THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 OCTOBER 1972
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993594
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 27, 1972
File:
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The President's Daily Brief
27 October 1972
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Exempt from general
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exemption category 58( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 October 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Both President Thieu and the Communists are making
preparations for a cease-fire in South Vietnam.
(Page 1)
North Vietnam is preparing to move unusually large
amounts of supplies to the south. (Page 3)
Laotian irregulars may not have time to force their
way onto the Plaine des Jarres before the Communists
reinforce and resupply. (Page 4)
Soviet(
/ (Page 5)
Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira made little progress
toward a peace treaty during his visit to Moscow.
(Page 6)
We discuss the resignation of Egyptian War Minister
Sadiq on Page 7.
Israel
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President Allende is negotiating a truce with strike
leaders in Chile. (Page 9)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu issued orders on Monday concern-
ing preparations for a cease-fire.
*
The Communists are also laying the groundwork
for expanding their control during the earliest
stages of a cease-fire.
The COSVN directives acknowledge that Communist
assets are limited and that procedures will vary
from place to place. Cadre have been told to get
out of their mountain and forest strongholds and to
get into the villages and hamlets. Weak cadres have
been told to take on only as many tasks as they can
effectively handle and to effectively supervise new
recruits. All areas have been charged with assess-
ing how many people could be mustered quickly for
antigovernment demonstrations.
(continued)
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In early October, COSVN asked each province to
assess prospects for Communist ,success in "seizing
land, controlling people, and putting up flags"
Other directives have ordered cadre to study expe-
riences following the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords
and to "learn from past mistakes."
Most of these reports have been vague on the
timing of the cease-fire. Two recently captured
documents, however, ordered preparations for a
cease-fire on 28 October. The same date has appeared
.in intercepts. Given the time differential between
South Vietnam and Paris, a cease-fire on the 28th
would be very close to 30 October (our time).
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NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese are preparing to move un-
usually large quantities of military goods to the
south as the new dry season resupply campaign gets
under way. In the North Vietnamese panhandle, for
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On 23 October, a large-scale movement of ve-
hicles into southern Laos was detected for the first
time since the 1971-1972 dry season ended last
spring.
The trucks arrived following several weeks
of repair work on the rain-damaged roads
into and through southern Laos. The pres-
ent good condition of the Laotian roadnet
and the availability of supplies in south-
ern North Vietnam would enable an early
start to the annual resupply effort in
this area.
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LAOS
yang Pao's task force on the southern tip of
the Plaine des Jarres, recently augmented by 2,000
fresh troops, was hit yesterday by a strong North
Vietnamese ground attack, supported by tanks and
artillery. Preliminary reports indicate that most
government units have abandoned their forward posi-
tions and may have suffered significant casualties.
The beginning of peace talks in Vientiane
lends additional urgency to the govern-
ment's efforts to re-establish a foothold
on the Plaine. If Vang Pao's troops have
been severely handZed, it is unlikely
that he will be able to organize another
major push onto the Plaine before improv-
ing weather enables the Communists to re-
inforce and resupply. An intercepted
Communist message indicates that one North
Vietnamese infiltration group is already
heading for north Laos.
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USSR
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USSR-JAPAN
Foreign Minister Ohira's visit in Moscow earlier
this week brought no progress toward a peace treaty.
The stumbling block remains Japan's effort to regain
the four northern islands lost to the USSR after
World War II. Ohira has stated publicly that the
USSR is not prepared to go beyond its earlier offer
to return the two southernmost islands. Although
the Soviets expressed anew their willingness to dis-
cuss the territorial issue, neither side appears in
any hurry.
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EGYPT
We consider the sudden resignation of War Minister
Sadiq as another reflection of President Sadat's
domestic troubles. Sadiq was believed by most Egyp-
tians to be loyal to Sadat, and in addition to being
a deputy premier, he held every key portfolio in the
government concerning the armed forces and war pro-
duction. Sadiq's feuds with other officials close
to Sadat may well have figured in his resignation,
but additional factors may also have come into play.
For example, Sadiq quarreled frequently with Soviet
officials, and he may have been an impediment to
better relations with Moscow.
Whether Sadiq resigned voluntarily or was forced to
do so, Sadat must have carefully weighed the conse-
quences of alienating so formidable a figure. Sadiq
undoubtedly has support in the armed forces, if only
because of his outspoken attitude toward the Soviets.
The new war minister and commander in chief of the
armed forces is General Ahmad Ismail Ali, chief of
Egypt's intelligence organization. Ali is one of
Sadat's close advisers and has known him since they
were classmates at military school. He is loyal to
Sadat, and his intelligence ties will help them
both to control Chief of Staff ShazZi, a highly am-
bitious officer who may well resent not being given
Sadiq's top posts.
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I SRAEL-FEDAYEEN
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CHILE
President Allende is negotiating a settlement
with leaders of the waning protest movement.
the talks are
snagged over the opposition's desire for guarantees
to be built into the agreement.
We expect Allende to avoid punitive meas-
ures except against the most flagrant
protesters. This would be consistent
with his style of appearing to compromise.
Actually, he has gained tactical advan-
tages from his handling of the crisis.
At least for now, he has strengthened his
authority within his own fractious politi-
cal coalition. Also, he has laid the
groundwork for blaming his opposition for
the damage to Chile's battered economy.
Moreover, the prolonged shutdowns havei
allowed the government to take over a
number of commercial, transport and in-
dustrial firms, some of which will be re-
tained under government control.
A key to Allende's success was his confi-
dence that he could rely on military sup-
port. The readiness of the armed services
to carry out their responsibilities under
the state of emergency reaffirms their
commitment to support constitutional gov-
ernment. Although some officers were
sympathetic to the protest movement, we
have seen no evidence that any officers
dragged their feet in taking measures to
minimize its effects or in containing the
attempts to incite violence.
Cabinet changes are expected soon and
Allende is now in a stronger position to
create the kind of cabinet he wants.
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