THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 SEPTEMBER 1972
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993515
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 12, 1972
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The President's Daily Brief
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12 September 1972
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
12 September 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
We have additional confirmation that the Communists
are directing their cadre to prepare for another of-
fensive burst in South Vietnam beginning this month
and continuing into October; the Communists hope that
the campaign will force major concessions from the
allies. (Page 1)
The Soviets are flying naval reconnaissance missions
out of Cuba for the first time ever as part of their
surveillance of activities leading to a major NATO
naval exercise. (Page 7)
Soviets
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Chilean President Allende has publicly invited the
Christian Democrats to resume talks aimed at calming
political tensions. (Page 9)
Domestic opposition in Japan and Taipei's refusal to
talk have complicated Tokyo's planning for relations
with Taiwan after recognition of Peking. (Page 10)
In Morocco, King Hassan apparently remains confident
that he can cope with his precarious political situ-
ation. (Page 11)
The Soviets
(Page 12)
(Page 13)
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SOUTH VIETNAM
COSVN has
instructed its subordinates to prepare for a cam-
paign designed to tie down Saigon's main forces
while the Communists attempt to extend their con-
trol in the countryside and roll back the pacifica-
tion program. Local forces and main force sapper
and artillery units allegedly, will conduct most of
the action in September, hitting friendly military
installations, district towns, and government out-
posts. In October, main forces are to lead an of-
fensive designed to "threafen urban areas, disrupt
South Vietnamese administrative functions, and de-
plete the government's military forces and supplies"
so that the allies will be "forced ?to negotiate a
settlement on the basis of the seven points."
Cadre have been told to be "determined to main-
tain the offensive and uprising at the present level,
and, at the same time, to build up our armed and
political forces rapidly so that we can fight for
a long time." The instructions stress the need for
the quick recruitment in September of many new
troops for use in October. They claim that if the
allies prove willing to reach a political settlement
that "favors" the Communists, enemy forces will be
used to achieve "greater victories" during the cease-
fire period. If the allies refuse to negotiate an
end to the war prior to the US presidential elec-
tions, "we will be able to use our armed and polit-
ical forces to return to a prolonged state of war-
fare and fight on indefinitely until the enemy is
defeated."
Communist main forces allegedly have been told
to "thrust far into the provinces around Saigon"
?and "penetrate the Saigon defense line."
by early September the enemy h
and 9th divisions had already established elements
in provinces adjacent to the capital. In fact,
Communist sapper and small-element attacks against
government strongpoints have increased recently
northwest of Saigon, and there are numerous indica-
tions that the enemy is concentrating forces in Hau
Nghia, southern Tay Ninh, and southern Binh Duong
provinces for a more substantial round of assaults,
including infantry attacks on urban centers. Main
elements of the Communists' 7th and 9th divisions
appear to be maintaining the positions they held
during the previous fighting around An Loc and along
Route 13, but parts of the 7th Division, at least,
could quickly move closer to Saigon.
(continued)
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COSVN's instructions appear to correspond
rather closely with the Communists' current public
line on negotiations, which is stressing the demand
for a three-segment coalition government that pre-
sumably would leave some, if not most, of the South
Vietnamese administrative mechanism intact as one
segment of the coalition. The instructions state
that a "victory" ?over the US means a political set-
tlement and the withdrawal of American forces. It
:does not "mean that the Saigon puppets cease to
exist." To deal with the remaining government ap-
paratus, cadre are urged to be in position to act
"quickly and forcefully" against South Vietnamese
Government personnel in the event of a political
settlement.
The COSVN instruction above deals with
tactics to force the allies to the nego-
tiating table. On 11 September, the Viet
Cong's "provisional government" (PRG)--
nominally COSVN's superior--issued a state-
ment indicating its major goals in such
negotiations and explaining in detail some
of its demands. The statement appears
consistent with COSVN's directive.
The PRG asserts that it is "prepared to reach
agreements to the effect that neither a Communist
regime nor a US-stooge regime shall be imposed on
South Vietnam." This assertion is obviously de-
signed to rebut the charge that the Communists are
demanding outright control in Saigon as part of a
settlement. Communist spokesmen have been saying
in recent weeks that Hanoi has no intention of im-
posing a Communist government on the South, but this
is the first time the PRG has talked in terms of a
formal agreement on the point.
The statement calls for an end to the "US mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam" in language reminiscent
of the Viet Cong's two-point "elaboration" last Feb-
ruary; it does not demand, however, that the US set
a deadline for its withdrawal. Nor is there any
explicit call for President Thieu's resignation or
for the dismantling of Saigon's "oppressive machin-
ery," although another section of the statement does
make it clear that the Communists still want Thieu
out of the picture before too long. Instead, the
statement focuses, as other recent pronouncements
have tended to do, on the three-segment "government
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of national concord" called for in both the seven-
point proposal and the two-point "elaboration."
It asserts that a settlement "must proceed from the
actual situation that there exist in South Vietnam
two administrations, two armies, and other political
forces," and it claims that the establishment of a
"concord" government is "necessary" to guarantee
"democratic freedom." At one point the statement
provides an explanation that Communist spokesmen
have refused to provide at such an authoritative
level in the past on how such a government would
be set up: the PRG and the Saigon government (minus
Thieu) would each appoint a third of the membership,
and the other third would be appointed "through ne-
gotiations," apparently among the Vietnamese parties
concerned.
Taken at face value, this statement ap-
pears to be the most authoritative expres-
sion to date of Communist willingness,
once the allies have accepted the prin-
ciples of a political settlement, to ne-
gotiate the specific modalities with the
Saigon government. The statement touts
the virtues of the seven points and the
"elaboration," however, in a way that
makes it clear that Hanoi is ready tore-
vert to a tougher line if necessary.
The message conveyed by the PRG statement
and the COSVN instructions is that the
Communists are planning to commit sub-
stantial elements of their main and local
forces to another offensive burst in the
hope that it will force major concessions
from the allies. They appear to be pre-
pared to abandon some of their detailed
demands on the exact shape of a political
settlement in return for agreement on the
principle of a three-segment coalition
that would bring them formally, if perhaps
loosely, into the central power structure.
At the same time, they appear to be care-
fully preserving their options for continu-
ing the war along present .lines if they
fail to force a settlement. They do not
appear to be preparing for one last, all-
out assault after which they would simply
accept the best terms available.
South Vietnamese forces are pressing their ef-
fort to recapture Quang Tri City despite determined
enemy resistance. Ranger and Airborne units have
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DEMILITARIZED ZONE
SOUTH
VIETNAM
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
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been fighting around the clock against Communist
forces to the north and south of the town, and a
forward Marine unit reportedly has entered the cita-
del. Casualties on both sides have been heavy.
South Vietnamese 1st Division elements are also at-
tacking southwest of Fire Support Base Bastogne in
Thua Thien Province and are encountering stiff op-
position.
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ISRAEL - ARAB STATES
? There have been other indications that the guer-
rillas,,elattd with the outcome of the Munich affair,
intend to keep up the pressure on Israel and to focus
international attention on the Palestinian question.
A member of the Israeli Embassy in Brussels was seri-
ously wounded on Sunday by an Arab identifying him-
self as a Moroccan national. In Israel, guerrillas
fired at an Israeli patrol near Hebron on the West
Bank of Jordan. There were no casualties.
Ambassador Palmer reports that a funeral being
planned in Tripoli for the five fedayeen killed in
Munich may set off serious demonstrations against
Western embassies. Several wealthy Libyan business-
men apparently have received custody of the bodies
and a large public burial is being planned. The
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Libyan Government is not officially involved, but
government officials are reported to be assisting
in planning of the services. The ambassador partic-
ularly fears that the West German diplomatic mission
will be singled out for attack.
The key to the situation is President
Qadhafi. Thus far, Qadhafi--who is said
to have reprimanded the leaders of a mob
that violently assaulted the British Em-
bassy last month--has remained silent.
Nevertheless, the Libyan leader is deeply
committed to the Palestinian cause, and
he could encourage excesses by inflamma-
tory rhetoric when he delivers his tribute
to the fedayeen martyrs.
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Soviet Naval Air Reconnaissance in the Atlantic
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USSR-CUBA
On Saturday and again yesterday, two of the
four Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft
that flew to Cuba last week conducted long-range
missions along the east coast of the US and por-
tions of the western Atlantic. The missions in-
cluded overflights of a US destroyer task group
en route to Europe.
Soviet nava/ aircraft have deployed to
Cuba on eight occasions since April 1970,
but this is the first time that the air-
craft have ever conducted operations
from the island. The flights apparently
were part of a coordinated Soviet recon-
naissance effort against NATO naval
forces that are moving into position for
a major exercise that gets under way this
week in the Norwegian and Barents seas.
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USSR
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CHILE
In a press conference on Sunday President
Allende publicly invited the Christian Democrats
to resume talks with him "to avoid armed confron-
tation." In another gesture to the opposition
parties, the government has authorized a major
demonstration planned for Thursday.
Allende, a skillful politician, appar-
ently recognizes that political tensions
have reached a dangerous point and he
is now trying to calm them. The Chris-
tian Democrats may press for more con-
cessions before agreeing to a resumption
of dialogue with him. His offer will
nonetheless increase divisions between
opposition groups who still favor polit-
ical solutions and those who would pro-
voke violence in the hope of a showdown
that would bring down the government.
In his remarks on Sunday, Allende again de-
nounced extremists of both the left and the right.
He had particularly harsh words for the violence-
prone ultras of his own Socialist Party, whom he
labeled "traitors twice over."
We are inclined to believe press reports that
Socialist Party Secretary General Altamirano has re-
signed, although Altamirano himself publicly denies
the story.
Altamirano's advocacy of the extremist
approach has been particularly galling
to Allende and his resignation would re-
move one serious obstacle to Allende's
efforts to calm tensions.
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JAPAN-TAIWAN
A top Foreign Office official told a US diplo-
mat last weekend that Japan does not expect to main-
tain any governmental presence on Taiwan after an
exchange of ambassadors with Peking. The official
said that, because the problem of relations with
Taiwan is an active political issue in Japan, plan-
ning is being tightly held to avoid giving Taipei's
supporters ammunition with which to attack the gov-
ernment. As a result, there is not yet a coordi-
nated position representing the views of the various
ministries involved. Three mechanisms for continu-
ing contacts with Taiwan are being considered--a
Japanese interest section in a resident embassy, a
quasi-official trade office, or a private trade and
cultural association.
A Japanese Government emissary is scheduled
to visit Taipei later this week, but a senior Na-
tionalist Chinese official says his government will
refuse to discuss the problem of relations in the
period after Tokyo-Peking ties are restored. The
official stated, however, that Taipei intends to re-
tain the fullest possible de facto relations with
Tokyo.
The Japanese expect some temporary dis-
ruption of trade, as well as some "un-
happy incidents" in Taiwan after rela-
tions are broken. The Japanese know, how-
ever, that Taiwan could not substantially
reduce its economic ties with Japan with-
out paying a very heavy price, and thus
expect a rapid return to normal trade re-
lations. Tokyo also believes--based on
its preliminary talks with the mainland
Chinese--that Peking will not object to
a continuation of Japan-Taiwan economic
ties.
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MOROCCO
Ambassador Rockwell saw King Hassan late last
week for the first time since the attempted coup
on 26 August. Rockwell found the King assured,
eloquent, and steadfast in his refusal to perceive
any personal responsibility for the situation that
provoked this year's or last year's military ef-
forts to overthrow him. The ambassador does not
think that Hassan believes that there was a foreign
hand behind the two coup attempts; the King, never-
theless, finds it useful to advance this thesis to
distract his people from his failings and those of
his regime. Hassan apparently wants to lure all
political parties into participating in the parlia-
mentary elections that he has promised by early
next year. Meanwhile, the King says he will purge
the army in an effort to remove further danger from
that quarter. The ambassador found no indication
that the King was thinking of abdication.
Even in the unlikely event that the King
could lure Morocco's political parties
into elections, the resulting parliament
would be a source of trouble. The parties
would want to turn it into a constituent
assembly with the job of drafting a con-
stitution that would lessen the King's
power. In addition, a further purge of
the army could serve more to aggravate
already frayed military tempers than to
cow them into submission. In sum, Hassan
is still skating on thin ice.
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USSR
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NOTE
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