THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 MARCH 1973

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005993781
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 27, 1973
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 The President's Daily Brief 27 March 1973 4 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Exempt from general declassification scheduk of E.O. 11652 exemption category 58(1),(2),(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 ZO*4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 EYES ONLY FOF? I FiL. FKtbIlitIN I CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY March 27, 1973 TOP SE 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 2bAl 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : EIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T006-36A011500010076-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 March 1973 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS Egyptian President Sadat's long speech yesterday suggests no major policy changes; in assuming the premiership, he presumably hopes to prove that he can provide the forceful leadership that many Egyp- tians have found wanting in his regime. (Page 1) India's low-key response to the US removal of an embargo on sales of military equipment to Pakistan suggests that New Delhi intends to continue to im- prove relations with Washington. (Page 2) Ugandan President Amin's charges that an invasion by Tanzania is imminent may actually be a further effort to keep his unruly army under control. (Page 3) The appearance of Uruguay's key generals on tele- vision and radio last Friday was, in effect, a second warning that civilian government can con- tinue only if it follows the military's directives. (Page 4) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY EGYPT In assuming the premiership yesterday, apparently for a limited period, Presi- dent Sadat presumably hopes to prove that he can provide the forceful leadership that many Egyptians have found wanting in his regime. Sadat's assumption of the post, however, means that he is more di- rectly exposed to the criticism that pre- viously was partially deflected to former Prime Minister Sidqi. Apparently real- izing this, Sadat has promised periodic joint conferences of legislative and party members to approve Egyptian poli- cies, a procedure that would spread re- sponsibility for decision-making. Sadat's long speech yesterday suggests no major policy changes, and a preliminary report on the new cabinet--which will be formally announced tomorrow--indicates that the reshuffle involves few important shifts. Sadat directed considerable criticism at the United States in the course of his speech, but he conceded that President Nixon had recently taken a positive position--at least on the surface--rd- garding some resettlement issues. Sadat described the current phase of the dispute with Israel as "all-out confrontation," but said diplomatic activ- ity would continue; He adhered generally to well- established Egyptian positions regarding settlement terms. In discussing Egyptian domestic problems, Sadat used the theme of "coming battle" to urge greater discipline and sacrifice. He warned that the activities of dissenters would not be tolerated and described student protesters as only a small minority of malcontents. 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY INDIA India's low-key response to the US removal of an embargo on sales of military equipment to Pakistan suggests that New Delhi intends to continue to im- prove relations with Washington. The prevailing Indian Government analysis apparently is that the US sales to Pakistan will have no significant ef- fect on the subcontinent's military balance. The government may have been moved toward such a con- clusion by growing criticism from conservatives of India's close ties with Moscow. When die-hard anti-US members in parliament sug- gested that the government turn down the restora- tion of $87.6 million in US economic assistance in protest, Finance Minister Chavan refused. More- over,? New Delhi's relatively relaxed position on US arms sales to Pakistan has apparently been com- municated to Congress Party functionaries through- out the country. Scarcely a week after the mili- tary sales announcement, the social welfare and re- lief minister of West Bengal buttonholed the US consul general in Calcutta with an appeal for in- creased PL-480 aid. More such requests are likely as Congress Party officials in other state govern- ments seek US food for their areas. Mrs. Gandhi will still have to cope with Moscow's strong lobby in India, which will attempt to make the most of the lifting of the arms embargo. Indian policy toward the US, therefore, may appear erratic,- but it seems likely that, for now, its main track will be toward better relations. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T0093-5A011500010076-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY UGANDA President Amin's charges that an invasion by Tanzania is imminent may actually be a further effort to keep his unruly army under control. The President may have contrived the latest invasion scare in order to put the army on alert and thus keep it too preoccupied to carry out any anti-government move? 3 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T0093eA011500010076-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY URUGUAY Last Friday night's appearance on radio and tele- vision of all of Uruguay's key generals was more than an effort to force a balky congress to imple- ment the military's plan for national economic re- covery. It was, in effect, a second warning that civilian government can continue only if it is will- ing to follow the military's directives. The gen- erals evidently now believe themselves strong enough to face down any opposition. The generals also are making their influence felt outside the government. For example, they have given a veiled warning to the nation's strongest labor union that the military will not tolerate a strike scheduled for Thursday. The reactions of civilian politicians have been rather meek. Ruling Colorado Party leaders have sought only to defend their records against charges of corruption. The opposition Elancos have not commented, but are preparing to do so. The left- ists in the "Frente AmpZio" coalition say they are studying" the military's statement. Within two months, the generals have twice imposed their will by coercion. Further opposition to them could endanger the survival of the already weakened civilian government and possibly prompt the gener- als to force President Bordaberry's resignation and install a military junta. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A011500010076-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTES UN 7 South Vietnam: Late last week Secretary- General Waldheim reportedly received both the Pro- visional Revolutionary Government's formal request for a UN liaison office in New York and a Secretar- iat memorandum opposing that request. The Secre- tariat advised Waldheim that there is no precedent for such action. Earlier, UN le4al adviser Stavro- poulus also cautioned Waldheim against haste, al- though he found no legal barrier. Despite US ob- jections, Waldheim has continued to consider PRG association, contending that it is necessary for ?a UN role in Vietnam relief projects. He is now likely to respond that the matter is under study. Zambia-Rhodesia: The Zambian Government is partially ignoring its border closure by allowing rail traffic to enter Zambia from Rhodesia. Stocks of consumer goods and other imports have dwindled, and the decision to revert to the Rhodesian rail- road for imports is designed to avoid the develop- ment of public discontent. There has been no re- laxation, however, of the ban on copper exports or road traffic through Rhodesia, and Lusaka is still hopeful that massive foreign assistance--so far slow in materializing--will permit it to re-route foreign trade. USSR-Pakistan: .A Soviet mission probably will negotiate a trade agreement with Pakistan in the next few weeks andsettle on a list of aid deliver- ies to be made this year. Earlier this month, Mos- cow relieved Islamabad of responsibility for out- standing debts incurred on behalf .of the former East Pakistan. Soviet-Pakistan economic relations have been'dormant since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Prior to the hostilities, Soviet-Pakistani trade amounted to $70 million annually, and Soviet aid deliveries averaged almost $10 million a year. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010076-6