THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 MARCH 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993772
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 16, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
16 March 1973
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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EYES ONLY FOR,THE,PRESIDENT
r LUktIL I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
TOP T
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
16 March 19;73'
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The North Vietnamese are preparing a major logistics
effort. The phase of "political struggle" the Com-
munists intend to carry out in South Vietnam is ex-
emplified by the recent experience of the Mekong
Delta region. (Page 1)
Chinese forces in northern Laos have been ordered
to stop shooting at aircraft. (Page 2)
There has been an improvement in the atmosphere of
Japanese-Soviet relations. (Page 3)
French officials do not like proposed US trade leg-
islation. (Page 4)
King Faysal of Saudi Arabia has suspended aid to
the Fatah group of fedayeen. (Page 5)
Chilean military officers may have given President
Allende a means to move them out of policy-making
posts. (Page 6)
On Cyprus, irredentist forces of General Grivas
have begun a campaign of political bombing.
(Page 7)
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NG\cAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
South China Sea
CON
/? SON
c=.?'
0 i,5 3,0 Miles
0 15 30 Kilometers
554225 3-73
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
? Messages intercepted this week indicate that
North Vietnamese military transportation units op-
erating in northern South Vietnam and southern Laos
are planning a "general transportation offensive"
to last from 15 March to 31 May. One logistics
unit operating in the same area was directed to
initiate a "road and bridge restoration campaign"
as part of the preparation for this "large trans-
portation effort."
Aerial photography of 27 February showed
the Communists improving roads and bridges
in northern South Vietnam. The work ap-
peared designed ultimately to give the
Communists a through route from the De-
militarized Zone into the central high-
lands and to the coast as well. Such a
road inside South Vietnam would run east
of the mountains that keep the spring
monsoon in Laos and would provide a dry
alternate to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which
becomes impassable in the rains.
The heavily populated Mekong Delta region
:has been the scene of unspectacular but persistent
fighting since 28 January. The government has im-
proved its position in the northern delta, and the
Communists have gained in the south.
In the northern delta, South Vietnamese forces
have recovered most of the territory lost at the
start of the cease-fire and are now setting up out-
posts where there has been no recent government
presence. There are still sizable Communist forces
in the area, but their access to the population has
been restricted.
In the southern delta, the Communists have
perceptibly increased their influence in Chuong
Thien Province. They now have unimpeded access
to communications and supply routes, as well as
a potential base for operations in the central
delta. In Chau Doc Province, the Communists have
strengthened their bases in the Seven Mountains
area, making easier their access to Cambodia.
Bac Lieu and Ba Xuyen provinces are being con-
tested, but there, the government appears to be
holding its own.
Throughout the delta, Communist assassinations,
abductions, and sabotage have recently increased.
Other areas of the country have not yet experienced
a comparable upsurge in terrorism, but such actions
could soon become more general. Communist direc-
tives dealing with the period after the cease-fire
have indicated that terrorism is to be a major part
of the Viet Cong's "political struggle."
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? Government-held location
? Communist-held location.
? Chinese-built road
-- Road
--- Trail
Mlles 20
Chinese Road Complex in Northwest Laos
Lai Chau
Muon
?len
Bien
Phu
1
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CHINA LAOS
Chinese forces have been ordered to refrain
from firing on aircraft overflying the road complex
they are building in northwest Laos, according to
an intercepted message of 9 March. The new order
was issued two days after an Air America cargo plane
was lost while flying near Pak Beng, the southern
terminus of the road network, where the Chinese are
equipped with radar-controlled antiaircraft weapons.
In the past, the Chinese have fired on air-
craft flying in the area, and they prob-
ably shot down the Air America plane. The
new directive indicates a Chinese decision
not to let this happen again. They may
reason that further incidents would draw
attention to China's activities in the
northwest at a time when the Lao Govern-
ment and Communists are working out de-
tails of a peace accord. Peking no doubt
also is motivated by a desire to avoid un-
necessary irritants in relations with the
US.
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JAPAN-USSR
There has been an improvement in the atmosphere
of Soviet-Japanese relations, as a result of recent
conciliatory gestures by both sides. Tokyo took the
first steps. A few weeks ago the Japanese made it
clear that they would not try to link the question
of Japanese participation in joint economic ventures
in Siberia with more intractable political problems.
A letter from Prime Minister Tanaka to Brezhnev, de-
livered by the Japanese ambassador on 6 March, went
further in promising Japanese Government backing for
the $1 billion Tyumen oil project. Tanaka's letter
avoided any mention of the long-standing territorial
issue that has impeded substantial improvement in
ties between Tokyo and Moscow.
The Soviets have seized the opportunity to re-
iterate their own interest in better relations.
Pravda
gave unusually heavy play to positive commentary on
the Soviet leader's meeting with the Japanese ambas-
sador.
Nevertheless, serious problems remain in,
the way of any fundamental improvement in
political relations.
With respect to bi-
lateral economic dealings, significant
progress on joint ventures to exploit Si-
berian resources must await further ex-
ploration and negotiation.
The gestures of the past few weeks show,
however, that Japan sees benefit in a mod-
est improvement in ties with Moscow to
balance recent advances in Sino-Japanese
relations. For the present, the Soviets
are clearly determined to repay smile for
smile.
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FRANCE
Ambassador Malmgren and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Treasury Worthington briefed
senior French officials this week on the
President's proposed trade legislation.
The US Embassy in Paris is now beginning
to receive French reactions, which are
critical.
--President Pompidou's financial and economic
adviser described the proposed legislation as
"brutal" in that it would give the U8 a dis-
tinct advantage when trade negotiations begin.
The EC' he said, could not match such powers,
and in any case, ? the power to "increase pro-
tection" was not the kind of mandate the Euro- .
peans hoped the U8 side would bring to the talks.
-7-The Foreign Ministry's director of economic
affairs expressed particular uneasiness about
the "broad criteria" for safeguarding against
imports. He believes such authority would
violate GATT rules and wondered whether the
US intends to. seekchanges in -these rules..
---;-These officials believe that the US will ben-
efit_from.cumulativedevaluations of the dollar
and. from. the EC's joint float of its currencies,
and they imply that the US should go easy on
-.changing. its trade laws until it can be dis?
cerned how much benefit is involved. The French
have made it plain they do not wish to make
trade...concessions:asua price for US participa-
tion in theestablishment of a new monetary
orders
The attitudes expressed above are, of
coursej designed-to influence the adminiS-
?tration as. it drafts theproposed trade
legislation, such attitudes nevertheless
reflect the positions Prance iZZ take dur-
ing future trade and monetary nogotiations.o
Protect-ion of the franc and of French agri-
culture is _uppermost in the minds of French
leadersi -who. would .suffer politica/4 if
they failed On. either ?acoount,
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SAUDI ARABIA - FEDAYEEN
In a conversation with Ambassador Thatcher
on Wednesday, King Faysal reiterated his firm op-
position to fedayeen terrorism and added that he
had suspended financial aid to the Fatah group.
He attempted to exonerate Fatah, however, from re-
sponsibility for the murders in Khartoum, attribut-
ing the act to "Communist and Zionist" elements
in Fatah.
Faysal said he will not reinstate his aid un-
til Fatah rids itself of such elements. He re-
fuses, however, to make the suspension permanent.
To do so, he said, would curtail Fatah's "normal
activities" against Israel, and would, moreover,
throw the fedayeen further into the arms of the
"radicals." Denial of his aid would also open
Saudi Arabia to attack from the fedayeen.
Faysal apparently clings to the belief
that he can use financial aid to influ-
ence the fedayeen toward moderation.
His commitment to the Arab struggle
against Israel makes him reluctant to
admit that his policy may have been a
mistake.
Saudi support of Fatah runs to several
million dollars a year, but even if it
were cut off permanently, fedayeen ter-
rorists would not be seriously hampered.
The terrorist groups are relatively
small and could operate on the basis of
the aid they receive from numerous other
sources, especially Libya.
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CHILE
Senior military officers, after consulting
among themselves, have advised President Allende
that they will stay in his government only if he
adopts a moderate line in domestic affairs and
tries to solve his problems with the US. The mes-
sage was reluctantly conveyed by General Prats,
Chile's interior minister and chief of the army,
who was pressed into doing so by his fellow offi-
cers.
The military may have played into Allende's
hands. Now that the elections are over
and he no longer needs them to help pro-
ject an image of stability, Allende sees
no reason to retain military officers in
the cabinet after Congress convenes in
May. For cosmetic purposes, Allende is
thinking of appointing additional mili-
tary men to administrative, rather than
policy-making positions, and there is no
doubt he could find sympathetic officers
willing to serve on such terms. Such a
development, however, could intensify
political differences within the armed
forces, which have remained up to now
relatively united in defense of constitu-
tional rule.
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CYPRUS
On Thursday, General Grivas? forces responded
to growing pressure from President Makarios by
blowing up police stations and bombing the homes
of police officers. Last night, in an apparent
counterattack by Makarios supporters, 27 bombs
exploded, many at the homes of Grivas' followers.
? Having failed to effect a truce with
Grivas, Makarios on 13 March decided to
dismiss at least 30 policemen suspected
of being Grivas supporters and to add
several hundred of his own men to the
force. Makarios told Ambassador Popper
that he is determined to neutralize
Grivas. For his part, Grivas probably
will stage more such attacks to demon-
strate that he remains a force to be
reckoned with.
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NOTES
Cuba-Panama: Cuba's foreign minister will be-
gin negotiations with Panamanian officials this week
on the establishment of diplomatic relations,
Castro apparently believes
formal ties will help defeat US-supported sanctions
against Cuba in next month's OAS meeting. For the
Panamanians, formal ties would merely formalize a
growing friendship that already includes cooperation
on security, educational, and cultural matters.
Venezuela: After meeting with President Caldera
on 13 March, the secretary-general of the ruling
Christian Democrats told newsmen that Caldera's party
?now favors advancing the date when facilities of for-
eign oil companies begin to revert to the state.
The present date for reversion of these largely US-
owned facilities is 1983. Even though the presiden-
tial elections are nine months away, party officials
are concerned about recent public opinion polls that
show their lackluster candidate, Lorenzo Fernandez,
trailing the opposition. They expect to profit from
exploiting this issue in a nationalistic fashion.
8
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Top Secret
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