THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 OCTOBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993580
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 19, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
The President's Daily Brief
19 October 1972
L5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
Declassified in Pa-rt - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. I 1652
exemption category 513(1112113)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A0-11200160001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
19 October 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Egyptian Premier Sidqi does not appear to have re-
solved any basic problems during his visit to Mos-
cow. (Page 1)
Israel is determined to drive the fedayeen out of
Lebanon. The guerrillas have fallen to fighting
among themselves over whether or not to strike at
Israel from Lebanese territory. (Page 2)
In Chile, the situation remains tense and neither
the government nor opposition-led strikers have
gained a decisive advantage. (Page 3)
Soviets
(Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-EGYPT
Egyptian Premier Sidqi does not appear to have re-
solved any basic problems during his visit to Mos-
cow. The main areas of agreement mentioned in ?the
communique issued after his visit were condemnation
of Israel and a willingness to continue further con-
tacts between the leaders of both countries. The
communique' said that Sidqi and Premier Kosygin "ex-
changed views.. .in an atmosphere of frankness;"
phrases that are ordinarily used by the Soviets to
denote disagreement.
One point of contention could well have been Moscow's
refusal to deliver the kinds of weapons that Cairo
says it needs to launch a military offensive across
the Suez Canal. 1
/In a speech
at a Kremlin reception Monday night, Sidqi expressed
Egypt's gratitude for the many examples of Soviet
economic aid and noted that it is natural to discuss
extending such cooperation to "other fields."
Whether or not the Egyptians really believe they can
reverse Soviet policy, they apparently intend--per-
haps in part for domestic reasons--to press Moscow
for new kinds of offensive weapons.
The communique' indicates, however, that the Soviets
will continue to withhold such weapons. Moscow may
have been encouraged to maintain its position by the
knowledge that the Egyptians have not had any success
finding an alternative to Soviet arms.
The communique' also said that the Arab states are
entitled to liberate their land by "diverse means
in accordance with the UN charter," a formula re-
flecting the Soviet view that terrorism is counter-
productive. This is also a weaker formulation than
was used during Sidqi's visit to Moscow in July,
when "all" means were approved, and no reference
was made to the UN charter.
Despite differences, both sides have clearly sig-
naled their interest in preventing relations from
getting worse. The Egyptians cannot afford to let
Soviet political, economic, and military support
sink below present levels, and at minimum Moscow
does not want to jeopardize its use of Egyptian
naval facilities. This attitude is reflected in
the communique', which notes that Brezhnev, Podgorny,
and Kosygin have accepted Sadat's invitation for a
summit meeting in Cairo. No date is specified for
this meeting, however, and further talks may be
necessary before a summit meeting takes place.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A0-11200160001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL-FEDAYEEN
Foreign Minister Eban has told Ambassador Barbour
that the recent Israeli air strikes were aimed pri-
marily at getting Lebanon to do more to halt fedayeen
activities. Eban strongly suggested that Tel Aviv
is trying to drive Lebanon into closing the fedayeen
bases and expelling their occupants from the country.
He admitted, however, he was not sure the Beirut gov-
ernment was able to do so.
Lebanon, Eban said, is the only place in close
proximity to Israel where the fedayeen are free to
train and prepare actions against Israel and its cit-
izens abroad. In contrast, he said, Egypt and Syria
encourage terrorist activity elsewhere, but tightly
control the guerrillas in-country.
On this point, Eban is essentially correct.
Egypt and Syria support the fedayeen but
do not approve of raids on Israel from
their territories.
In Lebanon, the government's restrictions on the
fedayeen have led to a sharp acceleration of infight-
ing within Fatah, the largest guerrilla organization.
Two bloody clashes occurred earlier this month be-
tween rival Fatah factions and there has been more
fighting this week. The most recent fighting was
triggered by Yasir Arafat's efforts to force certain
of the more radical elements to suspend cross-border
operations, as provided by the agreement with the
Lebanese Government.
The fighting within Fatah signals a diminu-
tion of Arafat's already tenuous control
of his organization. Extremist factions
unresponsive to his direction appear
headed for more independent action, includ-
ing increased terrorism and attempts to re-
sume operations in Israel.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHILE
The situation remains tense and neither the
government nor strikers supported by opposition par-
ties have gained the initiative.
On 18 October Allende made minor concessions,
averting a bus drivers' strike that could have en-
couraged others to take antigovernment positions.
There has been no serious violence yet, despite
numerous sabotage attempts--probably by rightist
extremists. Leftist extremists are spoiling for a
fight, but have thus far been reined in by Allende
and his more moderate advisers. The President is
determined not to let the left provoke the armed
forces but to make certain that the opposition gets
all the blame for disturbances and economic dislo-
cations.
Strike leaders seem uncertain what to do next.
They still hope that army chief General Prats will
finally be driven by events to move against the gov-
ernment.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5
,
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200160001-5