THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 JULY 1972
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993396
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 7, 1972
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The President's Daily Brief
7 July 1972
47
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of C.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I ).(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
She Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
7 July 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS'
North Vietnamese
(Page 1)
South Vietnamese. main force Units are consolidating
their positions near Quang Tri City, but the Commu-
nists may be readying counterattacks farther south
.(Page 2)
A joint Cambodian - South Vietnamese operation
aimed at reopening an important stretch of the high-
way between Saigon and Phnom Penh that has been
held by the enemy since April is now under way.
(Page 3)
President-Marcos now claims he wants no major alter-
ations in the US-Philippine treaties, but he may
have difficulty calming the public furor over the
issue that he instigated. (Page 4)
The meeting this week between Chancellor Brandt and
President Pompidou failed to end the deadlock in -
preparations for the EC summit this fall. (Page 5)
Chile's opposition Christian Democrats have forced
President Allende to capitulate on his proposed con-
stitutional reforms that would have legalized fur-
ther nationalization of private enterprises. (Page 6)
Military support for Argentine President Lanusse
may be weakening. (Page 7)
Fidel Castro is home again after a two-month trip
through Africa and Eastern Europe. that was capped
by .a ten-.day stay in the USSR. (Page 8)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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NORTH VIETNAM
1
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104
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Government forces have begun consolidating
their positions near Quang Tri City. The main
elements of the South Vietnamese Marine and Air-
borne brigades are a few miles south and east of
the provincial capital; advance airborne elements
are in the city. Fighting in the area was light
during the past 24 hours, with most of the enemy
action directed against the western flank of the
government force.
Farther south, enemy intercepts show Commu-
nist preparations for counterattacks against gov-
ernment strongpoints extending from the My Chanh
defense line to Hue. The headquarters of the
North Vietnamese 304th Division has been detected
moving south into Thua Thien Province where it
could direct attacks behind the line.
Elements of a North Vietnamese regiment have
been ordered to attack Fire Support Base Bastogne,
which guards the western access route to Hue.
Other intercepts refer to the deployment of artil-
lery and personnel to new positions west of Hue.
Artillery attacks against Hue and government posi-
tions west of the city have been increasing. Yes-
terday, Hue was struck by over 100 rounds, and gov-
ernment bases south and west of town were heavily
shelled.
2
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pong Thom
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553318 7-72 .CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CAMBODIA
Government forces and South Vietnamese units,
moving from different directions, are trying to
reopen a stretch of Route 1, the main highway be-
tween Phnom Penh and Saigon. Fourteen Cambodian
Army battalions and one armored squadron moved
eastward on 4 July from their Mekong River base
at Neak Luong in a three-pronged drive toward the
Communist-controlled town of Kompong Trabek. At
the same time a regiment of South Vietnamese Rangers
supported by heavy artillery and another armored
squadron began advancing northward from the South
Vietnam border toward Kompong Trabek. At last re-
port, lead elements of the Cambodian force had
moved to within a few miles of the town without
meeting any enemy opposition. Enemy intercepts
show that the Communists apparently knew of the
operation at least two days in advance.
The operation is Phnom Penh's most am-
bitious military undertaking since the
beginning of the rainy season; it is
also the first sizable operation con-
ducted with the South Vietnamese in more
than a year.
The Communists have held Kompong Trabek
since late April, when they also took a
score of other government positions along
Route 1, Although..no Communist Main- force
units are known to be in the immediate
vicinity of Kompong Trabek, the enemy
may feel compelled to shift Some-units
from the South Vietnam delta or from
nearby Svay Rieng Province to-the Kompong
Trabek region in order to protect Commu-
nist supply and infiltration routes.
South of Phnom Penh in Takeo Province, the
Communists are still thwarting efforts to relieve
an embattled government battalion at Angtassom.
Five Cambodian battalions from nearby Takeo City
remain pinned down by Communist troops a few miles
east. of Angtassom, which was hit by heavy enemy
shelling-yesterday. The government has received
reports that Communist reinforcements from Kampot
Province may be heading for the Angtassom-Takeo
area.
Communist pressure in this sector may be
designed to open new supply lines as well
as to tighten their political control over
the surrounding countryside.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
PHILIPPINES
In a private discussion with Ambassador Byroade
on 5 July, President Marcos said that despite in-
flammatory press stories calling for drastic changes
in the US-Philippine treaty relationships, he per-
sonally did not want major modifications in the
treaties. Marcos suggested that both sides name
top-level negotiating panels in December with the
expectation that final decisions would be reached
by next February or March.
The treaties first became a hot domestic
issue in early June when Marcos sought to
divert public attention from his shady
political tactics by publicly calling
into question the future of US bases in
the Philippines. The ploy succeeded so
well that Marcos may now find it diffi-
cult to calm the public furor he has
helped to create. His task is compli-
cated by the activities of opposition
political leaders, whose sweeping criti-
cisms of American involvement in the PhiZ-
ippines continue to make headlines in
Manila. On Tuesday, Marcos announced that
discussion of US bases in the Philippines
would be eliminated from the agenda of
the National Security Council meeting to-
day. Instead, the council will discuss
Philippine participation in the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, another poten-
tially contentious issue.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY - FRANCE
The meeting between Chancellor Brandt and Pres-
ident Pompidou in Bonn this week did nothing to ad-
vance preparations for the EC summit scheduled for
this fall. Although both leaders shied away from
calling off the summit, Pompidou continues to make
French participation conditional on the acceptance
of French demands in the monetary field, something
Brandt refuses to do. Paris contends the community
must work out common positions on the role of gold
and special drawing rights, the problem of sterling
and dollar balances, and dollar convertibility.
Although Brandt would like the summit to
take place as scheduled, he appears deter-
mined not to be cast in the role of sup-
plicant.
Foreign ministers of the present and pro-
spective EC members will meet on 19 July
to discuss a summit agenda. We doubt that
the differences between France and its
partners will be resolved at this meeting,
but we believe that continuation of the
deadlock would lead to a postponement of
?the summit rather than its cancellation.
5
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CHILE
President Allende has bowed to the opposition
Christian Democrats on a major political issue.
Since mid-June Allende had been negotiating with
them in search of a compromise on a constitutional
reform measure passed by Congress defining the gov-
ernment's role in the national economy. Last week
the Christian Democrats walked out of the talks
rather than accept Allende's proposed changes which
would have legalized further nationalization of
private enterprises. On Wednesday the President,
faced with the certainty of an adverse vote on his
proposals in the Senate, capitulated and withdrew
his changes.
Whether Allende now signs the original
measure or submits other objections, he
has suffered a significant setback in his
continuing struggle with the opposition.
The Christian Democrats appear to have
concluded, at least for the present, that
forceful opposition will bring more polit-
ical dividends than conciliation. In an-
other recent maneuver, they have provided
critical backing for impeachment charges
against Interior Minister Del Canto.
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ARGENTINA
There are indications that military support for
President Lanusse is weakening. On 4 July General
Rey, air force commander in chief, publicly criti-
cized Lanusse's handling of important issues, in-
cluding the role of the air force in the government.
Apparently reacting to reports that Lanusse plans
to continue as president beyond 1 January 1973, Rey
demanded that Lanusse stick to the agreement made
at the time the present junta seized power; that
agreement called for the rotation of power among
the three services, and for the air force to take
over on that date.
General Rey also claimed that the military high
command had not authorized the recently disclosed
secret talks between Lanusse's private emissary and
ousted dictator Peron in April 1971. General Lopez
Aufranc, the powerful III Corps commander in Cordoba,
also reportedly claims to have had no knowledge of
the conversation.
Lanusse had hoped to block speculation
about a secret agreement with Peron by
releasing a transcript of the conversa-
tions. Nevertheless, Rey's criticism
could arouse the still strong anti-Peron
sentiment in all three services.
Most top officers want to move away from
direct military rule and are therefore
reluctant to upset Lanusse's plans for
an orderly transition to elected govern-
ment. Their concern over continuing eco-
nomic problems and the rising level of
civil violence?combined with the fear of
a Peronist return to power and the dis-
satisfaction of the air force?could, how-
ever, create pressure for a move against
Lanusse.
7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CUBA USSR
Premier Fidel Castro returned to Cuba yesterday
following a ten-day stay in the USSR at the end of
a two-month trip through Africa and Eastern Europe.
In the final communique, Moscow endorsed the Cuban
demand for "unconditional removal of the Guantanamo
Naval Base"--an endorsement that represents little
change from previous Soviet statements--and the
Cubans praised Moscow's peaceful foreign policy
line. No new aid agreements were announced
Despite Castro's effusive praise of the
Soviets, we doubt that Moscow completely
allayed his suspicions that Cuban inter-
ests may have been undermined in the
course of President Nixon's visit to the
USSR. The communique' stated that the So-
viets "reported" on the summit contacts,
but carried no Cuban comment on those
meetings.
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