THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 NOVEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993614
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 8, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T06936A011300070001-4
The President's Daily Brief
8 November 1972
45
Top
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 513( 1),121.(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A-011300070001-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
8 November 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
West Germany's Chancellor Brandt is trying to make
the treaty of reconciliation with East Germany into
an election campaign asset. (Page 1)
The Soviet party's foreign policy apparatus seems
to be rivaling the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
the conduct of relations between states. (Page 2)
Soviet media have prepared the population for Presi-
dent Nixon's re-election. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY
Chancellor Brandt is determined to make the
treaty of reconciliation with East Germany into an
asset in the final days of West Germany's close
election campaign. He has announced that the treaty
will be initialed today, but not signed until after
a new government takes power.
The inter-German treaty is not as strong
a document to campaign on as Brandt had
hoped. Its strengths are in its psycho-
logical impact on the voter as a symbol
of the end to cold war with fellow Ger-
mans, and in the many practical improve-
ments in communication and travel between
the two states. The most popular aspect
is likely to be an exchange of letters
providing for reunification of families
and easier contact with relatives and
friends on both sides of the border. West
Berlin will be represented in Pankow by
Bonn, thus ending fears there that the
government might have disregarded the
city's interests to achieve a treaty.
From Brandt's point of view, the accord's
weaknesses are in its failure to include
specific references to eventual reunifica-
tion of the two Germanies and in the fact
that the document is not a final peace
treaty ending World War II. Both con-
cepts have long been held as basic to
West Germany's policy toward the East; in-
deed, reunification is stated as a na-
tional goal in Bonn's constitution. The
government settled for a compromise clause
in the document that refers indirectly to
the "national question," and for a supple-
mentary letter suggesting that the accord
leaves open the question of a peace treaty
for-all Germany.
Rainer Barzel, the Christian Democratic candi-
date for chancellor, homed in on this portion of
the treaty yesterday, saying that the section on
national unity will be particularly scrutinized by
his party. He also reserved the right to reopen
negotiations with East Germany, if he should be
elected.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
We believe there is a shift in relationships under
way in Moscow affecting the conduct of Soviet for-
eign policy. The party Central Committee's Inter-
national Department, which has heretofore concen-
trated on inter-party relations, .has begun to rival
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the conduct of
relations between states.
The most compelling evidence of the shift is the in-
creasing prominence of candidate member of the polit-
buro Boris Ponomarev, who oversees the operations of
the international Department. Ponomarev has become
more and more conspicuous in Soviet diplomacy. He
was most recently in evidence during the visit of
Italian Premier Andreotti during October, despite
the fact that he holds no government position that
would justify his participation in the talks.
Until 1970, Ponomarev was rarely seen in a public
role not related to his formal responsibilities for
dealing with foreign Communists and leftist move-
ments. The only exceptions concerned relations with
Arab and African states, and these exceptions may
well have been justified by the allegedly "social-
ist" and "anti-imperialist" nature of many of the
governments involved. Since then, his activities
have become more diversified, and his competence
seems to have broadened to include relations with
the West and Japan. During September, for example,
in the absence of Foreign Minister Gromyko Ponomarev
was the senior Soviet official to confer with a
visiting Japanese parliamentary delegation.
Because Ponomarev rose through the ranks of the
party as an associate of Mikhail SusZov, the party's
ideologist, his new stature could signify an enhance-
ment of SusZov's influence on the formulation of for-
eign policy. On the other hand, the rise in prom-
inence of the International Department parallels the
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936?A-011300070001-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
growing involvement of General Secretary Brezhnev in
foreign policy, and could mean that Brezhnev is using
Ponomarev and his staff rather than turning to the
Foreign Ministry. Many of the men recently appointed
to Brezhnev's growing staff of personal foreign pol-
icy advisers are veterans of the Central Committee's
foreign policy apparatus.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
USSR: Soviet media have for some weeks been
preparing the Soviet people for the re-election of
President Nixon. In commentaries aimed primarily
at the Soviet domestic audience, the media have
pointed at length to the President's lead in pre-
ele-ction polls and have stressed voter "dissatisfac-
tion" with various positions of Senator McGovern.
The recent improvement in US-Soviet relations has
invariably been advanced as one of the primary rea-
sons for the public support of the President.
The US Embassy in Moscow observes that the up-
turn in US-Soviet relations has resulted in more
balanced and thorough treatment of the campaign
than in the past, with fewer polemics calling the
US election process a sham.
Chile: Kennecott Copper Corporation continues
to seek attachment of copper shipments from its
expropriated Chilean mine. After favorable court
decisions in France and the Netherlands, the com-
pany now has a similar case pending in Sweden.
25X1
Laos: The month-old peace talks in Vientiane
have yet to register any substantive progress. Both
sides are marking time, waiting for Prime Minister
Souvanna to return on Thursday from abroad and for
further developments in the Vietnam negotiations.
To fill in the time, during their weekly meetings
government and Lao Communist negotiators have dis-
cussed minor procedural matters. Each time both
sides have rehearsed their basic positions without
any significant change.
Iran: The Shah announced last weekend his in-
tention to expand the Iranian Navy's striking force
"several times over" within two years and to extend
its defensive operations into the Indian Ocean.
This is the first public announcement of the Shah's
naval policy and will likely be followed by efforts
to obtain more modern naval equipment from the US,
Britain, and France.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
--
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300070001-4