THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JULY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993388
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 3, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
3 July 1972
(17
Top Secret
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5E(t),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
3 July 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
South Vietnamese troops remain stalled below Quang
Tri City as the Communists have increased their
pressure in the northern provinces. (Page 1)
The TASS account of President Nixon's press confer-
ence reported all the major points the President
made on Vietnam but questioned some of his state-
ments. (Page 2)
The five-day meeting between Prime Minister Gandhi
and President Bhutto made some gains on the lesser
issues and seems to have cleared the way for further
progress. (Page 3)
German negotiators Kohl and Bahr appear to have
moved ahead in their talks last week, but the major
obstacle to formal negotiations on normalizing re-
lations remains Bonn's demand that a treaty allude
to the single nation concept. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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108 110
Demilitarized Zone
? FSB Bast e
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"
OUANG
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SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
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k
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
The-Communists.are increasing their pressure
against government positions in the northern prov-
inces. South Vietnamese paratroopers 'remain, stalled
south of Quang Tri City as heavy rains as well as
stiff enemy resistance hamper the government's cam-
paign. Heavy artillery attacks along with some
ground probes hit government paratroop units spread
out west of Route 1 over the weekend, with the bulk
of fighting reported just above the My Chanh defense
line.
To the south, the Communists yesterday shelled
Hue for the first time since the enemy offensive be-
gan this spring, and renewed the attacks this morn-
ing. Most of the 122-mm. artillery rounds hit near
South Vietnamese Army positions in the Citadel and
at Camp Eagle to the south. Heavy mortar barrages
also hit government positions in the area of Fire
Support Base Bastogne southwest of Hue. There are
signs that this westernmost strongpoint may soon
come under attack from enemy-held Outpost Checkmate,
which overlooks the base. Intercepts also indicate
that the Communists may soon resume rocket attacks
against major government installations in the Da
Nang area farther south.
The Communists evidently are continuing to
withdraw main force units in the central provinces.
The North Vietnamese 3rd Division headquarters and
two of its regiments have been detected moving away
from the battered district capital of Phu My in
coastal Binh Dinh Province, returning to an area
the division held at the start of the current offen-
sive. In Kontum Province, the senior enemy military
authority for the central highlands has returned to
its pre-offensive base area along the South Vietnam-
ese - Cambodian border. Communist forces in the
Kontum Pass area south of Kontum City may also have
pulled back; military convoys again moved through
the pass unimpeded over the weekend.
Sporadic shelling attacks and some ground ac-
tion continued elsewhere in the country but little
hard fighting developed. In Phuoc Long Province
in northern MR-3, however, the Communists mounted
their first significant actions to date, destroying
a government ammunition depot and also a communica-
tions facility near the provincial capital of Song
Be.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR
The TASS account of President Nixon's press
conference carried by the Soviet press on Saturday
reported the following aspects of his statements
on Vietnam: that the US has informed Hanoi that it
will return to the Paris talks on 13 July; that the
US is prepared to conduct talks without any condi-
tions; that it would not have returned to Paris un-
less it considered there was a chance to begin se-
rious and constructive discussions; that the US will
take constructive positions and be prepared to meet
the other side halfway; that reports of US attacks
on North Vietnamese dams and dikes are not accurate;
that the US has ordered that dams not be bombed in
view of the very serious consequences for the civil-
ian population; and that this order will,remain in
force in the future.
TASS called into question certain of the Presi-
dent's statements. It described the President's,
conditions for ending the bombing as contrary to
his assurances that the US is not setting any pre-
conditions. It also observed that the President
again, left the Viet Cong proposals unanswered, and
characterized US bombing and mining operations as
"aggressive acts" condemned by the world. In addi-
tion,,it reported the lengthy question noting the
high level of US military activities in Indochina
and asking whether the President could end the war
by next January, in accordance with his campaign
promises. Along with the TASS account, Pravda car-
ried reports of the North Vietnamese and Viet Conq
reactions in Paris
TASS' criticism of the President's state-
ments is in keeping with a recent increase
in the volume of Soviet propaganda support
for Hanoi which has also entailed a slightly
more critical attitude toward the US. So-
viet commentaries on 30 June, for example,
resumed the use of pejorative language
reminiscent of various pre-summit periods
of heightened invective. Despite this,
however, these commentaries do not indi-
cate any shift in the fundamental Soviet
position in support of a negotiated set-
tlement on Hanoi's terms. They suggest,
rather, that Moscow feels some need to
strengthen at least its public record of
support for North Vietnam.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Prime Minister Gandhi and President Bhutto
concluded their five-day meeting at Simla, India,
yesterday by agreeing to withdraw troops from the
border south of Kashmir and to take steps to re-
store trade, communications, and travel between
the two countries. The troop withdrawal will not
take place until after. ratification of the pact.
The Kashmir dispute and such other issues as the
restoration of diplomatic relations and the repa-
triation of POWs were deferred, although the two
leaders agreed.in the interim to respect the Kash-
mir cease-fire line of last.December.
Despite the Zack of progress on the most
contentious issues, the meeting appears
to have eased tensions between the two
countries and set the stage for restoring
normal relations in the course of further
negotiations. India, by agreeing to the
troop withdrawal and the specific measures
to restore bilateral ties, backed off from
its view that a settlement should come
through a comprehensive package agreement,
including Pakistan's acceptance of a final
Kashmir partition. In gaining endorsement
of his step-by-step approach Bhutto seems
to have made only a slight concession:
he agreed to bilateral negotiations, rather
than third party mediation, as the principal
means of securing further progress. He
still is unlikely to achieve the most ur-
gent of his goals, the repatriation of
93,000 Pakistani POWs in India, however,
until he recognizes Bangladesh.
3
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EAST GERMANY - WEST GERMANY
In their talks last week, negotiators Kohl and
Bahr again discussed how to proceed toward formal
negotiations on normalizing relations. Claiming
that the two sides had "converged" on several im-
portant points, Kohl proposed that the talks should
now be upgraded to formal treaty negotiations. He
dropped an earlier demand that Bonn first agree to
an exchange of ambassadors and agreed that two of
Bonn's basic concerns--self-determination for the
German peoples and "human rights"--would be proper
topics for negotiations. As a further incentive,
Kohl added that Pankow would implement "extensive"
inter-German travel improvements following Bonn's
ratification of the recently concluded general traf-
fic treaty.
Despite these gestures Bahr responded nega-
tively. He insisted that Bonn would not begin for-
mal negotiations until there were indications that
agreement could be reached on the "special relation-
ship" issue.
The major obstacle to formal negotiations
remains this demand of Bonn's that a
treaty on political relations must allude
to Chancellor Brandt's single German na-
tion concept. It was apparently to under-
score Pankow's rejection of this idea that
East German Foreign Minister Winzer took
the unprecedented step of following up the
Kohl-Bahr talks with a meeting with Bahr
in which he expounded Pankow's position
in dogmatic terms. Winzer stated that
the two sides obviously would not be able
to agree on this question and that it was
not necessary to do so. Kohl later told
Bahr, however, that the foreign minister's
willingness to discuss the issue in the
future kept alive the possibility of com-
promise.
Pankow seems to have adopted the tactic of
offering to negotiate on topics where
agreement appears likely, while side-
stepping more contentious ones. Bahr also
favors dealing with the less difficult is-
sues first, and both sides appear eager
to maintain the current momentum in their
next series of talks scheduled to begin
on 2 August.
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTE
USSR: The Soviets yesterday deorbited Cosmos
496, an unmanned Soyuz. spacecraft. We believe that
the satellite, launched on 26 June, was intended to
test design changes made after last year's Soyuz 11
tragedy in which three Cosmonauts were killed. So-
viet scientists would wish to examine Closely the
results of the mission before proceeding with a
pending manned space event. We expect that the.
coming event will involve the rendezvous, docking
and extended stay in orbit of a manned Soyuz space-
craft and Salyut space station.
5
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