THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 JANUARY 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993719
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 18, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
18 January 1973
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
18 January 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1, we note that the Vietnamese Communists
are evidently moving on both political and military
fronts in anticipation of a cease-fire. Indica-
tions of Communist military preparations for a
cease-fire are discussed in detail at Annex.
West Germans
British
French
(Page 2)
In Chile the
military is increasingly frustrated over its
dwindling voice in the government. (Page 3)
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VIETNAM
The Vietnamese Communists are evidently moving
on the political as well as the military fronts in
anticipation of a cease-fire. The Viet Cong's
Liberation Radio reports, for instance, that the
Council of Ministers of the Provisional Revolution-
ary Government met last week and decided that the
single most important task now is to strengthen
ties with non-Communist opponents of the Thieu
government.
This foreshadows a greater emphasis on
united front tactics in the post-cease-
fire period.
We continue to receive indications from
a variety of sources on Communist mili-
tary preparations for a cease-fire.
These are discussed in detail at Annex.
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WEST GERMANY - UK - FRANCE
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CHILE
the mili-
tary's frustration over its role in the cabinet
came to a head last week when the government an-
nounced stringent new economic controls without
consulting the military cabinet members. The
Allende spent little
time trying to mollify the officers. He reminded
them that they knew that his was a Marxist gov-
ernment when they agreed to join the cabinet in
November.
The military's dilemma over its growing
identification with--but dwindling voice
in--a controversial government is dif-
ficult to resolve. There is consider-
able sentiment in the armed forces in
favor of withdrawal, but also a feeling
of responsibility for guaranteeing
free elections in March.
some officers fear that if
the military pulled out, its budget
would suffer.
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NOTES
Cambodia: Government forces have reoccupied
both banks of the Mekong River south of Neak Luong.
With the waterway back under government control,
regular supply convoys are resuming their run up
the Mekong from South Vietnam to Phnom Penh.
Fedayeen: Yasir Arafat was re-elected last
week as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization executive committee. The newly elected
ten-man committee includes at least one representa-
tive from each of the PLO member groups. Arafat's
Fatah, which previously dominated the committee,
lost two seats in a shuffle reflecting long-stand-
ing dissatisfaction with Arafat's policies. The
more representative distribution of seats suggests
a new effort by the fragmented Palestinian organ-
izations to move toward unity, but none of the feda-
yeen's problems was resolved.
China-Guyana:
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VIETNAM; PREPARING FOR A CEASE-FIRE
A variety of intelligence sources show the Com-
munists continue to keep their forces in a position
of readiness for a military push on the eve of a
possible cease-fire announcement. They apparently
anticipate a period of uncertainty and confusion
accompanying the cease-fire among both the populace
and some government military forces, and hope to
take advantage of it. If a cease-fire occurred in
the period of the lengthy Tet festivities in early
February, the Communists might expect the govern-
ment's guard to be further lowered. The Communists'
motive, of course, would be to strengthen their ter-
ritorial position in advance of an in-place stand-
down by the military units of both sides. It is
evident that the Communists will be trying to tie
any operations very closely to the actual implementa-
tion of a cease-fire, hoping thereby to block gov-
ernment efforts to retake lost ground after a truce
goes into effect.
Communist preparations are evident
and in the
deployment of enemy military forces.
enemy troops are being
told by higher headquarters to maintain themselves
at combat readiness in order to take the offensive
immediately after the order is given. Intercepted
messages of the past few days contain orders for
the preparation of munitions, for reconnaissance,
and for other support activities usually undertaken
prior to offensive operations. Intercepts indicate
that in MR-3, and possibly in other areas, addi-
tional enemy units have been moved into South Viet-
nam from Cambodia.
The North Vietnamese continue to move tanks,
artillery, and supplies toward South Vietnam. Much
of this materiel is needed to replace stocks lost
in the course of the Communist offensive in 1972.
It could be intended to increase the level of equip-
ment and supplies before inventories are frozen in
connection with a cease-fire. Even so, the materiel,
along with this dry season's infiltrators, will sub-
stantially bolster the Communists' ability to mount
and sustain major operations over the near term.
In the absence of heavy combat activity throughout
much of the country during the past several months,
many enemy main force units have been actively en-
gaged in resupply and refitting. The main forces
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have also attempted throughout most areas of the
country to stay near populated areas which provide
lucrative targets, rather than pull back into deep
base areas or into winter quarters in Cambodia or
Laos.
In northern South Vietnam, the combat poten-
tial of Communist forces just south of the DMZ is
probably higher than at any time since early last
summer. In the central highlands, the Communists
have recently carried out limited offensive opera-
tion's and, after achieving some of their objectives,
we doubt that they are ready to mount a high level
of operations any time soon. Along the central
coast, Communist main force units are likely to
have recovered somewhat from their losses in of
operations late last summer and could under-
take a fairly high level of operation. In MR-3,
Communist forces are probably, on the whole, no
stronger than they were at the time of the October
offensive. In the delta, enemy forces have been
attempting to refit, although there has not been
much evidence of concentration for offensive oper-
ations.
inconsistent as to just how
strong an offensive the Communists might attempt
in conjunction with announcement of a cease-fire.
Some reports describe general orders for an all-out
assault including most of those main forces that
were not involved in the abortive and understrength
enemy cease-fire offensive last October. Other re-
ports, particularly from the area of MR-3, indicate
that the Communists plan only fairly limited offen-
sive action--about on ,a. par with the level of last
October. The latter reports usually give heavy
stress to the substantial losses the enemy has
suffered in some areas since October in attempting
to maintain his forces close to populated areas.
It seems most likely, based on the physical evidence
of their military preparations, that the Communists
hope to launch countrywide attacks on a level well
above last October's, but short of an all-out ef-
fort. The enemy realizes that he must preserve
much of his strength for the post-cease-fire period,
or risk being gradually overcome by the government.
Although we doubt that the Communists could
overrun any major population centers, some district
capitals and a number of villages and hamlets near
Communist strongholds are vulnerable to enemy pene-
tration. Rather than trying direct, heavy assaults
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on the pattern of the 1972 offensive, the Communists
might attempt to break down some of the North Viet-
namese main force units into small elements for use
with the Viet Cong in local attacks. Small-scale
but widespread assaults, backed by artillery, against
lightly defended population centers and government
installations could complicate the government's de-
fensive response. In their premature October of
therCommunists were unable to retain overrun
areas for longer than a few days whenever heavily
challenged by government forces. An offensive timed
to a cease-fire, however, would be calculated to re-
lieve them of the need to hold off prolonged counter-
attacks.
For their part, government forces now appear
to be in a Stronger. combat position than in October.
The army has replaced most of the manpower losses.
it sustained during the Communists' 1972 offensive
and has gone over to relatively aggressive combat
operations in several sectors of the country. The.
most importantHgovernment gains have come in the
far northwhere, despite the enemy's rebuilding ef-
fort, Saigon's forces have pushed the Communists
back from some of the positions which provided ac--
cess to the populated lowlands. These operations
have kept the enemy on the defensive.
The South Vietnamese are well aware that the
Communists may try a cease-fire offensive, and they
have deployed their forces with considerable care
to deal with the possibility. Nevertheless, the
Communists are in a position to cause substantial
trouble for the government if they do attempt a ma-
jor series of cease-fire attacks.
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