive. Earlier this month he asked a com-
mittee of foreign policy experts to de-
termine how foreign policy could serve as
an "instrument of economic development."
Marcos may believe that by raising the
issue of the US treaties, he can pressure
Washington into providing more aid. In
the past, he has also made public issue
of the US-Philippine relationship in or-
der to distract attention from domestic
problems. This may again be in the back
of Marcos' mind, in view of his inability
thus far to effect reforms promised last
September when he declared martial law.
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NOTES
Laos: Despite bellicose statements from Sam
Neua on the bombing at Tha Viang, Lao Communist en-
voy Phoune Sipraseuth is continuing to meet twice
daily with government negotiator Ngon Sananikone
in Vientiane. Ngon says little progress is being
made at these sessions. The Communists in effect
have repudiated the tentative agreement on the di-
vision of cabinet portfolios by renewing their de-
mands for a deputy prime ministership and the min-
istry of interior. Ngon believes that the private
sessions will continue, but sees the prospects for
any immediate progress as dim.
European Communities: EC agricultural minis-
ters failed to agree this week on community prices
for 1973-74. The EC Commission had proposed modest
price rises for most products and a return to the
common price system disrupted by the currency cri-
ses. The opposition of some of the ministers to
these proposals was reinforced by demonstrations
in northern France by some 30,000 French, German,
Belgian, and Dutch farmers demanding larger price
increases. The Council will meet again next week,
but farmer protests will continue to make agree-
ment difficult.
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