THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 FEBRUARY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993757
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 28, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
28 February 1973
45
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tani
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduIC of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
28 February 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The North Vietnamese apparently fear they will lose
their leverage once they return all US POWs. (Page 1)
The Soviets appear to be pressing both the West
Germans and the Czechoslovaks to restore relations.
(Page 2)
The Western oil consortium and Iran have reached a
new agreement. (Page 3) ?
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
(Page 4)
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NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi's announcement that no US prisoners will be
released until certain "serious problems" in the
implementation of the Vietnam agreement are taken
care of appears to reflect North Vietnamese fears
that return of all the prisoners will cost them
their leverage. The Communists have not been spe-
cific about the nature of the "serious problems"
but the treatment of their delegations in South
Vietnam is a prime issue. Another is Saigon's
handling of the Communist prisoners it holds. A
third could be the pace of US minesweeping opera-
tions in North Vietnamese waters.
The Vietnamese Communists clearly see the emotion-
ally charged return of prisoners to the US as an
exploitable issue, and we believe they will try to
use it to get the US to influence the South Viet-
namese to implement the accords in a manner that
is more to their liking.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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WEST GERMANY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA
For their part,, the Czechs moved toward accom-
modating Bonn last week during Soviet party chief ?
Brezhnev's visit, to PragueH The communique issued
at the end of the visit avoided mention of Prague's
longstanding demand that the. Munich Agreement of
1938 be declared invalid "ab initio"--something Bonn
has steadfastly refused to do. The Czechs apparently
now will be satisfied with a statement that simply
declares the agreement to be "invalid."
This formulation undercuts the go-slow
arguments of legal experts in the West
German Foreign Office, and we believe
that talks are likely to resume soon.
2
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IRAN
The Shah and repreeentatives of the Western oil
consortium have reached a new agreement in principle.
Although final details have yet to be worked out,
the settlement will in large part meet the Shah's
demand for greater control over the operations of
the companies. As a result, the government will
conclude a five-year management contract and a 20-
year sales contract enabling the companies to con-
tinue-to produce and market most of Iran's oil.
Negotiations of details could take until 15 April.
The consortium had reached a tentative
agreement with Iran last spring, but the
Shah reopened negotiations in December
because he felt that the same companies
had in the meantime given several Arab
Persian GuZf oil states a better deal.
In a tough speech last month, the Shah
gave the consortium a choice: either
renegotiate the agreement immediately or
break off the relationship in 1979 when
the present contract expires.
The new agreement will help the Shah ful-
fill his desire to assert his Leadership
role in the Persian Gulf. Its terms are
financially about the same as those nego-
tiated by other governments of the gulf.
Therefore, it should not cause the others
to seek renegotiation of their agreements.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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NOTE
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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,i
Top Secret
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