THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 JULY 1972

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005993396
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 7, 1972
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4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 The President's Daily Brief 7 July 1972 47 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part'- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Exempt from general declassification schedule of C.O. 11652 exemption category 5B( I ).(2),(3) declassified only on approval of She Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010990070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 July 1972 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS' North Vietnamese (Page 1) South Vietnamese. main force Units are consolidating their positions near Quang Tri City, but the Commu- nists may be readying counterattacks farther south .(Page 2) A joint Cambodian - South Vietnamese operation aimed at reopening an important stretch of the high- way between Saigon and Phnom Penh that has been held by the enemy since April is now under way. (Page 3) President-Marcos now claims he wants no major alter- ations in the US-Philippine treaties, but he may have difficulty calming the public furor over the issue that he instigated. (Page 4) The meeting this week between Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou failed to end the deadlock in - preparations for the EC summit this fall. (Page 5) Chile's opposition Christian Democrats have forced President Allende to capitulate on his proposed con- stitutional reforms that would have legalized fur- ther nationalization of private enterprises. (Page 6) Military support for Argentine President Lanusse may be weakening. (Page 7) Fidel Castro is home again after a two-month trip through Africa and Eastern Europe. that was capped by .a ten-.day stay in the USSR. (Page 8) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T0093.6A010900070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NORTH VIETNAM 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 104 ?16 THAILAND ?14 Tonle Sap ?12 ?10 Gulf of Thailand 104 553320 7-72 106 , NORTH ViETNA 108 110 Demilitarized Zone CIUA.NG TRI .(1t,iang Tri ? -v Chanh River defense line FSB Bastogne LAOS CAMBODIA CHAU DOC AN GIANG Aroong BINH LONG TAY NINH BINH DUONG KIEN lIEN PHONG TUONG KIEN IANG PHONG DINH CHUONG THIEN AN XUYEN DINH TUONG GO, CO ---- VINM LONG 1( M HOA BINH BA XUYENs' 4 PHUOC LONG LONG KHANH BIEN HOA IG PHUOC TUY HIEN QUANG NAM GUANO TIN QUANG NGAI KONTUM PLEIKU DARLAC QUANG DUG LAM =ONG R3 PHU BON DUC BINH THUAN Capital Special Zone 118 MR 1 BINH DINH PHU YEN KHANH HOA NINH THUAN MR 2 ?114ANH South China Sea SOUTH VIETNAM MILES 110 16- 14- 12- 10 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A610900070001-9 25X1 Declassified in0Part - 4Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY VIETNAM Government forces have begun consolidating their positions near Quang Tri City. The main elements of the South Vietnamese Marine and Air- borne brigades are a few miles south and east of the provincial capital; advance airborne elements are in the city. Fighting in the area was light during the past 24 hours, with most of the enemy action directed against the western flank of the government force. Farther south, enemy intercepts show Commu- nist preparations for counterattacks against gov- ernment strongpoints extending from the My Chanh defense line to Hue. The headquarters of the North Vietnamese 304th Division has been detected moving south into Thua Thien Province where it could direct attacks behind the line. Elements of a North Vietnamese regiment have been ordered to attack Fire Support Base Bastogne, which guards the western access route to Hue. Other intercepts refer to the deployment of artil- lery and personnel to new positions west of Hue. Artillery attacks against Hue and government posi- tions west of the city have been increasing. Yes- terday, Hue was struck by over 100 rounds, and gov- ernment bases south and west of town were heavily shelled. 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 pong Thom sturt9 Chipit Miles Communist-held location ratie Er0 PHNOM PENTI An Loc ngtassom VE ' Nea Luo n oCambo im forces liompo g i i rabe SVAY ? out iietnamese '-'---.Svay Rieng forces RIENG \lay Ninh SOLJ7"--1 VIET VINH RA CH GIA 553318 7-72 .CIA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010600070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CAMBODIA Government forces and South Vietnamese units, moving from different directions, are trying to reopen a stretch of Route 1, the main highway be- tween Phnom Penh and Saigon. Fourteen Cambodian Army battalions and one armored squadron moved eastward on 4 July from their Mekong River base at Neak Luong in a three-pronged drive toward the Communist-controlled town of Kompong Trabek. At the same time a regiment of South Vietnamese Rangers supported by heavy artillery and another armored squadron began advancing northward from the South Vietnam border toward Kompong Trabek. At last re- port, lead elements of the Cambodian force had moved to within a few miles of the town without meeting any enemy opposition. Enemy intercepts show that the Communists apparently knew of the operation at least two days in advance. The operation is Phnom Penh's most am- bitious military undertaking since the beginning of the rainy season; it is also the first sizable operation con- ducted with the South Vietnamese in more than a year. The Communists have held Kompong Trabek since late April, when they also took a score of other government positions along Route 1, Although..no Communist Main- force units are known to be in the immediate vicinity of Kompong Trabek, the enemy may feel compelled to shift Some-units from the South Vietnam delta or from nearby Svay Rieng Province to-the Kompong Trabek region in order to protect Commu- nist supply and infiltration routes. South of Phnom Penh in Takeo Province, the Communists are still thwarting efforts to relieve an embattled government battalion at Angtassom. Five Cambodian battalions from nearby Takeo City remain pinned down by Communist troops a few miles east. of Angtassom, which was hit by heavy enemy shelling-yesterday. The government has received reports that Communist reinforcements from Kampot Province may be heading for the Angtassom-Takeo area. Communist pressure in this sector may be designed to open new supply lines as well as to tighten their political control over the surrounding countryside. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY PHILIPPINES In a private discussion with Ambassador Byroade on 5 July, President Marcos said that despite in- flammatory press stories calling for drastic changes in the US-Philippine treaty relationships, he per- sonally did not want major modifications in the treaties. Marcos suggested that both sides name top-level negotiating panels in December with the expectation that final decisions would be reached by next February or March. The treaties first became a hot domestic issue in early June when Marcos sought to divert public attention from his shady political tactics by publicly calling into question the future of US bases in the Philippines. The ploy succeeded so well that Marcos may now find it diffi- cult to calm the public furor he has helped to create. His task is compli- cated by the activities of opposition political leaders, whose sweeping criti- cisms of American involvement in the PhiZ- ippines continue to make headlines in Manila. On Tuesday, Marcos announced that discussion of US bases in the Philippines would be eliminated from the agenda of the National Security Council meeting to- day. Instead, the council will discuss Philippine participation in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, another poten- tially contentious issue. 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY WEST GERMANY - FRANCE The meeting between Chancellor Brandt and Pres- ident Pompidou in Bonn this week did nothing to ad- vance preparations for the EC summit scheduled for this fall. Although both leaders shied away from calling off the summit, Pompidou continues to make French participation conditional on the acceptance of French demands in the monetary field, something Brandt refuses to do. Paris contends the community must work out common positions on the role of gold and special drawing rights, the problem of sterling and dollar balances, and dollar convertibility. Although Brandt would like the summit to take place as scheduled, he appears deter- mined not to be cast in the role of sup- plicant. Foreign ministers of the present and pro- spective EC members will meet on 19 July to discuss a summit agenda. We doubt that the differences between France and its partners will be resolved at this meeting, but we believe that continuation of the deadlock would lead to a postponement of ?the summit rather than its cancellation. 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CHILE President Allende has bowed to the opposition Christian Democrats on a major political issue. Since mid-June Allende had been negotiating with them in search of a compromise on a constitutional reform measure passed by Congress defining the gov- ernment's role in the national economy. Last week the Christian Democrats walked out of the talks rather than accept Allende's proposed changes which would have legalized further nationalization of private enterprises. On Wednesday the President, faced with the certainty of an adverse vote on his proposals in the Senate, capitulated and withdrew his changes. Whether Allende now signs the original measure or submits other objections, he has suffered a significant setback in his continuing struggle with the opposition. The Christian Democrats appear to have concluded, at least for the present, that forceful opposition will bring more polit- ical dividends than conciliation. In an- other recent maneuver, they have provided critical backing for impeachment charges against Interior Minister Del Canto. 6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14: CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A0109-60070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ARGENTINA There are indications that military support for President Lanusse is weakening. On 4 July General Rey, air force commander in chief, publicly criti- cized Lanusse's handling of important issues, in- cluding the role of the air force in the government. Apparently reacting to reports that Lanusse plans to continue as president beyond 1 January 1973, Rey demanded that Lanusse stick to the agreement made at the time the present junta seized power; that agreement called for the rotation of power among the three services, and for the air force to take over on that date. General Rey also claimed that the military high command had not authorized the recently disclosed secret talks between Lanusse's private emissary and ousted dictator Peron in April 1971. General Lopez Aufranc, the powerful III Corps commander in Cordoba, also reportedly claims to have had no knowledge of the conversation. Lanusse had hoped to block speculation about a secret agreement with Peron by releasing a transcript of the conversa- tions. Nevertheless, Rey's criticism could arouse the still strong anti-Peron sentiment in all three services. Most top officers want to move away from direct military rule and are therefore reluctant to upset Lanusse's plans for an orderly transition to elected govern- ment. Their concern over continuing eco- nomic problems and the rising level of civil violence?combined with the fear of a Peronist return to power and the dis- satisfaction of the air force?could, how- ever, create pressure for a move against Lanusse. 7 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T0093-6A010900070001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY CUBA USSR Premier Fidel Castro returned to Cuba yesterday following a ten-day stay in the USSR at the end of a two-month trip through Africa and Eastern Europe. In the final communique, Moscow endorsed the Cuban demand for "unconditional removal of the Guantanamo Naval Base"--an endorsement that represents little change from previous Soviet statements--and the Cubans praised Moscow's peaceful foreign policy line. No new aid agreements were announced Despite Castro's effusive praise of the Soviets, we doubt that Moscow completely allayed his suspicions that Cuban inter- ests may have been undermined in the course of President Nixon's visit to the USSR. The communique' stated that the So- viets "reported" on the summit contacts, but carried no Cuban comment on those meetings. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 25X1 4X.salrOi ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010900070001-9