THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 OCTOBER 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993555
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 5, 1972

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
The President's Daily Brief
5 October 1972
45
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 581 I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
5 October 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira has provided impres-
sions ?and background details on the discussions in
Peking last week. (Page 1)
South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak states that the
increasingly negative North Korean attitude bodes ill
for the future of the North-South talks. (Page 4)
Communist sappers and gunners are becoming more ac-
tive in the southern half of South Vietnam. Prepara-
tions for the coming dry season supply push through
the Laotian panhandle appear well under way. (Page 5)
Bonn's Egon Bahr plans to fly to Moscow on Sunday to
seek Soviet aid in concluding the inter-German treaty
negotiations. (Page 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
JAPAN-CHINA
Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira has provided
Ambassador Ingersoll with impressions and background
details on the Sino-Japanese discussions in Peking
last week. The Japanese found the Chinese leader-
ship more open than they had expected. Ohira termed
the Chinese "more democratic, disarming, and soft"
than anticipated and noted that they did not give
the Japanese side "a feeling that there is a great
gap to bridge."
--Ohira said the Chinese made no effort to un-
dermine or affect the US-Japan Security Treaty,
noting merely that China "neither agrees nor
objects to it." The Chinese also agreed with
the Japanese statement that normalization of
relations between Japan and China might bene-
fit Sino-US relations.
--The Chinese did not make an issue of Japanese-
Taiwanese trade and did not disagree with the
Japanese view that normalization of relations
with Peking should not affect Tokyo's economic
ties to Taiwan. In further discussion the Chi-
nese stated explicitly that it was "inconceiv-
able that armed conflict would arise" over the
Taiwan problem. They stated that for the time
being "Japan and China should let the US take
care of Taiwan" and agreed with a Japanese sug-
gestion that a total US withdrawal might lead
the Soviets to attempt to fill the vacuum. The
Chinese also implied that they felt there might
be a change in US policy toward Taiwan after
the Indochina war had been ended.
--The Chinese took aboard with evident satis-
faction the Japanese statement that there would
be no peace treaty with Moscow unless all four
northern islands were returned, commenting
that Tokyo was in for "an arduous and strenuous
time" in economic and diplomatic negotiations
With the Soviets. They did not object, however,
to Japanese statements on future economic coop-
eration with the USSR. They made the usual
noises about the bad state of their own rela-
tions with the USSR.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
--The Chinese also made standard remarks about
non-export of revolution (stating explicitly
that Japan need not worry about revolution),
about their support for the North/South Korean
communiqug, and about China's backwardness.
Such subjects as the Indochina war and insurgent
movements in Southeast Asia were left virtually
uncovered.
Ohira stated that he expected ambassadors to be
exchanged between the two countries soon, adding
that conclusion of a peace treaty was a long-term
matter. He wished to visit the United States for
top-level debriefings around 17 and 18 October, add-
ing that he might then visit the USSR for the same
purpose.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-EGYPT
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
A
KOREA
South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak told Ambas-
sador Habib late last week that the increasingly
negative North Korean statements and propaganda bode
ill for the future of the North-South talks. Yi
attributed this change of mood to Pyongyang's frus-
tration over its recent failure to get the Korean
question onto the agenda of the UN General Assembly,
to the North's inability to make political inroads
in the South, and to the hostile tone in the South
Korean press during the visit of the North Korean
Red Cross delegation to Seoul last month.
Yi's arguments have some foundation. Since the
UN vote, Pyongyang has castigated Seoul in a manner
it had avoided after the announcement of the joint
communique on unification last July. In a recent
interview with a Japanese paper, Premier Kim Il-sung
accused the South of deliberately violating agree-
ments to work toward unification and suggested that
unless Seoul changed its policies, the talks could
be in jeopardy.
We doubt that Kim is prepared to precipi-
tate a breakdown in negotiations. The
Red Cross talks have not yet reached sub-
stantive matters, and the membership of
the higher level coordinating committee
is still being negotiated, so he may sim-
ply be intensifying pressure on Seoul to
bend to his various demands.
Yi told Habib that Seoul is willing to make
some small compromises to keep the talks on the
track, but emphasized that his government needs to
maintain a tight grip on domestic affairs as the
talks proceed. He claimed that Pyongyang hopes to
establish contact with opposition political forces,
with an eye to their greater prospects as President
Pak approaches the end of his third term in 1975.
In taking this line, Yi is signaling that
Pak will use the issue of negotiations
with the North as one more reason for
taking steps to prolong his rule beyond
1975.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
LAOS:Central Panhandle
uang Khe
?Dong Hol
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
THAILAND
ean
553685 10-72
-
Miles 25
S ?
14)
,-40e ?
f.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Communist sappers and gunners are becoming
more active in the southern half of South Vietnam.
Harassing attacks in the provinces around Saigon
and in the delta have been directed largely against
major highways, remote outposts, and other lightly
defended government positions. Several main roads
leading to the capital city were temporarily cut.
Communications patterns and an apparent relo-
cation of the headquarters of the North Vietnamese
325th Division north of the DMZ suggest that this
may be the first combat unit to pull out of the
Quang Tri area since the fighting began there early
this year. We do not yet have any indications that
the division's subordinate regiments are withdraw-
ing.
The Communists appear to be preparing for the
coming dry season supply push. An intercept of
29 September stated that 60 vehicles had recently
been delivered to southern North Vietnam. The ve-
hicles arrived loaded with cargo and were to be
moved to transportation battalions both west of the
DMZ and in the Ban Karai Pass area. Three addi-
tional transportation battalions also have recently
been identified in the DMZ - Laos panhandle area.
They came from the interior of Laos.
These developments suggest that when the
dry season starts in November, emphasis
will be placed on the supply corridors in
the DMZ and Ban Karai areas. Some key
routes crossing the Laotian border evi-
dently have remained in good condition
over the wet season, and moderate traffic
has been observed on some of them. Com-
munist resupply efforts in southern North
Vietnam have continued at a high pace
through the summer, and we believe that
significant quantities of supplies are
available there for shipment down the
trail.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
West Germany - USSR: State Secretary Egon Bahr
plans to visit Moscow from 8 to 10 October in an ef-
fort to enlist Soviet aid in concluding the inter-
German treaty negotiations before the West German
elections next month. Bahr told Allied ambassadors
yesterday that the negotiations had reached a "cri-
sis" stage because of the lack of movement on major
political issues, notably Bonn's need for some,ref-
erence to the goal of national unification. He
added that Chancellor Brandt may write to party
leader Brezhnev stating Bonn's requirements for a
general treaty.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011200040001-8