THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 JULY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993425
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 22, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
22 July 1972
45
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
22 July 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In South Vietnam, fighting around Quang Tri City
remains relatively light, but the Communists appear
to be trying to increase activity on the government's
western flank. (Page 2)
The Soviets are continuing early phase test launch-
ings of their new large ICBM. (Page 3)
The Cuban leadership has issued a central committee
resolution indicating dissatisfaction with some key
Soviet policies. (Page 4)
Chile
(Page 5)
The Soviets have now responded favorably to King
Husayn's request to visit Moscow. (Page 6)
At Annex, we discuss the dike bombing issue.
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EGYPT-USSR
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Demilitarized Zone
Gulf of
Thailand
104
553366 7-72
Capitol Special Zone
a
South
China
Sea
10-.
SOUTH VIETNAM
118 MILES 1110
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VIETNAM
South Vietnamese Airborne and Marine forces
report only scattered ground contacts with enemy
troops in the vicinity of Quang Tri City, but the
Communists are continuing to shell government forces.
The Communists are maintaining pressure on govern-
ment positions along Route I just below the My Chanh
River. Two enemy prisoners, captured just before
these attacks began,
/have been as-
signed the mission of interdicting Route 1 along
the Quang Tri - Thua Thien provincial border. Other
elements of this division have been active west of
Route 1 and just north of the My Chanh River.
Intercepts indicate that all three regiments
of the enemy's 324B Division are now west of Hue.
The messages order division elements to coordinate
prior to a "coming heavy mission," suggesting that
the enemy plans increased action against government
positions along Route 547, the main road into Hue
from the west.
In coastal Binh Dinh Province, the government
drive to retake the northern three districts, which
has been moving ahead on schedule, may soon face
stronger opposition. A North Vietnamese regiment
is apparently moving to join two regiments of the
Communist 3rd Division that are already in northern
Binh Dinh.
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USSR
The latest satellite photography of Tyuratam
shows more missile debris in the complex used in
test launchings of the USSR's new large ICBM. /
This photography gives us fresh evidence
that early phase test launchings of the
new missile are continuing. There now
have been several such tests since late
last year, and in each instance, the mis-
sile apparently was destroyed immediately
after Zift-off. If this phase of testing
has proceeded satisfactorily, firings from
Tyuratam to the Kamchatka Peninsula could
begin at any time. About two years of
flight testing will be required before
the missile is ready for deployment. We
believe the new ICBM could be equipped
with MIBils and that it will be installed
in the new large silos currently under
construction at five SS-9 complexes.
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CUBA
A carefully worded resolution on Fidel Castro's
recent trip issued by the Communist Party central
committee indicates that the Cuban leadership is
less than satisfied with certain key aspects of
Soviet policy. The choice of the central committee
to make the statement?the committee has met only
twice since 1965--indicates that Castro wishes to
emphasize the unity of the Cuban leadership as
well as the importance of the statement.
Havana's major problem is with Moscow's policy of
detente with the US. The resolution states that
the "struggle against imperialism" must be "based
upon the full awareness that imperialism's apparent
cooperation with any truly revolutionary process
is deceptive and false in the long run."
Havana's displeasure is primarily linked to what
it views as a Zack of Soviet support for North Viet-
nam. The resolution declares that victory in Viet-
nam requires "international solidarity" and points
to the statements on Vietnam made by Fidel during
his trip. In Poland, for example, he affirmed that
"today Vietnam is the supreme test of proletarian
internationaZism...the supreme test of the prin-
ciples of Marxism-Leninism." Although the Cuban
leader may be genuinely concerned with the fate of
Vietnam, he is even more concerned over its pos-
sible implications for Cuba's security.
The resolution also hints that Havana is upset over
Soviet attempts to press Cuba into more orthodox
economic policies in exchange for increased eco-
nomic assistance. It asserts that assistance from
socialist countries is a "moral right" of those
nations "where truly revolutionary changes are be-
ing made."
Despite his displeasure, Castro has few alternatives
to continued close cooperation with Moscow. Cuba
is almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union,
and we do not foresee that Fidel will attempt to
alter this relationship significantly at this time.
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CH I LE
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NOTES
Jordan-USSR: After several months of tempo-
rizing on King Husayn's request to visit Moscow,
the Soviets on 19 July informed the Jordanians
that they will be delighted to receive the King at
anytime.. Husayn originally had hoped to persuade
the Soviets to support his West Bank federation
proposal, which he put forth last March, but the
acrimonious Egyptian and fedayeen reaction to his
plan apparently forced the Soviets to put off his
trip. The timing and apparent urgency of the re-
sponse, in the aftermath of events in Egypt, may
well foreshadow additional Soviet efforts to shore
up relations with the other Arab states.
Iraq: Satellite photography of 9 July shows
four SA-3 missile sites around Baghdad. Equipment
for these sites was seen at Rashid Airfield near
Baghdad last April, but this is the first time
operational SA-3 sites have been observed in Iraq.
Laos: Lao Communist leader SOuphanouvong's
latest message to Prime Minister SOuvanna contains
no new. proposals for settling the war. The letter
refers to earlier:Communist proposals and repeats
the Communist line that any progress towarda
settlement depends on a US bombing halt throughout
the country. It does not rule out,-howeverl'addi-
tional preliminary contacts between Souvanna and
Souk Vongsak, the Communists' envoy.
Thailand: The appointment of Field Marshal
Thanom as supreme commander of the armed forces
has been extended for one year. This will delay
other- changes in the top leadership and postpone
significant changes in Thailand's internal and
foreign policies. The extension, the second granted
Thanom since he reached the retirement Age of .60
last year, indicates that the deputy chairman of the
ruling National Executive Council, General Praphat,
still lacks sufficient popular support to move into
the number one spot. The intense rivalry between-
Thanom's and'Praphat's supporters, which tends to
have an immobilizing effect on government operations,
is likely to continue.
(continued)
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Panama: I Foreign Minister Tack told Ambassador
Sayre?a?Tddnesday that a new negotiating position
on the Canal is ready for final review by General
Torrijos. Tack plans to bring it to Washington
himself, and his past comments suggest that he wants
to discuss it with Secretary Rogers.
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North Vietnam
Water Control System
? Primary dike
? Secondary and smaller dike
E:=1 Flooding of cultivated
areas 1971
? Railroad
5 10 15 Miles
553367 7-72 CIA
Example of cratering near Hai Duong
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NORTH VIETNAM: THE DIKE BOMBING ISSUE
Since the early weeks of the US air interdiction
program, Hanoi- has tried to convince the world that
North Vietnam's elaborate dike system of water con-
trol is a, direct and deliberate target of US bombing.
We-now have photographic coverage of the Red River
Delta as of mid-July which enables us to assess
Hanoi's claims. It provides evidence of scattered
and inconsequential damage done by bombs directed
at nearby military targets, but in no case of seri-
ous or deliberate attack.
North Vietnam's Water Control System
North Vietnam's elaborate network of dikes,
dams, and locks controls the water of the heavily
populated Red River Delta. The delta farmland de-
pends on irrigation during the dry months and is
endangered by flooding in the wet months. The coun-
try's major transportation waterways--the Red River,
the Thai Binh River, and the connecting Canal des
Rapides and Canal des Bambous--link the principal
urban centers. Fertilizer, foodstuffs, petroleum,
and other commodities are moved, in part, by these
waterways, as is the coal mined in the Hon Gai and ,
Cam Pha areas. Southern North Vietnam also contains
rivers necessitating a. dike and lock system for
water control and navigation, but the system is less
important than that of the delta.
Dikes to control flooding and the course of
the waterways are most fully developed along the
Red-River. The Red River system begins near Viet
Tri, only 43 feet above sea level, although about
100 miles inland. The great amount of silt brought
-down from the mountains and deposited along the river
beds-in-the delta has raised the waterways above the
surrounding countryside in many places and requires
a constant elevation of the restraining walls. In
some areas?particularly around Hanoi--the height
of the dikes reaches 40 feet. Some are as broad as
80 feet at the flood line and spread to 200 feet at
the base. A secondary system between 4 and 22 feet
high running parallel to the main dikes is designed
to localize and minimize damage if the primary dikes
are breached. A tertiary system of smaller dikes
divides the rice-growing plains into compartments,
assists irrigation, and controls the level of small
streams and local waterways. In addition, small
natural or man-made dikes along the coast keep out
brackish sea water.
(continued)
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Dams and locks play a lesser role. Only a few
large dams are constructed of concrete with gates
to permit passage of watercraft, and only one major
waterway in the Red River Delta has navigation locks
to control water levels and facilitate transport.
Recurring Floods
The rivers rise to a seasonal peak during July
and August, when unusually heavy rains frequently
cause breaches in the levees. Extensive floods and
destruction to property and agricultural crops re-
sult. Although there have been only a few major
breaches since the mid-1940s, minor breaks occur
almost every year.
The floods of last August rank with the most
serious ever recorded. Four major breaches occurred
in the primary dikes along the Red River. An esti-
mated 1.1 million acres of riceland--a quarter of
the country's rice acreage--were seriously flooded
and the entire crop in that area destroyed. Storms
took out a half-mile section of a levee outside
Hanoi and closed the railroad north to Dong Dang.
The .area of heavy flooding continued to expand through
late September, probably because prolonged soaking
and high water pressure had undermined the secondary
dike systems.
Apart from immediate rice losses, the floods
produced extensive longer term physical damage.
The enormous force of water unleashed through breaches
in the primary dikes caused widespread erosion far
beyond obvious scouring effects near the breaks.
Long stretches of irrigation canals were cut, and
the press reported many washed-out pumping stations.
Flood water everywhere deposited silt in drainage
ditches. The prolonged inundation during the floods
may have caused subtle undermining of the primary
dike systems that will not show until late this
summer. The possibility that the dike system has
been weakened thus adds to this year's flooding
threat.
Resiliency of the System to Bombing
North Vietnam's water control system includes
a large number of widely dispersed individual com-
ponents which could be substantially affected only
by a large-scale, coordinated air offensive. Such
attacks would be necessary against specific locks,
dams, and dike areas, and bomb damage would have
effect only during the relatively short periods of
high water. Even then, the North Vietnamese, long
accustomed to battling against floods, could be ex-
pected to act promptly to mend breaches in the sys-
tem.
(continued)
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Damage to the locks would have little effect
on either North Vietnam's transport or its water
control systems. Inland craft could be diverted
to waterways not dependent on locks, and some car-
goes could be sent by the many alternative land
routes. Accidental bomb damage during the 1965-68
period made some locks inoperative, but had little
effect on water transport or flooding in the area.
Similarly, breaching of dams, even during periods
of high water, would not cause significant disrup-
tion because most are small and easily repaired.
Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb damage.
Those in the primary system could be breached only
by a series of overlapping craters across the entire
top of a dike, and the lips of the craters would
have to be sufficiently lower than the river surface
to initiate the flow and subsequent scouring action
of water rushing through the breach. The dikes
along the Red River near Hanoi are approximately
80 feet wide at the flood line.
Hanoi's Claims Versus Actual Damage
North Vietnam's official press agencies and
radio services have repeatedly described alleged US
bombing attacks on the dike system. In April and
May, the North Vietnamese made more than 40 specific
allegations, and on 30 June the official press quoted
the Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that 20
bombing attacks had been made on dikes ?during that
month. Foreign diplomats, newsmen, and, most re-
cently, actress Jane Fonda have been escorted to
dikes to view damage--most of it around Hai Duong,
southeast of Hanoi.
A detailed examination has been made of photog-
raphy of mid-July of the North Vietnamese Red River
Delta. No flooding has been identified resulting
from bombing. Dikes cratered by bombs were detected
at 13 locations, four of which were just north of
Hai Duong. ?None of the damage has been in the Hanoi
area, where destruction of the dikes would result in
the greatest damage to North Vietnam's economy and
logistics effort. Nearly all the damage has been
scattered downstream from Hanoi, as well as down-
stream from the areas of major breaks resulting from
the 1971 floods. Most craters are on primary dikes,
with the others on the secondary system.
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/Because a large number of North Vietnamese
dikes serve as bases for roadways, the maze they
Create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable
that air attacks directed against transportation tar-
gets cause scattered damage to dikes.
There are no signs of destruction of vital dike
portions stretching to a length of several kilometers--
as reported by Hanoi-based newsmen. In comparison
to the dikes, the craters are small, and no flooding
has occurred as a result of the damage. Although
water levels are not yet at their highest,: the ab-
sence of leakage through the craters indicates that
damage was limited.
The bomb craters verified by photography can
be repaired easily with a minimum of local labor
and equipment--a. crew of less than 50 men with
wheelbarrows ,and hand tools could repair in a:day
the largest crater observed. Repairs to all the
dikes could be completed within a week, as the nec-
essary-equipment is available throughout the delta.
Local labor historically mobilizes to strengthen
and repair' dikes to avoid serious flooding. An ?
occasional bomb falling on a dike does not. add sig-
nificantly to the burden of annual repair work nor-
mally required. North. Vietnam must, however,.com-
Plete the repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods
before next month when this year's rainy-season,.will
reach its peak.
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