THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 10 MAY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993291
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 10, 1972

Declassified inPart- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/06/14 : CIA-RDP79T00936A010700090001-9
The President's Daily Brief
10 May 1972
4 7
Top Secret
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
10 May 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
On Page 1 we report Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese
Communist reactions to President Nixon's 8 May
speech.
In the Vietnam fighting, the enemy is maintaining
pressure on government positions in the northern
provinces. Meanwhile, the Communists are reported
to be taking measures to consolidate political con-
trol over areas' they have occupied. (Page 2)
The resolution of last-minute difficulties has
cleared the way for debate today of Bonn's Eastern
treaties. (Page 5)
The national elections in Italy produced only mar-
ginal shifts in the parliamentary strengths of the
leading parties and another center-left government
appears likely. (Page 6)
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VIETNAM
In the period immediately following President
Nixon's announcement on 8 May, both Soviet and Chi-
nese Communist military activities appear normal.
The Yugoslav news agency's correspondent in Moscow
has reported, however, that the Soviet Politburo
has convened to discuss the President's statement.
The Soviets first took note of the President's
address in a routine TASS account issued 11 hours
after the speech was given. The statement, date-
lined Washington, said the US actions were "open
aggressive acts, signifying increased interference
in Vietnam." TASS noted the President's remark
that "these actions are not directed against any
?other country," but it did not report the part of
the speech directed specifically at Moscow. TASS
also reported the US offer to begin withdrawing as
soon as the prisoners are released and a cease-fire
is established. It concluded that, although the
speech contains a number of reassurances that the
US wants to end the war, US actions "speak of some-
thing quite different."
Peking has not yet commented on the President's
speech, but the Foreign Ministry issued a statement
yesterday protesting the attacks on Chinese merchant
ships near Vinh over the weekend. The protest is
brief and relatively mild. It asserts that the at-
tacks constitute a "grave provocation against the
Chinese people" and adds that Washington must bear
"full responsibility" for "all the grave consequences
arising from such attacks if they are not stopped.
All Vietnamese Communist statements from Hanoi and
Paris insist that US actions will have no effect on
Communist determination to carry on. the war. Much
of the Vietnamese Communist commentary on the speech
is vituperative. In addition to bitter invective
aimed at the President personally, the propaganda
also contains long and emotional passages on the
aggressive nature of US actions, the right of the
Vietnamese people to defend-themselves,.the hopeless.
position of the US and its "puppets," and other sta-
ples of recent Hanoi statements.
Hanoi is giving heavy emphasis to international
implications of the US action. A North Vietnamese
statement in Paris claimed that the US is posing an
"insolent challenge" to Hanoi and its Communist back-
ers, and the Viet Cong added that Washington's action
is a violation of international law and moral prin-
ciple. According to French press reports from Hanoi,
North Vietnamese spokesmen are claiming that the
President's speech is an "ultimatum" aimed not just
at the Vietnamese Communists but at the "entire so-
cialist bloc and the world."
(continued)
1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
These initial reactions suggest not only
that Hanoi will maintain a very tough
stand but also that it will take every op-
portunity to remind the Soviets and the
Chinese of their obligations to support
the Vietnamese Communists.
Communist military forces are maintaining
pressure on government positions in the northern
provinces. Enemy artillery and ground attacks con-
tinue in the Hue area, but the main thrust of Com-
munist activity at the moment is toward completing
logistical and other combat preparations. Inter-
cepted North Vietnamese messages show that a major
logistic authority has moved from the Laos panhandle
to the Hue area, apparently to facilitate large-
scale logistic support for the pending offensive
against that city. Intercepts show that the Commu-
nists have already moved artillery and some infantry
units into striking positions near Hue, but that
some other units may not be ready for action until
the middle of this month.
In the central highlands, the loss yesterday
of Polei Kleng has opened Kontum City's western
approaches to the enemy. In coastal Quang Nam Prov-
ince the North Vietnamese
apparently are increasing their activity against
major towns in the area and are now within range of
Da Nang and the provincial capital of Hoi An.
President Thieu is expected to sign an order
today relieving General Dzu of command of Military
Region 2 and replacing him with General Nguyen Van
Toan, currently commander of South Vietnam's Armored
Command.
Dzu seemed complacent about the unprece-
dented enemy buildup in the highlands last
winter, but when the fighting began he
proved to be an ineffectual commander.
Thieu has apparently been considering
Dzu's replacement since his forces aban-
doned their second line of defense at Vo
Dinh in late April. Communist regiments
and local forces have been moving almost
at will through the countryside of northern
Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces and, in
effect, have cut South Vietnam in half.
(continued)
2
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Thieu clearly hopes that Toan will get a
more vigorous, aggressive performance from
Military Region 2 forces, save the situa-
tion at Kontum City, and protect Qui Nhon
City from the enemy forces headed that way.
The city of Da Nang is trying to cope with
some 400,000 refugees that have streamed in from
Quang Tri, Hue, and outlying regions in recent weeks.
According to the US Consul General in Da Nang, just
providing water--let alone food, medical care, and
sanitary facilities--is proving to be a sizable task.
In addition to these problems, there is a grow-
ing fear that Da Nang may be attacked by the enemy.
Communist artillery attacks against Da Nang or news
of the fall of Hue or Hoi An might spark a panic in
much of the city that would greatly complicate ef-
forts to defend it. The situation may be eased some-
what if a plan to ship as many as 100,000 refugees
from Military Region 1 to a new refugee center in
Military Region 3 is successfully carried out.
Refugees fleeing from Communist-occupied dis-
tricts in northern Binh Dinh Province are bringing
out stories about enemy moves to consolidate politi-
cal control there. The Communists are said to be
setting up "liberation governments" and executing
some South Vietnamese officials. Journalists who
have interviewed the refugees report that the North
Vietnamese units that spearheaded the attacks in
Binh Dinh immediately turned over civil authority
to local Viet Cong officials, some of whom are gov-
ernment cadre who were recruited earlier, as secret
Viet Cong.
The new governments are said to be carrying
out routine functions such as trying criminals, ar-
bitrating land disputes, .and supervising repair of
war damages. They are also said to be screening
all individuals who were connected in any way with
the government. Some officials are being given the
opportunity to cooperate with the Viet Cong, but
others, particularly policemen, reportedly are be-
ing shot.
The refugees' accounts are generally con-
sistent with earlier reports of how the
Communists proceeded after occupying other
areas in South Vietnam, such as Loc Ninh
District north of An Loc. The Communists
evidently have well-thought-out procedures
that are being implemented as a follow-up
to their military operations. The enemy's
measures are intended for the long term
and indicate that the Communists clearly
mean to stay in the areas they have seized.
3
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HANOI
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NORTH VIETNAM
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY
A government spokesman has announced that last-
minute Soviet objections to parts of the draft Bun-
destag resolution have been resolved and that debate
on the Eastern treaties will begin today.
Yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Ministry indicated:
that it could not accept the wording that the trea-
ties are only a modus vivendi l and do not create a
legal basis for existing borders. Moscow also con-
tended that another passage:dealing with residual
Four Power rights in Germany was repetitive and un-
necessary. Later in the day, however, Soviet Am-
bassador Falin indicated that these points might be
negotiable.
In announcing the agreement last night, the Bonn
spokesman said. the Soviets had only been seeking
clarification of certain points and they had re-
ceived "satisfactory .answers. He added that the
treaties could be voted on today, and predicted that
they would pass with a broad majority.
5
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ITALY
The 7-8 May national elections produced only
marginal shifts in the parliamentary strengths of
?the leading parties. The four parties of the center-
left coalition that have governed Italy for most of
the last decade gained six seats for a total of 371
in the 630-member Chamber of Deputies. Although
the Communist Party won two additional seats, the
extreme leftist parties did poorly, with the Prole-
tarian Socialists losing all 23 of their seats and
the militant Manifesto group failing to win any in
its first electoral test.
The far right parties scored the most impres-
sive gains. The neo-fascists, who joined forces in
this campaign with the tiny Monarchist Party, won
56 seats, 26 more than their total in the outgoing
parliament. The far rightists apparently drew
strength from the center-right parties, especially
from the Liberals, who lost ten seats.
The Liberal Party's decline reduces the
possibility of a centrist coalition as
a viable alternative to the well-worn
center-left alignment. The four parties
that would have made such a center com-
bination possible now have three seats
fewer (331) than they had in the outgoing
Chamber. This would constitute a majority,
but one with a margin that is probably
too thin for.a viable government.
Thus we expect an attempt to refurbish the
center-left alliance, even though it would
face the same problems that forced the
early dissolution of the last parliament.
Putting the new government together may
not be completed until the major parties
have had a chance to sort out their.prob-
Zems at party congresses this summer. In
the interim, the Christian Democrats are
likely to rule as a minority government.
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NOTE
USSR-Cuba:
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