THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 JUNE 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993353
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 14, 1972

Declassified in Part.- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T06936A0108001-20001-4
The President's Daily Brief
14 June 1972
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
14 June 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
A British official has provided some interesting
commentary on his recent ?visit to Peking. (Page 1)
Military activity in South Vietnam is widely scat-
tered with the heaviest action in the delta. The
movement of Communist forces away from Kontum City
suggests that the city may have a respite. (Page 3)
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(Page 4)
Soviet President Podgorny arrives in Hanoi this
morning. (Page 5)
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CHINA
British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs
Boyle has briefed Ambassador Annenberg in
confidence on his recent visit to Peking.
Boyle talked mostly with Deputy Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua; he did not see
Chou En-Zai although the Chinese had orig-
inally said that Chou wanted to meet him.
The talks included an extensive tour
d'horizon as well as discussion of bilateral
issues. While there are no surprises in
Royle's account, his assessment seems a
good reading of the current mood in Peking.
--Royle said it was clear that the Chinese would
not allow Soviet ships to unload supplies for North
Vietnam in Chinese ports. He also thought they did
not want to have an increase in Soviet goods transit-
ing the country by rail. East European ships are
being allowed to dock in Chinese ports because Pe-
king wishes to draw a distinction between its rela-
tions with Moscow and with other European socialist
states. The Chinese are anxious to improve relations
with all the East European states, but not the USSR.
--Royle thought the conversations made it clear
that Hanoi's offensive was undertaken against Chi-
nese advice; the Chinese believe the Soviets were
behind the decision. Royle gained the impression
that the Chinese were not displeased with the cur-
rent situation in Vietnam. He thought, however,
that they would do certain things in support of
Hanoi in order to maintain their bargaining position
in any negotiation of a Vietnam settlement. They
appeared to believe that definitive moves would come
in the Paris talks context rather than through a
revival of the Geneva conference.
--Once again the Chinese expressed apprehension
about the possibility of a militaristic revival in
Japan. They were deeply interested in the evolution
of political events in Japan and wanted Royle's as-
sessment of who would succeed Prime Minister Sato;
they did not, however, express any preference among
the candidates. They made it clear that normaliza-
tion of relations would depend on resolution of the
Taiwan issue.
--The Chinese response to Royle's plea that
they work toward bringing India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh together, and that they recognize Dacca,
made him believe that they would move in this gen-
eral direction, although slowly.
(continued)
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--The Chinese were intensely interested in the
European Economic Community and were strongly in
favor of its expansion. They clearly see its polit-
ical significance as a counter to the USSR in Europe.
At the same time they condemned NATO and the presence
of US troops in Europe but apparently did not con-
test Royle's rebuttal on this point.
--The Chinese made their usual analysis of the
world as divided into superpowers, middle powers,
and small powers. Their fear of the Soviet Union
was, Royle thought, all-pervasive and colored their
talks with him. They see themselves ringed by
Soviet power and forced to prepare for a war they
do not want. He believes that they are anxious to
improve relations with a wide variety of states,
including the US, as a means of damping down the
possibility of a world war stemming from superpower
actions.
--The Chinese were anxious to enlarge exchanges
with Great Britain in all possible areas; an ambas-
sador will arrive in London in August and defense
attachgs no doubt will be exchanged. Our embassy
in London thinks that Royle may have brought back
an assessment on trade matters which has whetted
British appetites for substantial sales of aircraft.
Royle did not expand on bilateral trade matters,
however.
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Demilitarized Zone
Gulf of
Thailand
104
Capital Special Zone,
South
China
Sea
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
100
12-
10-
53232 6-72
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VIETNAM
Military activity. in. South Vietnam is heaviest
in the delta area where skirmishing and Communist
shellings continue in scattered areas. South Viet-
namese forces are in contact with Communist troops -
just inside Cambodia near the Kien TuOng Province
border. Communist forces have been attempting to
gain control of the extensive canal network and river
system in nearby Kien Phong Province to assist their
infiltration of men and materiel into the delta.
Newly reinforced government forces are continu-
ing to clear Communist troops from sections of An
Loc. In the central highlands, Communist forces
are shifting away from Kontum City, apparently for
resupply and refitting. Communist forces are con-
tinuing to resist government efforts to clear the
Kontum Pass, but South Vietnamese engineers are work-
ing on a bypass that would permit the reopening of
overland communication with Kontum City.
In the north, South Vietnamese troops?operating
a few miles above the defensive line at the My Chanh
River report no contact with Communist forces in the
southernmost part of Quang Tri Province.
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IRELAND
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NOTES
USSR - North Vietnam: Soviet President Podgorny
left Moscow for Hanoi yesterday. /
India: The US Embassy in New Delhi reports
that American businessmen are. finding it increasingly
uncomfortable to operate in India as they cope with
continuing discrimination against their firms. This
is especially evident in New Delhi. One businessman
went so far as to claim that the Indian Government
has relegated the US tothe position of last resort
as a source for Indies imports. The antagonism
extends beyond business relationships; senior Indian
officials are hesitant to make any decisions that
might be construed as pro-US by their superiors or
by members of Parliament.
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,
Top Secret
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