THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 MAY 1972
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005993316
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 24, 1972
File:
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The President's Daily Brief
24 May 1972
45
Top Secret
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
24 May 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Vietnam, Communist forces continue pushing against
government positions north of Hue and edging closer
to Kontum City.
(Page 1)
On Page 3 we discuss recent efforts by both Moscow
and Cairo to smooth out their prickly relationship.
(Page 5)
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VIETNAM
North of Hue, Communist forces continue to
push against government positions, although South
Vietnamese marines stopped them from advancing
yesterday. Intercepts suggest that the Communists
are preparing new action south of Hue. Elements
of a North Vietnamese division have been conducting
reconnaissance around the US base at Phu Bai near
Hue, and one unit reported on 22 May that "we are
ready to strike at Hue and the Americans."
In the central highlands, Communist units con-
tinue to edge closer to Kontum City.
To the south, govern-
ment troops have made contact with North Vietnamese
troops blocking Route 14, and government territorial
forces have retaken a fire support base that was
overrun on Monday.
North of Saigon, the 21st Division that has
been moving to relieve An Loc is about one mile
south of the town. Enemy attacks yesterday kept
it from making any further progress, but the gov-
ernment troops inside the town are reported to
have expanded their perimeter on the north and the
west.
(continued)
1
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_
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-EGYPT
The imposing military entourage that toured Egypt
with Marshal Grechko last week was part of a growing
Soviet effort to shore up President Sadat's inter-
national and domestic position.
The Soviets presumably decided last month that ad-
ditional measures were needed to buttress Sadat, as
well as the Soviet position in Egypt. During Sadat's
visit to Moscow in April, the Soviets for the first
time publicly supported Arab use of "other means"
(presumably military) to regain Israeli-occupied
territory. The communique winding up the visit also
stated that the two sides had "reached agreement on
a further strengthening of military cooperation be-
tween them." In May, during Defense Minister Grech-
ko's visit, the USSR and Egypt announced that they
had "coordinated practical steps" to implement that
agreement. The public statements, however, provide
no indication as to the specifics involved.
Moscow could do very little that would significantly
improve Egypt's military position against Israel.
Nevertheless, several courses of action are open
that would have beneficial effects on Sadat's po-
litical position and on Soviet-Egyptian relations.
One such step would be the symbolic restoration of
Cairo's offensive capability against Israel (e.g.,
several TU-16 bombers with ASM capability). Another
would be Soviet help in establishing a defense in-
dustry in Egypt. The Egyptians are sensitive about
their deficiencies in both these areas. Any Soviet
aid of this sort would be designed primarily for
its political impact rather than to change the mili-
tary balance in the Middle East.
(continued)
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The Soviets, in any, event, have demonstrated their
continued military support of Egypt. By sympathizing
with Sadat's references to the need for military ac-
tion against Israel and by announcing that a new
arms agreement has been concluded, the Soviets put
the best possible face on their ties with Cairo prior
to discussions of the Middle East situation with
President Nixon.
With one striking exception--noted below?Egyptian
officials and media are now going along with the
Soviet theme of mutual Soviet-Egyptian satisfaction
with their relationship.
The Cairo press in recent days has played up reports
that the Soviet Union is intent on discussing Middle
East problems "directly" as a vital area of tension
between Moscow and Washington. The Egyptians have
also stressed that the Soviets fully back their view
that the Arab-Israeli dispute can be settled only by
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied
territories, even if this requires Egypt to use
force.
Despite all this, the Egyptians still believe that
they can expect nothing positive from the summit
meetings, and they undoubtedly still have misgivings
about great power dealings over their heads. The
only exception to the general Zine of mutual con-
fidence has been a round-table discussion among
prominent Egyptian writers and Foreign Ministry
officials reported in al-Ahram last week. The dis-
cussion focused on these misgivings and may have
been intended to remind Moscow of its undertakings
on Egypt's behaZf.
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NOTES
Poland:
USSR-India: In Moscow's first major arms ship-
ment to India since the war with Pakistan, ?.a Soviet
freighter delivered seven MIG-21s, apparently the
J-model, to Bombay/
/these air-
craft have weapons-carrying capability and
combat radius better than the MIG-21 India is cur-
rently manufacturing. India plans to begin making
its own J-models sometime next year
Laos: Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on Mon-
day de7iTE the final blow to. the latest challenge
from rightistsin the National Assembly. Asa sub-
stitute for a:rightist.demand for the government's
resignation,, the Assembly approved aAnotion calling
merely for the government to respect.the constitu--
tion. Souvanna carried the day by insisting that
he would not change his government even if the vote
went against him and.by showing that he retained
the strong support of King Savang
6
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Top Secret
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