THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 NOVEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993631
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 17, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
17 November 1972
45
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
17 November 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Libya
(Page 1)
Several contacts of the US Interests Section in
Cairo have reported a recent incident that may have
been a coup attempt by some air force officers
against the Sadat government. (Page 3)
Soviet
Egypt
(Page 4)
The Argentine Government has imposed tight security
precautions for the scheduled return of Juan Peron
this morning, but his arrival could trigger some
incidents. (Page 5)
Chilean President Allende has told his Socialist
colleagues that military participation in his gov-
ernment is necessary to consolidate the policy
changes of the past two years. (Page 6)
At Annex, we give a retrospective examination of
the rainy season's military activity in Laos.
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LIBYA-ISRAEL
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LAOS
The continuing peace talks and the prospect of
an end to the fighting have clearly become uppermost
in the thoughts and actions of the contending mili-
tary forces. As the new dry season begins in Laos,
we can expect a series of attacks and maneuvers in
anticipation of some form of in-place cease-fire.
The recent rainy season leaves the Commu-
nist side in a relatively good military
position. At Annex, we give a retrospec-
tive examination of the season's military
activity.
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EGYPT
Several contacts of the US Interests Section in
Cairo have reported an incident that may have been
a coup attempt by a group of air force officers at
an airbase south of Cairo within the past few days.
Details are sketchy, but as many as 20 arrests may
have been made. According to one account, a senior
officer of army intelligence was dismissed follow-
ing the incident.
The activities of Egypt's two leading military
figures provide an indication of official concern.
War Minister Ahmad Ismail Ali, who had been scheduled
to attend the meeting of Arab foreign and defense
ministers in Kuwait beginning on 15 November, appar-
ently delayed his departure by one day. During that
day he visited the troops and renewed his exhorta-
tions to "maintain discipline," and to focus on
strictly military matters in preparation for "the
battle against Israel." Chief of Staff Shazli did
go to Kuwait, but returned after one day.
We have noted a number of other recent
manifestations of malaise in Egyptian
society, including the public denuncia-
tion of the Sadat regime by a small num-
ber of army personnel in Cairo early last
month and some instances of student res-
tiveness. So far the disaffected ele-
ments in the military and elsewhere in
Egyptian society remain disorganized, and
Sadat presumably is taking greater secu-
rity precautions. As discontent with the
regime's lack of direction increases, how-
ever, so does the danger to his position.
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USSR-EGYPT
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ON4Y
ARGENTINA
The Lanusse:government has imposed tight secu-
rity"preCautions'for the scheduled return of Juan
Peron at 9 this morning, Washington time. Troops
have cordoned off the airport. 21 miles from down-
town-Buenos Aires and have occupied radio and TV
stations to prevent. take-overs. The government has
pre-empted plans for strikes by declaring a public
holiday.
Peron's presence in Argentina, even for
a week or less, will nevertheless provide
dissidents of the right and left with the
best chance they are likely to get to
sabotage the elections scheduled for next
March. Overreaction to any incidents by
Peronists or by the security forces could
set off a chain reaction of violence.
President Lanusse is out of the capital
until tomorrow. We have some indications
that he and Peron have reached an under-
standing on the conduct of the elections,
and they may get together to provide the
finishing touches.
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CHILE
President Allende's explanation to .a recent So-
cialist:Party plenum of why he brought senior mil-
itary officers into his government. The plenum, was
called last week to challenge his course of action.
His statements on this issue and on his plans for
his coming trip abroad included:
--The armed forces are in the l government to
stay as an essential element at all levels.
--He had promised that he will not interfere
in the military chain of command and that his
government will comply with judicial decisions.
--The military presence is vital to re-estab-
lishing an image of a peaceful and productive
Chile deserving foreign assistance.
--His coming trip abroad is necessary to re-
furbish Chile's reputation, badly damaged by
his coalition's record.
--In Moscow he will ask for a $500-million loan
to be made available immediately, challenging
the Soviets to demonstrate that they believe in
the Popular Unity government. Until now the
switch to friendship with Socialist countries
has been fruitless.
--In his address to the UN General Assembly he
will attack multinational corporations, but he
will also seek signs during his stay that the
US desires frank discussions of US-Chilean dif-
ferences.
Allende has evidently decided that the
armed forces are the key to consolidating
the many social and economic changes his
government has set in motion. Although
the Socialist leaders appear to have con-
cluded that they must go along with him
for the time being in view of the disor-
ganized state of their party, the extrem-
ist allies of party chief Altamirano are
unlikely to change their view that the
military should be removed from the cab-
inet.
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LAOS: THE RAINY SEASON IN RETROSPECT
As the new dry season begins in Laos, the Com-
munists must view the results of their military ac-
tivities during the rainy season with some satis-
faction. In the north, they managed to turn back
all of Vang Pao's efforts to repeat last year's re-
capture of the Plaine des Jarres. In the south,
they succeeded in keeping government forces well
away from the Ho Chi Minh supply corridor to South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
The Contest for the Plaine
As the rainy season began in April in north
Laos, the Communists were still maintaining pres-
sure against Long Tieng. Their siege of Vang Pao's
headquarters quickly ended, however, when the early
arrival of rainy weather washed out their supply
route and the 312th North Vietnamese Division was
sent to South Vietnam. When the Communists aban-
doned positions overlooking Long Tieng, they shifted
the bulk of their forces to a line of hills south-
west of the Plaine to check possible government of-
fensives. With the departure of the 312th, the
North Vietnamese were left with four regiments--the
same number they had during the 1971 rainy season
when they did not make any real attempt to defend
the Plaine.
The North Vietnamese pullback allowed govern-
ment forces to recapture Sam Thong, a former refu-
gee center just north of Long Tieng, and several
nearby hills. The irregulars tried unsuccessfully
to breach the Communist defensive line southwest of
the Plaine in June and July, but relatively few ir-
regular units were involved because most of Vang
Pao's tribal forces had returned to rear areas for
badly needed rest and refitting. By mid-August,
Vang Pao was able to commit nearly all of his 6,000
retrained tribal troops, plus some 4,000 troops from
other areas, to a major offensive against the Plaine.
The military objective was to push the Communists
far enough back to limit the effectiveness of any
enemy drive on Long Tieng the following dry season.
The political aim was to regain as much territory
as possible to strengthen Prime Minister Souvanna's
hand in any possible peace negotiations with the
Communists.
For the next two and a half months, irregular
task forces tried to move onto the Plaine from the
north, west, and south. The North Vietnamese used
one of their crack regiments to hold the defensive
Al
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line southwest of the Plaine, while their other
three regiments--despite heavy air strikes--maneu-
vered from one sector of the Plaine to another to
inflict a series of defeats on the irregulars.
As the rains began to taper off in mid-October,
yang Pao concentrated over 5,000 men--including some
of the government's best troops--in a single task
force on the southern tip of the Plaine. After
making some limited progress, these troops lost just
enough momentum to allow the Communists to concen-
trate the bulk of three regimdints--around 3,000 men--
against them. On 26 October communist ground forces,
tanks and artillery routed the government troops,
killing over 100, wounding 200, and capturing many
more. yang Pao is currently attempting to regroup
the remaining elements in the hills a few miles
south of the Plaine, but they are still under heavy
enemy pressure.
Fighting in the South
In south Laos,.the North Vietnamese objective
was little different from previous years--keep the
government at arm's length from the Ho Chi Minh trail
complex. The North Vietnamese were, however, a bit
more aggressive. Communist pre-emptive moves began
in mid-May, when a. North Vietnamese regiment for
the ,first time occupied Khong Sedone, a provincial
capital north Of Pakse. Although government troops
managed to recapture Khong Sedone in early June, it
took them another two months to drive the North Viet-.
namese well away from the surrounding area. The
fighting at Khong Sedone had resulted in some heavy
casualties on both sides, and the irregulars had to
have several weeks of rest and retraining before
they could be committed to regaining lost ground.
At the same time that the North Vietnamese
moved into Khong Sedone, other Communists were
launching attacks farther south against. government
defensive positions just 15 miles from Pakse. Ele-
ments of one North Vietnamese regiment kept up these
attacks throughout the summer, successfully tying
down government troops east of that important town.
The combined pressure in the Khong Sedone and Pakse
sectors prevented the government from organizing -
any sizable offensive operations in the south until
mid-October. Since then eight irregular battalions
succeeded in driving Communist troops temporarily
from Saravane--a provincial capital north of the
Bolovens Plateau--while other government units have
moved into the village of Ban Lao Ngam, which is on
an important Communist supply route. The Communists
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attempted to forestall this government offensive by
once again attacking Khong Sedone and the frontline
east of Pakse, but they failed. With the irregulars
blocking their supply routes, the North Vietnamese
shifted units to counter government moves north of
the Bolovens and, on 15 November, the Communists
again attacked and reoccupied Saravane.
Looking Ahead
.The government's failure to redress the losses
sustained in the previous dry season leaves the Com-
munists in a good military position. The prospect
of an imminent settlement in Vietnam and a cease-
fire in Laos, however, adds political dimensions to
the military situation. An end to the fighting is
now obviously uppermost in the thoughts and actions
of both sides, and the dry season seems likely to
bring a series of attacks and maneuvers in antici-
pation of some form of in-place cease-fire.
In some areas this seems well under way. Early
this month, the Communists staged their strongest
attacks in over a year to drive dispirited irregu-
lar battalions back to within ten miles of the royal
capital of Luang Prabang and have recently attacked
the airfield there with rockets. Enemy units made
an unprecedented attack on Keng Kok, southeast of
Savannakhet, and broke a long-standing informal
local arrangement by attacking Thakhek, a provin-
cial capital on the Mekong and several other posi-
tions to the north near Route 13. The timing of
these unusual attacks suggests that they were aimed
in part at making limited territorial gains in light
of the peace talks now under way in Vientiane. At
a minimum they serve to remind the government that
military pressure can be increased if the negotia-
tions become stalled.
In the north, the course of future fighting
seems less clear. It is not at all certain that
the North Vietnamese will mount a major attack on
Long Tieng once they have chased yang Pao's remnants
away from the Plaine. Any full-scale attack on the
defenses around Long Tieng would require a buildup
of new troops and supplies from North Vietnam. Some
troops to fill out the ranks of units already in
place have been detected moving toward the Plaine,
but no significant amounts of supplies have been
shipped.
(continued)
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LAOS: Communist Controlled Areas
Pak Bong
,Xieng Lam
Hong Sa
Sayabo.
Pak Lay
Vientiane
I _
June 1962
? Area held byCommunist and Neutralist
Forces as shown on Communist maps
Area held by Communists as shown
on U.S:maOs
Area held by Neutralist Forces
as shown on U.S. maps
?
The areas shown, particularly for territory held by
Neutralist Forces, are approximate. Some neutralist
areas were held bfloint Neutralist/Pathel Lao Forces.
Communist maps make no distinction between areas
' held by Neutralist and Communist Forces.
Thakhek
Savannakhei
Icheore,.
Satnneuct
laiangei Bouani Longo
Prabang
PLAINE CES
JAMS,: X'
Xieng torn
Hong Sa
'mane
(hang
November 1972
Communist controlled areas..
Contested areas
? Communist-held location .
? Gove'r-nnient-h.eld location.
Thakhe
Sayannakhet
Communist Controlled Areas: The Communists ifave military
and/or administrative presence and the PLC has little or no pres-
ence. Although PLC patrols or teams may occasionally move
through or conduct clandestine-operations in the area, armed
clashes are infrequent. .(Similar criteria-are applied fer-RLG con-
trolled areas shown in while.)
Contested Areas: Those in which neither slde has sufficient
military and/or administrative presence to exclude the other. This
Includes areas where!poth sides are present In strength and clash
frequently, where patrols of either side may be ambushed and ci-
vilians taxed by both sides, as well as other areas where both sides
have few forces and do not make much effort to exclude the other.
Khong Ban ogSaPavane
Sedoneer Ltygam
" PakyiBOLOVENS
PLATEAU
qttopeul
Attepeu
553832 11-72 CIA
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If a cease-fire is arranged in the next sev-
eral weeks, the Communists will control more than
half of Laos, more territory than they held at the
time of the 1962 cease-fire. An exact comparison
between 1962 and 1972, however, is not possible be-
cause no effort was made ten years ago to draw an
agreed upon cease-fire line or to pinpoint troop
locations.
If North Vietnamese forces are eventually with-
drawn, and the. government accedes to Communist de-
mands that irregular units be disbanded, the op-
posing military forces would consist of the Royal
Lao Army and the Pathet Lao.. Vientiane's regular
army stands at some 48,000 men--including some
nominally "neutralist" units--while the Lao Commu-
nists have approximately 35,000 to 45,000 combat
and support troops spread throughout the country.
Over the years these indigenous Lao forces of both
sides have not been particularly aggressive or ef-
fective. Without foreign prodding they would pre-
sumably be generally willing, if not eager, to com-
ply with the terms of any cease-fire.
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?
Top Secret
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