THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 JUNE 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993345
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 9, 1972

Li1:2eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010800080001-9
The President's Daily Brief
9 June 1972
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
9 June 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
South Vietnamese forces have driven the Communists
from within firing range of Kontum City's airfield,
and an airborne unit has linked up with a govern-
ment position just south of An Loc. (Page 1)
Japa
China
(Page 3)
Chinese suggestions that might
lead to Peking's participation in a reorganized
Geneva disarmament conference. (Page 4)
At Annex, we discuss the results of last Sunday's
presidential election in Cambodia and the prospects
for the country's political stability.
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ORT
VIET
Demilitarized Zone
MR I
L S
THAILkND
ang Ngai
ONTUM
cint m
BINH
DINH
Kontu Pass
An Nhon
DARL C
Alekonfl
LAM DO
/OEN
HONG
KIEN
TUONG
R3
Capital Special Zone
?10 10--
?oo
110
MR 2
South
China -
%
Sea
16-
14-
12?
VINN
BINH
Gulf of
Thailand
104
.553212 6-72 CIA
AN
XUYEN
MR 4
106
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILES
El [7] E] nncinn 173 r1_
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VIETNAM
The attack by five South Vietnamese marine bat-
talions into Quang Tri Province apparently has met
only light resistance.
South Vietnamese forces still are clearing the
northern outskirts of Kontum City of the last enemy
troops dug in there. The enemy has been driven from
firing positions within range of. the town's airfield
and aircraft can land there again. Bad weather is
hampering the government's efforts to clear the Com-
munists from Route 14 at Kontum Pass. To the east,
in Binh Dinh Province, the Communists appear to have
committed two battalions in An Nhon District.
A South Vietnamese airborne unit has linked up
with a government position just south of An Loc.
The main relief column, however, remains stalled
along Route 13 about nine miles south of the city.
Saigon has assigned more than two infantry di-
visions, an airborne brigade and an armored cavalry
regiment to the An Loc operation. Forces defending
other parts of MR-3 are spread thin, and the enemy
is trying to take advantage of this. Elements of
the Communists' 5th Division in the Parrot's Beak
area of Cambodia pose a threat to Tay Ninh and Hau
Nghia provinces and to the nearby delta. These areas
are defended primarily by territorial security forces
which have fought well but could not withstand a de-
termined main-force assault. The North Vietnamese
7th Division is responsible for keeping Route 13
closed. Some reports indicate that elements of the
Communists' 9th Division, which took part in the
early heavy fighting around An Loc, have slipped
south and are preparing to attack in Binh Duong and
Bien Hoa provinces north of Saigon.
(continued)
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JAPAN-CHINA
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Chinese
reactions
CHINA
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on the possibility of Peking's participa-
tion in a reorganized Geneva disarmament conference.
They stressed Peking's desire to take part from the
beginning in any discussions on reorganization, even
though China is not now a conference member.
The Chinese have long held open the option
of joining the conference, but this ap-
pears to be their most explicit sounding
to date. The Chinese apparently seek to
have non-members allowed to attend con-
ference sessions. They would presumably
also call for the elimination of US-Soviet
co-chairmanship. Consultations on so ex-
tensive a reorganization would, of course,
be protracted.
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NOTES
Cambodia: Communist shelling and ground attacks
in the Phnom Penh area early yesterday resulted in
only light damage and casualties. Targets included
the Defense Ministry, the railroad station, the water
works, and the airport. Shelling just south of the
city was accompanied by small harassing attacks by a
battalion-size sapper unit. Government units quickly
responded with clearing operations and with fire
against suspected enemy rocket positions, but the at-
tacks underscore the capital's continuing vulnerabil-
ity to Communist harassment.
USSR - Yemen (Aden):
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CAMBODIA
Although this week's presidential election re-
sults fell short of Lon Nol's expectations, the out-
come appears to augur well for Cambodia's short-term
political stability. The government engaged in just
enough skulduggery to ensure Lon Nol's election, but
it stopped short of manipulating the lopsided victory
Lon Nol wanted but could not win honestly. The re-
sult is that opposition elements cannot make a strong
case for foul play, the students are quiescent, and
the election has received favorable treatment in the
international press. Moreover, Lon Nol's claim to
legitimacy is enhanced. He can now counter Sihanouk's
assertion that the royal government was illegally
deposed by citing victory in an open and honest elec-
tion as the legal basis for his rule.
On the other hand, the narrowness of his victory
exposes the fragility of Lon Nol's hold on the Cam-
bodian people. In Cambodia, where obeisance to the
man in power is a matter of course, Lon Nol's 55 per-
cent of the vote comes close to being a repudiation.
In the populous and politically sophisticated Phnom
Penh area, Lon Nol ran well behind his chief chal-
lenger, In Tam. Lon Nol almost certainly did poorly
among the country's students and intellectuals, who
have been particularly upset over his authoritarian
style and over his failure to crack down on wide-
spread corruption in the government and armed forces.
He lost the votes of many civil servants and even
some foot soldiers who have been hit hard by rising
prices. Primarily, however, Lon Nol has been vulner-
able to the complaints of Cambodians in all walks of
life that he is responsible for the war and for the
government's failure to defeat the Communists and
end the fighting.
Many Cambodians obviously are drawing invidious
comparisons between conditions under Lon Nol and
those under Sihanouk. This is demonstrated by the
remarkable 21 percent of the vote won by Keo An, a
political nobody who had no money and did little
campaigning. Keo An's only attraction was his prom-
ise to allow Sihanouk to return to Cambodia. The
significance of his showing will not be lost on
Khmer Communists, who continue to exploit the
Prince's name for their own ends. At the same time,
this also serves to harden the determination of Lon
Nol and others not to accept any settlement with the
Communists calling for Sihanouk's return.
The election also has further enhanced the po-
litical power of the military. Until recently, the
country's senior military leaders have eschewed na-
tional-level politics. In this election, however,
they openly campaigned for Lon Nol, and if it had
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not been for the large military vote they delivered,
Lon Nol might have been forced into an embarrassing
runoff election, or even defeated. As a result, Lon
Nol is now more dependent on the support of his mil-
itary colleagues. In addition, the generals' state-
ments critical of In Tam during the campaign indicate
that they intend to exercise a veto over who rules
Cambodia after Lon Nol is gone.
With the military solidly behind Lon Nol, the
prospects for political stability in the short run
appear good. Significant battlefield defeats could
cause the military once again to question Lon Nol's
leadership, but major reverses are not expected in
the next four months or so. The rainy season will
impair the Communists' mobility, and North Vietnam-
ese main force units will most likely either remain
preoccupied in South Vietnam, or will be in no con-
dition to undertake a major offensive in Cambodia.
Lon Nol has not in-
dicated whom he intends to appoint as his deputy.
Prior to the election he offered the post to Sink
Matak, who turned it down, in part because he mis-
trusts the reliability of Lon Nol's support for him.
However, in view of Matak's evident desire to re-
main in politics, he may reconsider if Lon Nol re-
news the offer. Matak seems to have more support
among the military than any other successor now on
the horizon
First Minister Son Ngoc
Thanh is another possibility, but he is closely as-
sociated with the South Vietnamese, and it is doubt-
ful that he has the adroitness and forcefulness to
whip his opponents into line. In Tam, who would com-
mand support among civilian elements in Phnom Penh,
is apparently unacceptable to the military. The mil-
itary itself may put forth someone like Defense Min-
ister Sak Sutsakhan as a candidate, but at this junc-
ture events have not reached a point where the prin-
cipal actors themselves have thought through the pos-
sibilities.
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