THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 NOVEMBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993602
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 1, 1972

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300010001-0
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The President's Daily Brief
1 November 1972
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011300010001-0
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO, 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
1 November 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
A Communist spokesman in Paris has criticized the
US for not signing the truce agreement yesterday,
but added that the US must respect the text of the
accords and sign them as soon as possible. Mean-
while, South Vietnamese President Thieu has used
his toughest language to date in denouncing the pro-
posed peace agreement. (Page 1)
The possibility of a cease-fire is inducing the Cam-
bodian Government to pay greater attention to pos-
sible military and political approaches to the Khmer
Communists. (Page 2)
In Chile, opposition moves to impeach four members
of President Allende's cabinet have provided the oc-
casion for the resignation of all 15 ministers.
Allende may now seek to form a "technical" cabinet
with some military participation. (Page 3)
The unrest in Bolivia over devaluation appears to
be easing. (Page 4)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
In a prepared statement to the press, the
spokesman for the PRG delegation in Paris, Le Van
Sau,-criticized the US for not signing the truce.
agreement on 31 October, but went on to Say that
the US must respect the text of the accords and
sign them as soon as possible. Similarly, a broad-
cast over Hanoi's domestic service yesterday avoided
any hint of a deadline, stating only that the US
was responsible for the prolongation of the war.
Meanwhile, Moscow continues to hold back from
a formal endorsement of North Vietnam's statement
of 26 October. The Soviets appear to be waiting
for some sign that the issues Currently dividing
Washington and Hanoi are close to being resolved
before making any authoritative statement in sup-
port of the North Vietnamese. A Pravda. commentator
yesterday issued a comparatively mild callfor
early US signature of the agreement. He noted that
Hanoi's deadline had expired and disparaged as "un-
convincing" the argument that South Vietnamese Pres-
ident Thieu must be brought aboard.
President Thieu, in a National Day address on
1 November, used his toughest language to date in
denouncing the proposed peace agreement. As in
similar statements during the past Week, Thieu did
not attack the US directly, but denounced those in-
dividuals and Organizations that would "sell out"
the country. Thieu continued to claim that he is
not an obstacle to a peace settlement and called
on the Communists to hold serious talks.
Emissaries of President Thieu now touring vari-
ous Far Eastern countries apparently are exercising
restraint. US Ambassador Lydman in Kuala Lumpur,
for example, has been told by Malaysian Deputy
Prime Minister Ismail and South Vietnam's Ambassa-
dor Quang that the weekend visit of Ambassador to
the US Phong produced no requests on the part of.
Saigon. Phong explained his government's objections
to the Communist proposals and Saigon's concern
that Hanoi was trying to exploit the imminence of
the US elections to force a premature settlement.
According to both sources, Phong did not present
his case as a criticism or rebuttal of the US posi-
tion and his listeners were generally sympathetic.
1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
The possibility of a cease-fire is inducing
Phnom Penh to pay greater attention to possible mil-
itary and political approaches to the Khmer Commu-
nists. Charge Enders reports that the government
is embarking on a program aimed at rallying as many
Khmer Communist troops as possible. As a first
step, instructions have been passed to all provin-
cial leaders and to all Cambodian Army field com-
manders to try to contact local Khmer Communist ele-
ments in order to persuade them to rejoin govern-
ment ranks.
Thus far, there has been no significant Khmer
Communist response to the new program.
Lon Nol and other Cambodian leaders are
now only beginning to delve into the po-
litical aspects of the Khmer Communist
problem. There are no indications as yet
that Phnom Penh has begun to think about
the question of high-level negotiations
with the Khmer Communists aimed at a broad
political settlement.
Nonetheless, the question of coping with
the Khmer Communists appears to have im-
pressed upon Lon Nol the need for stronger
political support for the government.
Lon Nol has asked former Democratic Party
head In Tam to play a major role in the
new rallier program, but he is still re-
luctant to accept such a post. Lon Nol
has also shown some signs of interest in
Sink Matak's proposals for the inclusion
of opposition elements in the government,
and has added Matak to the committee work-
ing on the ?government cease-fire program.
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CHILE
Opposition moves to impeach four members of
President Allende's cabinet provided the occasion
for the resignation of all 15 ministers yesterday.
Allende has accepted the resignation of two of the
targets for impeachment, the interior and education
ministers (both are preparing to run for Congress
next March), but has not yet indicated how he will
deal with the other resignations.
Allende may be preparing to form the kind
of "technical" cabinet with some military
participation that he has long wanted.
The service chiefs remain divided in their
attitude toward participating, however.
Some are reluctant to join the cabinet,
Zest a political advantage accrue to Al-
lende. Others, possibly including Army
Chief Prats, hope that as part of the
cabinet they could moderate official pol-
icies. Of the principal government par-
ties, the Socialists are less attracted
to military participation than are the
Communists, but even they might find
certain officers acceptable.
The government meanwhile has offered to reopen
negotiations with the strikers. Our latest reports
indicate that some protest leaders still hope to
hold out, but the resolve of others is weakening.
Shutdowns continue to be widespread but uneven,
and essential services and supplies are being main-
tained with the aid of the armed services. r
3
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
Bolivia: The government is making headway in
its efforts to defuse the crisis over devaluation.
Troops overcame pockets of worker resistance in La
Paz yesterday and the government claims that nego-
tiations to end strikes have been successful.
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