THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 DECEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993687
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 20, 1972

Declassified in -Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
The President's Daily Brief
20 December 1972
45
Thf
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I)(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S. DAILY BRIEF
20 December 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
,Hanoi's propaganda seems designed to ensure that
Washington, rather than Saigon, is blamed for the
impasse in the peace talks. A Viet Cong editorial,
meanwhile, has obliquely acknowledged the presence
in South Vietnam of troops from the North. (Page 1)
Moscow's first reaction to the resumption of full-
scale bombing of North Vietnam is milder than that
of last April. (Page 2)
The celebration of the USSR's 50th anniversary this
week may provide the occasion for a Warsaw Pact sum-
mit meeting dealing with East-West negotiations.
(Page 3)
Both Moscow's ambassador in Peking and its chief
negotiator on Sino-Soviet border talks have returned
to Moscow. (Page 4)
Malta's Prime Minister Mintoff has reacted sharply
to Britain's rejeCtion of his demand for more money
under the base agreement of last March. (Page 5)
General Prats' assumption of an active political
role in Chile is dismaying opposition and govern-
ment politicians alike. (Page 6)
A severe rice shortage in Indonesia is causing the
government many headaches. Its ramifications could
weaken President Suharto's position in the long run.
(Page 7)
At Annex, we examine the growing intensity of the
Sino-Soviet dispute, in which the shrill Chinese
propaganda offensive has placed the Soviets on the
defensive.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Hanoi's denunciation of President Thieu's
proposals of 12 December and its insist-
ence that Thieu is a US puppet--as detailed
in a Commentator article in the party daily
on Monday--appear designed to make sure
that Washington, rather than Saigon, is
blamed for the stalled peace talks. Hanoi
also seems to be trying to prevent any gain
in Thieu's stature for his independent
stance on negotiations.
On the same day the Viet Cong's Liberation News
Agency published an editorial defending Hanoi's re-
fusal to agree explicitly to withdrawal of North
Vietnamese troops from the South. Obliquely acknowl-
edging the presence of personnel from the North, it
claimed that most of them are "fighters and sons" of
the Vietnamese who had regrouped to the North under
the 1954 Geneva Agreements.
This is the first known instance of such
a propaganda claim, implying that the
northerners are really southerners fight-
ing in their "own homeland."
The Communists are continuing to rotate malor
combat units on the Ouana Tri battlefront.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR TI-JE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-VIETNAM
Moscow has reacted to the resumption of full-
scale bombing of North Vietnam with a relatively
temperate TASS statement condemning the action and
warning only that "governing circles in the USSR"
are giving "most serious consideration" to the sit-
uation created by the US actions. The statement
contrasts US deeds with the "numerous protestations
of US leaders" about their desire to seek a mutually
acceptable solution for "remaining uncoordinated
problems." It adds that the resolution of the Viet-
nam problem will likely be further complicated by
US acts.
The statement is not the last word on
this score, but it is notably milder than
that issued when the US resumed large-
scale bombing last April. It contains
no pledge of continuing support for the
North Vietnamese and no threat that US
actions in Indochina would complicate
"the international situation as a whole,"
as was charged last spring.
The only official Chinese statement is-
sued since the bombing has been a routine
congratulatory message to the Viet Cong's
Liberation Front on its anniversary. It
makes no mention of the bombing.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
The celebration of the USSR's 50th anniversary
this week will bring a number of foreign government
and Communist party leaders and representatives to
Moscow, but will offer little occasion for serious
discussions, except perhaps among the East Europeans.
General Secretary Brezhnev apparently will make a
major speech. A Warsaw Pact summit meeting is
likely, during the week, and this would provide the
opportunity to discuss the preparatory talks for
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
and to consider a Pact position on force reductions.
The Romanians are working hard to frus-
trate a common Pact line on CSCE matters
and, conversely, to ensure their own in-
volvement in force reduction talks. Both
issues are likely to come up in Moscow
this week.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CHINA
Both Moscow's ambassador in Peking and its
chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks
flew back to Moscow on 16 December.
Presumably they returned for the plenum
of the Central Committee on Monday. Am-
bassador Tolstikov is a member of the
Committee, and Deputy Foreign Minister
Ilychev, the chief negotiator, will be
available to brief Soviet leaders on the
frontier talks. Last year the two men
came home shortly before the plenum, ap-
parently for the same reason--and Ilychev
delayed his return to China for four
months.
This year the Soviets are even more con-
cerned about the Chinese. They are
clearly anxious to find some way to blunt
the wide-ranging Chinese political of-
fensive against them that has been gath-
ering steam in recent months. At Annex,
we examine Peking's recent tactics and
the defensive reactions they have brought
from Moscow.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MALTA
Prime Minister Mintoff has reacted sharply to
a letter from Prime Minister Heath rejecting his
demand for compensation for the losses caused by
London's floating of the pound. Heath said he ex-
pected all parties to the base agreement of last
March (including other NATO countries) to observe
the agreement in letter and in spirit.
Mintoff has told the US, West German, and
Italian ambassadors that he interprets Heath's mes-
sage as a threat to use force to maintain the Brit-
ish military presence on Malta after 31 December
with the support of the allies. He says that un-
less the allies dissociate themselves from Heath's
position "within 24 hours" he will raise the issue
in the UN Security Council.
In many ways this clash appears to be a
re-enactment of the end-of-year drama of
1971. This time, however, the British
are even less inclined to seek a compro-
mise, and they are backed by all the
European NATO allies except Italy and
Belgium.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
General Prats' assumption of an active po-
litical role is dismaying opposition and
government politicians alike.
Prats showed no hesitation in assuming respon-
sibility as chief executive when President Allende
left on 30 November for a two-week trip, although
he had been interior minister only a little over
three weeks.
when he met with Popular Unity (UP) party leaders
early this month, he left no doubt as to who was
running Chile in Allende's absence. He warned that
the armed forces would tolerate neither reprisals
against government opponents nor efforts to deny the
opposition a political forum in the press or else-
where. Prats also expressed concern over the irre-
sponsible behavior by labor members of the UP par-
ties, and said he meant to establish direct contact
with workers himself.
the UP leaders--
particularly the Communists--expressed alarm over
the implications of his aggressive behavior in the
usually pro forma role of vice-president. They
fear that he intends to enlarge the role of the
armed forces in directing the country.
Opposition parties criticize other actions by
Prats as partial toward the UP. On 15 December
Christian Democratic Party President Fuentealba ac-
cused Prats of a whole litany of misdeeds. The con-
servative National Party, started criticizing Prats'
conduct even earlier, following reports that Prats
believes Chilean industrialists are feeding leftist
extremism by trying to retain all their old privi-
leges.
Prats apparently believes that only by ex-
panding military influence in the govern-
ment can he restore political calm for the
elections next March. It is increasingly
apparent that he relishes his new role,
however, and he may harbor ambitions to
become president himself.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDONESIA
A severe rice shortage, expected to persist
for several months, has considerably embarrassed
the government. The shortage has led to student
protests in several cities, opposition allegations
of corruption in the rice agency, wide press cover-
age of anti-government statements, and charges that
manipulation by indigenous Chinese businessmen is
the root cause of the rice shortage.
Although the rice problem and its rami-
fications are not likely to create im-
mediate political difficulties, they
could weaken Suharto's position over the
longer term.
7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
China: A freight car shortage has delayed
some gTIPTients of foodstuffs to North Vietnam.
The shortages have been reported in various parts
of China since the middle of the year, apparently
because the freight car fleet is not growing rap-
idly enough to keep up with the general demand for
rail services.
25X1
Peru-Cuba: A two-week visit to Cuba by a
Peruvian military delegation could presage closer
relations between the two countries, which renewed
diplomatic ties last July. The 30 officers from
all services, including prime minister - designate
Mercado, were highly impressed with the quality
of the Soviet weapons in the Cuban inventory.
This may further incline Peru to buy Soviet arms
at a time when the recent seizure of a US tuna
boat has further dimmed the prospects for restoring
US credits for military sales.
8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A NEW SHRILLNESS
The intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute has
increased considerably over the past two months.
The Chinese, who have been on the diplomatic and
propaganda offensive throughout the period, have
used a variety of means to press their case--hard-
hitting speeches in the UN, authoritative People's
Daily commentaries, comments to visiting delega-
tions, stopover visits by Deputy Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua in London, Paris, and Bucharest, and
an economic mission to Eastern Europe. The immedi-
ate goals have been to impede any further movement
toward detente between Moscow and the nations of
Western Europe, to nip in the bud any improvement
in relations between Moscow and Tokyo, and in gen-
eral to project the image of Peking as a rational
and moderate player in the global arena.
The Soviets, clearly on the defensive, are
worried by the scope and vehemence of Chinese at-
tacks and have responded with propaganda counter-
attacks. The most authoritative of these was a
speech by General Secretary Brezhnev on 30 Novem-
ber in which he was more outspoken in condemning
Peking than he has been since the border talks
began more than three years ago.
Europe
In Europe Peking has warned of the dangers of
both a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and negotiations on military reductions.
The Chinese see these as Soviet ploys aimed at re-
ducing pressure in the West in order to free Soviet
military and diplomatic energy for use against
China. They have missed no occasion to sow seeds
of doubt about Soviet intentions by underlining
Moscow's past use of military force and insisting
that Moscow simply cannot be trusted. Chinese
spokesmen have also argued that a mutual reduction
of US ?and Soviet forces would give Moscow a stra-
tegic edge because US forces could not return to
Europe quickly enough to meet a Soviet conventional
attack. They have even made it known that they ap-
prove of Europe's continued reliance on the US nu-
clear umbrella and favor a strong NATO.
Moscow is clearly concerned over these Chinese
attempts to frustrate their initiatives in Western
Europe. The Soviets were obviously annoyed at
Chiao's European junket. The USSR lashed out at
the UK following British Foreign Secretary Douglas-
Home's visit to Peking and published a barrage of
propaganda attacks refuting Chinese allegations
about Moscow's motives in pushing its detente
schemes.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
A
X
Declassified in -Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
"Japan
the Chinese have warned that Moscow is the primary
threat to security in Asia. Peking has gone out
of its way to say that neither Tokyo's close mili-
tary ties to Washington nor the continued develop-
ment of the Japanese self-defense force are ob-
stacles to further improvement in Sino-Japanese
relations. China has offered support for a perma-
nent UN Security Council seat for Japan and en-
dorsed Japan's territorial claims to the Soviet-
held islands northeast of Hokkaido.
Most importantly, Peking has moved toward eco-
nomic policies which will help expand the already
substantial Sino-Japanese trade. Although the USSR
is a far more attractive trading partner for Japan,
at least in the short run, Peking is making a con-
certed effort. to compete by indicating a willing-
ness to accept long-term credits to finance the
import of new technology from Japan, as well as to
enter into long-term contracts to supply Japan with
raw materials, including petroleum.
Support for elevating Japan's UN status poses.
no problem for Moscow, but Peking's open support
for Japanese claims to the northern islands compli-
cates that difficulty for the USSR. The Japanese
have made return of the islands the first condition
for improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, and
the Soviets have been acutely sensitive to any,in-
timation that the Japanese might try to use improved
relations with Peking to nudge the USSR into be-
coming more accommodating on the territorial issue.
Moscow is increasingly unhappy with the slow
pace of negotiations on Japanese participation in
joint projects to exploit natural resources in Si-
beria. There is evidence that the Soviets suspect-
China may-be partly responsible for Tokyo's reluc-
tance.
Chinese Chances
China may not expect any spectacular gains
from these maneuvers, but it is intent on frus-
trating Moscow's diplomacy as much as possible.
Prospects are brighter in Asia than in Europe. So-
viet-Japanese-exchanges have not gone well, whereas
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Sino-Japanese negotiations are proceeding smoothly.
Moreover, rapprochement with Peking has been a pop-
ular political issue in Japan, while Moscow has no
similar domestic wellspring to tap. Tanaka en-
hanced his domestic popularity by moving quickly to
normalize relations with China; he is certainly in-
curring no domestic liabilities by not resolving
Japan's differences with the USSR.
In Europe, however, the Chinese have consider-
ably less leverage. While Peking has succeeded in
normalizing relations Aiith all the major states of
Western Europe, Moscow's proximity and its military
and economic strength give the USSR a much higher
priority in the minds of European decision makers.
Moreover, despite Peking's efforts to revive the
specters of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, West Euro-
pean leaders increasingly view Moscow as an essen-
tially rational actor on the European stage. In
this context, Peking's warnings. about CSCE and force
reductions are not likely to impede movement toward
their realization. The Chinese, realizing this,
have been careful not to push their position so far
as to alienate the West Europeans.
Other Issues
While in recent months both sides have given
highest priority to their rivalry in Europe and
Japan, contention on other issues continues. In
the UN, the Chinese have vehemently opposed almost
everything the Soviets have favored, including So-
viet disarmament proposals and the admission to the
UN of Bangladesh. In Korea, the Chinese have scored
points by offering early and continued support to
Pyongyang's new moderate approach to the South. In
the Middle East, the Chinese have sought propaganda
mileage from the ouster of Soviet forces from Egypt,
and in Africa the traditional rivalry continues un-
abated.
In Southeast Asia, the situation is more com-
plex. On the question of peace in-Vietnam, Moscow
,and Peking find themselves in basic agreement, and
both have urged Hanoi to reach a settlement as
quickly as possible. But even this convergence of
views reflects a basic rivalryin still another
arena--the desire of each power to court and use
Washington in its contest with the other. In other
parts of Southeast Asia, primarily in Cambodia, Chi-
nese and Soviet interests fundamentally diverge,
and the Soviets have recently renewed their efforts
to bring about a settlement there which would ex-
clude Prince Sihanouk, who has the backing of Peking.
(continued)
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936-A011400170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Taken together, all of these actions suggest
that the rivalry which has characterized Sino-Soviet
relations now for over a decade will certainly con-
tinue, altering its focus and emphasis only to the
extent that new developments alter the patterns of
the global system within which Moscow and Peking
operate. That this rivalry is kept within definite
limits, however, is most clearly demonstrated by
the fact that Sino-Soviet trade continues and has
even expanded over the past year. Moscow has been
willing to sell transport aircraft to China. Though
deadlocked, neither side has moved to break off the
border talks, and the regular annual meeting of So-
viet and Chinese navigation authorities from the
disputed river areas is scheduled to begin next
month.
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/18 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011400170001-2