THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 JANUARY 1973

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005993725
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 25, 1973
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PDF icon DOC_0005993725.pdf239.29 KB
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"*. _ - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A61-1500610021-6 The President's Daily Brief 25 January 1973 45 Top Secrei-5x1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 January 1973 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS In South Vietnam we have additional indications that the Communists will try to improve their mil- itary position before the cease-fire goes into ef- fect, but so far their action has been mostly con- fined to harassment and light shelling. (Page 1) The Thai Army is abandoning large-scale operations against Communist insurgents in favor of the use of small, specialized units directed against cadre and base camps. (Page 2) Argentine military leaders have reaffirmed their support for President Lanusse and for proceeding with the electoral process, despite recent reports that they were pressing him to foreclose a Peronist victory. (Page 3) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 I OR V ETNA art..Mral ? \ DEMILITARIZED ZONE fe [long Ha .Quang In ? Wog ci e, e len `41 o MILES 25 t** ? c14111? v rn -era abaidon driii ' A "M? 7/ b 6ornmuniii- Da Nang 0 ti-liep D?c Tin? t.Ong SOUTH VIETNAM Tay Ninh GON (hang Ngai Kontum .171 ? t Pleiku Id r- MR 1 ,MR 2 r'' A fel N II 554041 1-73 CIA ?Ch 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SOUTH VIETNAM US military authorities in Saigon report that as of 0530 EST there has not been a significant- in-' crease,in Communist military action, although we have additional indications that the Communists in- tend to tty to improve their position on the ground before the cease-fire goes into effect. Communist officials have con- tinued to meet in the past several days to dissem- inate orders to use small units to expand control of land and people. Except for a sharp clash in the western delta, most of the action remains limited to Communist harassment and, light, shelling. Some signs point to main force enemy.attacks, possibly in an effort to capture a few district centers or even a provincial capital. the North Vietnamese have been strengthening their forces in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon and now have at least three regiments there, possibly with armor support. South Vietnamese forces have disrupted enemy staging and storage areas north of Saigon that would have been used in any push toward the capital itself, In Military Region 1 the South Vietnamese apparently have abandoned their effort to retake the Hiep Duc district capital follow- ing a series of Communist counterattacks on Monday. In Pleiku Province the government forces lost Duc Co Ranger Camp earlier this week, and there are indica- tions that the Communists will try to oust the gov- ernment from scattered fire support bases in a largely Communist-controlled area north of the Kontum provin- cial capital. 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 25X1 25X1 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THAILAND ? The Thai Army is abandoning large-scale sweep operations against Communist insurgents--which have been unsuccessful--and is opting instead to Use small, specialized Units. Future combat operations will be conduCted largelylpy 12-man teams that will concentrate :on identifying and eliminating Communist cadre and base camps. This decision against sustaining military pressure upon the Communists is another indication of Bangkok's reluctance to ac- cept the casualties and expenditures re- quired by an all-out effort. Over the long term, the development of small, well- trained units could improve the army's counterinsurgency performance. The imme- diate effect of the new strategy, however, will be to give the Communists welcome re- ? lief from military pressure and opportun- ity for further growth. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ARGENTINA Signs of growing Peronist strength and unity in recent days, combined with a rising level of po- litical violence, have revived the old anti-Peronist fears and hatreds within the armed forces. President Lanusse has been under growing pressure to take action that would foreclose a Peronist victory, even if it means post- poning or canceling the elections scheduled for 11 March. Following meetings held yesterday, however, military leaders reaffirmed their support for Lanusse and for proceeding with the elections. Tighter con- trols are to be imposed on the candidates. Lanusse appears to have leaked accounts of his dismay over political trends in order to warn the Peroni^sts to moderate their tactics as well as to obtain this pledge from the military. He is person- ally committed to returning the govern- ment to elected officials and is likely to do everything he can to keep to his promise and, at the same time, to keep the Peronists from winning. If fear of a Peronist victory becomes over- riding, however, we would expect Lanusse to step down and leave to someone else the unpleasant task of canceling the elec- tions and dealing with the public outcry that would follow. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011500010021-6